Part 3 (1/2)

The dilemma now confronting Was.h.i.+ngton was hydra-headed. Either way it was serious. On one side New England lay open to the enemy, on the other New Jersey. And an advance was also threatened from the North. If he stayed where he was, the enemy would overrun New Jersey at will. Should he move his army into New Jersey, Howe could easily cut off its communications with New England, the chief resource for men and munitions. Of course this was not to be thought of. On the other hand, the conquest of New Jersey, with Philadelphia as the ultimate prize, in all probability would be Howe's next object. At the present moment there was nothing to prevent his marching to Philadelphia, arms at ease. To think of fighting in the open field was sheer folly. And there was not one fortified position between the Hudson and the Delaware where the enemy's triumphal march might be stayed.

Forced by these adverse circ.u.mstances to attempt much more than twice his present force would have encouraged the hope of doing successfully, Was.h.i.+ngton decided that he must place himself between the enemy and Philadelphia, and at the same time hold fast to his communications with New England and the upper Hudson. This could only be done by dividing his greatly weakened forces into two corps, one of which should attempt the difficult task of checking the enemy in the Jerseys, while the other held a strong position on the Hudson, until Howe's purposes should be more fully developed. With Was.h.i.+ngton it was no longer a choice of evils, but a stern obedience to imperative necessity.

[Sidenote: The army divided.]

[Sidenote: Was.h.i.+ngton in New Jersey.]

Lee was now put in command of the corps left to watch Howe's movement east of the Hudson, loosely estimated at 5,000 men, and ordered back behind the Croton. Heath, with 2,000 men of his division, was ordered to Peekskill, to guard the pa.s.ses of the Highlands, these two corps being thus posted within supporting distance. With the other corps of 4,000 men Was.h.i.+ngton crossed into New Jersey, going into camp in the neighborhood of Fort Lee, where Greene's small force was united with his own command.[1] Orders were also despatched to Ticonderoga, to forward at once all troops to the main army that could be spared. Fort Lee had thus become the last rallying-point for the troops under Was.h.i.+ngton's immediate command, and in that sense, also, a menace to the full and free control of the lower Hudson, which the guns of the fort in part commanded at its narrowest point. Howe determined to brush away this last obstruction without delay.

[Sidenote: Fort Lee taken.]

Regarding Fort Lee as no longer serving any important purpose, perhaps foreseeing that it would soon be attacked, Was.h.i.+ngton was getting ready to evacuate it, when on the night of November 19[2] Lord Cornwallis made a sudden dash across to the New Jersey side, pa.s.sing Fort Lee unperceived, landed a little above the fort at a place that had strangely been left unguarded, climbed the heights unmolested, and was only prevented from making prisoners of the whole garrison by its hurried retreat across the Hackensack. Everything in the fort, even to the kettles in which the men were cooking their breakfasts, was lost.

As regards any further attempt to stay the tide of defeat, all was now over. The enemy had obtained a secure foothold on the Jersey sh.o.r.e from which to march across the State, when and how he pleased. Unpalatable as the admission may be, the fact remains that the Americans had been everywhere out-generaled and out-fought. Nearly everything in the way of war material had been lost in the hurried evacuation of New York.[3]

Confidence had been lost. Prestige had been lost. Clearly it was high time to turn over a new leaf. With this lame affair the first division of the disastrous campaign of 1776 properly closes, and the second properly begins. It had been watched with alternate hope, doubt, and despondency. Excuses are never wanting to bolster up failing reputations. The generals said they had no soldiers, the soldiers declared they had no generals; the people hung their heads and were silent.

[Ill.u.s.tration: AMERICAN POSITION BEHIND THE HACKENSACK.]

Footnotes:

[1] The Eastern troops remained on the east bank of the Hudson, under Lee's command, while those belonging to the Middle and Southern colonies crossed the Hudson with Was.h.i.+ngton. This disposition may have been brought about by the belief that the soldiers of each section would fight best on their own ground, but the fact is notorious that a most bitter animosity had grown up between them.

[2] This movement is a.s.signed to the 18th by Gordon and those who have followed him. The 19th is the date given by Captain Harris, who was with the expedition.

[3] An enumeration of these losses will be found in Gordon's _American Revolution_, Vol. II., p. 360.

VI

THE RETREAT THROUGH THE JERSEYS

It was now the 20th of November. In a few weeks more, at farthest, the season for active campaigning would be over. Thus far delay had been the only thing that the Americans had gained; but at what a cost! Yet Was.h.i.+ngton's last hopes were of necessity pinned to it, because the respite it promised was the only means of bringing another army into the field in season to renew the contest, if indeed it should be renewed at all.

[Sidenote: Strength of the army.]

[Sidenote: State of public feeling.]

Losses in battle, by sickness or desertion, or other causes, had brought his dismembered forces down to a total of 10,000 men, of whom 3,500 only were now under his immediate command, the rest being with Lee and Heath.

And the work of disintegration was steadily going on. Always hopeful so long as there was even a straw to cling to, Was.h.i.+ngton seems to have expected that the people of New Jersey would have flown to arms, upon hearing that the invader had actually set foot upon the soil of their State. Vain hope! His appeal had fallen flat. The great and rich State of Pennsylvania was nearly, if not quite, as unresponsive. Disguise it as we may, the fire of '76 seemed all but extinct on its very earliest altars, and in its stead only a few sickly embers glowed here and there among its ashes. The futility of further resistance was being openly discussed, and submission seemed only one step farther off.

In one of his desponding moments Was.h.i.+ngton turned to his old comrade, Mercer, with the question, ”What think you, if we should retreat to the back parts of Pennsylvania, would the Pennsylvanians support us?”

Though himself a Pennsylvanian by adoption, Mercer's answer was given with true soldierly frankness. ”If the lower counties give up, the back counties will do the same,” was his discouraging reply.

”We must then retire to Augusta County in Virginia,” said Was.h.i.+ngton, with grave decision, ”and if overpowered there, we must cross the Alleghanies.”