Part 50 (1/2)

_Article_ 13.--The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

_Article_ 14.--Spain will have the power to establish Consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

_Article_ 15.--The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other.

_Article_ 16.--It is understood that any obligations a.s.sumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the Island to a.s.sume the same obligations.

_Article_ 17.--The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen-Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Was.h.i.+ngton within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1898.

_William R. Day_.

_Cushman K. Davis_.

_William P. Frye_.

_Geo. Gray_.

_Whitelaw Reid_.

_Eugenio Montero Rios_.

_B. de Abarzuza_.

_J. de Garnica_.

_W. R. de Villa-Urrutia_.

_Rafael Cerero_.

Two years afterwards a supplementary treaty was made between the United States and Spain, whereby the Islands of Cagayan de Jolo, Sibutu, and other islets not comprised in the demarcation set forth in the Treaty of Paris, were ceded to the United States for the sum of $100,000 gold. These small islands had, apparently, been overlooked when the Treaty of Paris was concluded.

CHAPTER XXIV

An Outline of the War of Independence, Period 1899-1901

”I speak not of forcible annexation because that is not to be thought of, and under our code of morality that would be criminal aggression.”--_President McKinley's Message to Congress_; _December_, 1897.

”The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana by purchase, or Texas or Alaska.”--_President McKinley's Speech to the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment; August_ 28, 1899.

_Ignorance_ of the world's ways, beyond the Philippine sh.o.r.es, was the cause of the Aguinaldo party's first disappointment. A score of pamphlets has been published to show how thoroughly the Filipinos believed America's mission to these Islands to be solely prompted by a compa.s.sionate desire to aid them in their struggle for immediate sovereign independence. Laudatory and congratulatory speeches, uttered in British colonies, in the presence of American officials, and hope-inspiring expressions which fell from their lips before Aguinaldo's return to Cavite from exile, strengthened that conviction. Sympathetic avowals and grandiloquent phrases, such as ”for the sake of humanity,” and ”the cause of civilization,” which were so freely bandied about at the time by unauthorized Americans, drew Aguinaldo into the error of believing that some sort of bond really existed between the United States and the Philippine Revolutionary Party. In truth, there was no agreement between America and the Filipinos. There was no American plenipotentiary empowered to make any political compact with the Islanders. At that date there was neither a Philippine policy nor any fixed programme regarding the future disposal of the Islands, and whatever naval, military, or other officers might have said to Aguinaldo was said on their own private responsibility, and could in no way affect the action of the American Government. Without any training in or natural bent for diplomacy, Aguinaldo had not the faintest idea of what foreign ”protection”

signified. He thought that after the capture of Manila the Americans would sail away and leave the Filipinos to themselves, and only reappear if any other Power interfered with their native government.

Admiral Dewey had a double task to perform. He had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and to co-operate in the taking of Manila. In the destruction of the fleet the att.i.tude of the natives was of little concern to him. In the taking of the capital it was important to know what part the natives would play. It was certain they would not be placid spectators of the struggle, wherever Aguinaldo might be. If they _must_ enter into it, it was desirable to have them led by one who could control them and repress excesses. It would have been better for the Americans if, pending the issue with the Spaniards, no third party had existed; but, as it did exist, both contending nations were anxious for its goodwill or its control. Therefore Admiral Dewey's recognition of Aguinaldo as a factor in the hostilities was nothing more nor less than a legitimate stratagem to facilitate his operations against the Spaniards. Dewey simply neutralized a possible adverse force by admissible military artifice, and Aguinaldo was too ingenuous to see that he was being outwitted. The fighting section of the Filipinos was intensely irritated at not having been allowed to enter and sack the capital. They had looked forward to it as the crowning act of victory. The general ma.s.s of the christianized Islanders hoped that Philippine independence would immediately follow the capitulation of Manila, although, in the capital itself, natives of position and property evinced little enthusiasm for the insurgents' triumph, whilst some inwardly doubted it. In September a native lawyer, Felipe Agoncillo, was sent to Was.h.i.+ngton to lay the Filipinos' case before the President in the hope of gaining his personal support of their claims (_vide_ p. 472). The first fear was that the Colony might revert to Spain, but that idea was soon dispelled by the news of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. Simultaneously Aguinaldo's revolutionary army was being pushed farther and farther away from the capital, and it was evident, from the mood of his fighting-men, that if the Americans remained in possession of the Colony, hostilities, sooner or later, must break out. The Americans officially ignored the Aguinaldo party as a factor in public affairs, but they were not unaware of the warlike preparations being made. Secret anti-American meetings were held at places called clubs, where it was agreed to attack simultaneously the Americans inside and outside the capital. General Pio del Pilar slept in the city every night, ready to give the rocket-signal for revolt. Natives between 18 and 40 years of age were being recruited for military service, according to a Malolos Government decree dated September 21, 1898. In every smithy and factory bowie-knives were being forged with all speed, and 10,000 men were already armed with them. General E. S. Otis was willing to confer with Aguinaldo, and six sessions were held, the last taking place on January 29, six days before the outbreak. Nothing resulted from these conferences, the Americans alleging that Aguinaldo would make no definite statement of his people's aims, whilst the Filipinos declare that their intentions were so well understood by the American general that he would listen to nothing short of unconditional submission.