Part 55 (2/2)
The Philippine Archipelago is a military division under the supreme command of a Maj.-General. The commanders, since the taking of Manila (1898), have been successively Maj.-Generals Merritt, Otis, McArthur, Chaffee, Davis, Wade, Corbin, and Wood.
The Division is administratively subdivided into three departments, namely Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, the two former being commanded by Brig.-Generals and the last by a Maj.-General.
The _Department of Luzon_, headquarters at Manila, includes the following princ.i.p.al islands, viz. Luzon, Catanduanes, Romblon, Masbate, Marinduque, Mindoro, Sibuyan, Polillo, Ticao, Tablas, Lucbang, and Burias.
The _Department of Visayas_, headquarters at Yloilo, embraces the islands of Cebu, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Samar, and Bojol.
The _Department of Mindanao_, headquarters at Zamboanga, includes all the remaining islands of the Philippine Archipelago.
STATEMENT OF ARMY STRENGTH IN THE PHILIPPINES ON JUNE 30, 1904 [244]
Present Absent Present and Absent Officers. Troops. Officers. Troops. Officers. Troops.
General Officers 5 0 0 0 5 0 Gen. Staff Officers 45 0 4 0 49 0 Non-Com Officers at posts 0 109 0 0 0 109 Medical Department 93 919 10 0 103 919 [245]Contract Surgeons 63 0 22 0 85 0 [245]Contract Dental Surgeons 17 0 0 0 17 0 Engineers 25 395 1 7 26 402 Signal Corps 7 353 2 1 9 354 Ordnance Corps 2 49 0 2 2 51 Officers temporarily in the Division 33 0 0 0 33 0 Total Cavalry 172 2,903 27 32 199 2,935 Total Artillery 9 293 3 0 12 293 Total Infantry 356 7,020 78 70 434 7,090
Total American Forces 827 12,041 147 112 974 12,153 Philippine Scouts 77 4,565 23 413 100 4,978
Total Strength 904 16,606 170 525 1,074 17,131
Besides the American troops, there is a voluntary enlistment of Filipinos, forming the Philippine Scout Corps, a body of rural police supplementary to the constabulary, commanded by a major and 100 American first and second lieutenants. Until recently the troops were stationed over the Islands in 98 camps and garrison towns, as follows, viz.:--In the Department of Luzon 76, Visayas 8, and Mindanao 14; but this number is now considered unnecessarily large and is being reduced to effect economy.
The Army, Navy, and Philippine Scouts expenses are entirely defrayed by the United States Treasury. A military prison is established in the little Island of Malahi, in the Laguna de Bay, whence the escape of a prisoner is signalled by three shots from a cannon, and whoever captures him receives a $30-reward. As the original notice to this effect required the recovery of the prisoner ”alive or dead,” two armed natives went in pursuit of an American soldier. To be quite sure of their prey they adopted the safe course of killing him first. Such an unexpected interpretation of the notice as the grim spectacle of an American's head was naturally repugnant to the authorities, and the ”alive or dead” condition was thenceforth expunged.
CHAPTER XXIX
The Land of the Moros ”Allah Akbar!”
The Military Department of Mindanao comprises the large island of that name and the adjacent insular territories inhabited chiefly by Mahometans, called by the Christians _Moros_ (_vide_ p. 129, et seq.).
The natural features of these southern islands are, in general, similar to those of the other large islands of the Archipelago, but being peopled by races (exclusive of the settlers) of different habits, customs, religions, and languages, some aggressively savage and warlike, others more or less tractable, but all semi-civilized, the social aspect is so distinct from that of the islands inhabited by the Christian Filipinos as almost to appear like another quarter of the tropical globe.
Early in the year 1899 General John C. Bates was appointed to the command of the Mahometan islands. In Mindanao Island there was no supreme chieftain with whom to treat for the gradual introduction of civilization and American methods, the whole territory being parcelled out and ruled by petty Sultans, _Dattos_ or chiefs, in separate independence. In the Lake Lanao district, for instance, there is at least one _Datto_ for every 50 men. The only individual who had any pretence to general control of the Mahometan population was Hadji [246] Mohammad Jamalul Kiram, the Sultan of Sulu [247] (_vide_ p. 141). Therefore, in August, 1899, General Bates and this petty prince made an agreement which was ratified by Congress on February 1 following, on the recommendation of the Schurman Commission (_vide_ p. 562), and thenceforth came into force. The princ.i.p.al conditions of this convention were: (1) The Sultan's dignity and certain monopoly rights were recognized under American suzerainty. (2) An annual pension of 3,000 pesos was secured to him, and annual salaries ranging from 180 to 900 pesos were to be paid to eight of his _Dattos_ and one priest. (3) A Moro accused of crime was to be tried by a Moro judge, the maximum penalty for murder being fixed at 105 pesos (equal to about ten guineas), which was a fair price in this region, from the Moro point of view, for life here is held very cheap. (4) Absconding Americans or Sulus were to be mutually surrendered. (5) The Americans were (_a_) to protect the Sultan against encroachments by foreigners or European nations; (_b_) not to take arms against the Sulus without consulting the Sultan; (_c_) not to transfer their dominion over Jolo to others except in agreement with the Sultan; (_d_) to be at liberty to occupy any place in the Sultan's domains without trespa.s.sing on lands about the royal residence, except as a military necessity of war with a foreign Power; (_e_) not to interfere with the Mahometan religion, or its rites, or its customs; (_f_) not to travel about Sulu Island without the permission of the Sultan, who would provide an escort. (6) The American flag was to be used on land and at sea. (7) The Sulus were to be free to carry their native arms. (8) The Sultan was at liberty to collect tribute everywhere in his domains, and to have the right of direct intercourse with the American Gov.-General.
In consideration of the above, the Sultan undertook to maintain order between his _Dattos_, to repress internecine warfare, and gradually to abolish slavery throughout his jurisdiction.
Apparently the Sultan entered into the agreement much in the spirit of Mr. Micawber, who signed the I.O.U.'s and thanked G.o.d his debts were paid. The ruler of Sulu was not over-willing and far less able to give effect to its conditions, his power being more nominal than real in his own possessions, and in Mindanao almost _nil_. Nevertheless, it was a politic measure on the Americans'
part, because its non-fulfilment opened the way for the adoption, with every appearance of justification, of more direct and coercive intervention in the affairs of this region. General Bates was succeeded by other generals in the command of this district, without any very visible progress towards definite pacification and subjection to civilization. The military posts on the coasts, evacuated by the Spaniards, were occupied by American troops and new ones were created, but every attempt to establish law and order beyond their limits, on the white man's system, was wasted effort. When the Spanish-American War broke out, the Spanish military authorities were on the point of maturing a plan for the final conquest of Mindanao. Due to the persistent activity of my old friend General Gonzalez Parrado, they had already achieved much in the Lake Lanao district, through the Marahui campaign. On the evacuation of the Spaniards the unrestrained petty chiefs were like lions released from captivity. Blood-shed, oppression, extortion, and all the instinctive habits of the shrewd savage were again rife. A preconcerted plan of campaign brings little definite result; it never culminates in the attainment of any final issue, for, on the native side, there is neither union of tribes nor any combined organized attempt at even guerilla warfare, hence the destruction of a _cotta_ or the decimation of a clan has no immediate and lasting moral effect on the neighbouring warlike tribe. Life is cheap among them; a Moro thinks no more about lopping off another's head than he does about pulling a cocoanut from the palm-tree. The chief abhors the white man because he interferes with the chief's living by the labour of his tribe, and the tribesman himself is too ignorant even to contemplate emanc.i.p.ation. Subservience to the bidding of the wily _Datto_, poverty, squalidity, and tribal warfare for bravado or interest seem as natural to the Moro as the sight of the rising sun. Hence, when the Americans resolved to change all this and marched into the tribal territories for the purpose, the war-gongs rallied the fighting-men to resist the dreaded foe, unconscious of his mission of liberty under the star-spangled banner. The sorrows or the joys of one tribe are no concern of the other; thus there was seldom, if ever, any large combination of forces, and the Americans might be fighting hard in the Taraca country, or around the Lanao Lake, whilst the neighbouring clan silently and doggedly awaited its turn for hostilities. The signal for the fray would be the defiant reply of a chief to the Americans' message demanding submission, or a voluntary throwing down of the gauntlet to the invader, for the Moro is valiant, and knows no cringing cowardice before the enemy. Troops would be despatched to the _cotta_, or fortress, of the recalcitrant ruler, whence the _lantaca_ cannon would come into action, whilst the surging mob of warriors would open fire in squads, or rush forward in a body, _barong_ or kris in hand, only to be mown down, or put to flight and the _cotta_ razed to the ground. A detailed account of the military operations in these islands would be but a tedious recital of continuous struggles with the irresistible white man. In Mindanao, the Malanao tribes, occupying the northern regions around the Lake Lanao districts, seem to have offered the most tenacious resistance. On April 5, 1902, a fierce encounter with the Bacolod tribes ended with their fort being destroyed, 120 Moros killed, and 11 Americans wounded. In the following month the b.l.o.o.d.y battle of Bayan brought such disastrous results to the natives that they willingly accepted peace for the time being. In the Taraca River engagement, 10 _cottas_ were destroyed, 250 Moros were killed, 52 were taken prisoners, and the booty amounted to 36 cannon and 60 rifles. The Moros possessed a large number of Remington rifles, looted from the Spaniards, on whom they had often made surprise raids. The Bacolod and the Taraca tribes, although frequently defeated, gave much trouble long after the other districts had been forced into submission.
One of the most exciting expeditions was that of Lieutenant Forsyth, who went out reconnoitring with 15 men, marching from Parang-Parang Camp northwards. Moros came to meet him on the way to warn him not to advance, but Forsyth bravely pushed on until his party, surrounded by hundreds of hostile natives, was almost all destroyed. Forsyth and his fellow-survivors fled into an unknown region, where they lost themselves, and all would have perished had they not been befriended by a _Datto_ who enabled them to get back. Then Colonel (now Brig.-General) F. D. Baldwin set out from Malabang Camp in May, attacked and captured the _cottas_ of the Datto of Binadayan and the Sultan of Bayan on Lake Lanao, and gained a signal victory over them with a loss of seven killed and 44 wounded. Lieutenant Forsyth's horses and rifles were recovered, and the Moros suffered so severely in this engagement that it was hardly thought they would rise again. In consequence of this humiliation of the great Sultan of Bayan, many minor Lake _Dattos_ voluntarily cultivated friendly relations with the Americans. Even among the recalcitrant chiefs there was a lull in their previous activity until they suddenly swept down on the American troops twelve times in succession, killing four and wounding 12 of them. The whole Lanao Lake district was in a ferment when, on September 28, 1902, Captain John J. Pers.h.i.+ng was detached from Baldwin's force to lead another expedition against them ”composed of a battalion of the 7th Infantry, a troop of the 15th Cavalry, and two platoons of the 25th Field Artillery.” [248] Pers.h.i.+ng inflicted such a crus.h.i.+ng defeat on the Macui Moros, destroying many of their strongholds, one Sultan and a large number of his warriors, that he was hailed with delight as the pacifier of Mindanao. The expedition returned with a total loss of only two Americans wounded, and after Pers.h.i.+ng's heroic exploit, not only was it in the mouth of every one, ”there is peace in Mindanao,” but in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, p. 19, there is a paragraph beginning thus:--”_Now that the insurrection has been disposed of_ we shall be able to turn our attention, not merely to the slave trade, but to the already existing slavery among the Moros.” But peace was by no means a.s.sured, and again Captain J. J. Pers.h.i.+ng distinguished himself as the successful leader of an expedition in the Marahui district. Starting from Camp Vicars [249] on April 5, 1903, with 150 men, Maxim guns, mortars, and artillery, his instructions were to ”explore” the north and west coast of Lake Lanao, but to overcome any opposition offered. It was quite expected that his progress would be challenged, hence the warlike preparations. Arrived at Sugud, the Moros kept up a constant fire from the hills on the American front. On the high ridge running down to the lake the Bacolod fort was clearly seen flying the battle flags of defiance. On the battlements there was a yelling crowd of Moros beating their gongs, rus.h.i.+ng to and fro, flouris.h.i.+ng their weapons, and firing their _lantaca_ cannon towards the Americans; but the range was too great to have any effect. The artillery was brought into action, forcing many of the Moros to try their fortunes in the open; but again and again they were repulsed, and by nightfall the Bacolod ridge was occupied by the troops. The next morning the mortars were brought into play, and sh.e.l.ls were dropped into the fort during all that day and night. On the third day Captain Pers.h.i.+ng decided to storm the fort; bridges were constructed across the ravines, Maxim guns poured shot through the loopholes, and finally an a.s.sault party of 10 men rushed across the bridge and climbed the parapet, where they were met by the Moros, with whom they had a desperate hand-to-hand fight. It was a fine display of American pluck. The attacking party was quickly supported by more troops, who either killed or captured the defenders. Finally all the combustible portion of the fort was burnt to the ground, 12 cannon were captured, and about 60 Moros were slain. The demolition of Bacolod fort was a great surprise to the Moros, who had considered it impregnable, whilst the defeat of the savage Sultan (the _Panandungan_) destroyed for ever his former unlimited prestige among the tribe. The force was then divided, and before the troops reached camp again there were several smaller fights, including the bombardment of Calahui _cotta_. The distance traversed by this expedition was about 80 miles, the American losses being one man killed and two officers and 14 men wounded. For this signal victory the War Department cabled its thanks to Captain J. J. Pers.h.i.+ng on May 11.
As to the management of the Moros, Captain J. J. Pers.h.i.+ng expresses the following just opinion, viz.:--”As far as is consistent with advancement, a government by a Sultan, or a _Datto_, as the case may be, should be disturbed as little as possible; that is, the people should be managed through the _Dattos_ themselves,” etc. [250]
The last general in command of the District of Mindanao, prior to the present const.i.tution of the Moro Province, was Brig.-General Samuel Sumner, who, just before his departure therefrom, wrote as follows, viz.:--”Murder and robbery will take place as long as we are in the country, at least for years to come. The Moro is a savage, and has no idea of law and order _as we understand it_. _Anarchy_ practically prevails throughout the region. To take power and control away from the Sultans and _Dattos_ until we can inaugurate and put in force a better government would add to the confusion already existing.” [251]
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