Part 8 (2/2)
The principle is a.n.a.logous to that employed in the investigation of sources. The details of a social fact are so manifold, and there are so many different ways of looking at the same fact, that two independent observers cannot possibly give completely coincident accounts; if two statements present the same details in the same order, they must be derived from a common observation; different observations are bound to diverge somewhere. We may often apply an _a priori_ principle: if the fact was of such a nature that it could only be observed or reported by a single observer, then all the accounts of it must be derived from a single observation. These principles[174] enable us to recognise many cases of different observations, and still more numerous cases of observations being reproduced.
There remains a great number of doubtful cases. The natural tendency is to treat them as if they were cases of independent observation. But the scientific procedure would be the exact reverse of this: as long as the statements are not proved to be independent we have no right to a.s.sume that their agreement is conclusive.
It is only after we have determined the relations between the different statements that we can begin to count them and examine into their agreement. Here again we have to distrust the first impulse; the kind of agreement which is really conclusive is not, as one would naturally imagine, a perfect similarity between two narratives, but an occasional coincidence between two narratives which only partially resemble each other. The natural tendency is to think that the closer the agreement is, the greater is its demonstrative power; we ought, on the contrary, to adopt as a rule the paradox that an agreement proves more when it is confined to a small number of circ.u.mstances. It is at such points of coincidence between diverging statements that we are to look for scientifically established historical facts.
(2) Before drawing any conclusions it remains to make sure whether the _different_ observations of the same fact are entirely _independent_; for it is possible that one may have influenced another to such a degree that their agreement is inconclusive. We have to guard against the following cases:--
(_a_) The different observations have been made by the same author, who has recorded them either in the same or in different doc.u.ments; special reasons must then be had before it can be a.s.sumed that the author really made the observation afresh, and did not content himself with merely repeating a single observation.
(_b_) There were several observers, but they commissioned one of their number to write a single doc.u.ment. We have to ascertain whether the doc.u.ment merely gives the statements of the writer, or whether the other observers checked his work.
(_c_) Several observers recorded their observations in different doc.u.ments, but under similar conditions. We must apply the list of critical questions in order to ascertain whether they were not all subject to the same influences, predisposing to falsehood or error; whether, for example, they had a common interest, a common vanity, or common prejudices.
The only observations which are certainly independent are those which are contained in different doc.u.ments, written by different authors, who belonged to different groups, and worked under different conditions.
Cases of perfectly conclusive agreement are thus rare, except in reference to modern periods.
The possibility of proving an historical fact depends on the number of independent doc.u.ments relating to it which have been preserved, and the preservation of the doc.u.ments is a matter of chance; this explains the share which chance has in the formation of historical science.
The facts which it is possible to establish are chiefly those which cover a large extent of s.p.a.ce or time (sometimes called _general_ facts), customs, doctrines, inst.i.tutions, great events; they were easier to observe than the others, and are now easier to prove. Historical method is not, however, essentially powerless to establish facts of short duration and limited extent (those which are called _particular facts_), such as a saying, a momentary act. It is enough that several persons should have been present when the fact occurred, that they should have recorded it, and that their writings should have come down to us. We know what were the words which Luther uttered at the Diet of Worms; we know that he did not say what tradition puts in his mouth.
This concurrence of favourable conditions becomes more and more frequent with the organisation of newspapers, of shorthand writers, and of depositories of doc.u.ments.
In the case of antiquity and the middle ages historical knowledge is limited to general facts by the scarcity of doc.u.ments. In dealing with contemporary history it is possible to include more and more particular facts. The general public supposes the opposite of this; it is suspicious about contemporary facts, with reference to which it sees contradictory narratives circulating, and believes without hesitation ancient facts, which it does not see contradicted anywhere. Its confidence is at its greatest in respect of that history which we have not the means of knowing, and its scepticism increases with the means of knowledge.
VI. _Agreement between doc.u.ments_ leads to conclusions which are not all of them definitive. In order to complete and rectify our conclusions we have still to study _the harmony of the facts_.
Several facts which, taken in isolation, are only imperfectly proved, may confirm each other in such a manner as to produce a collective certainty. The facts which the doc.u.ments present in isolation have sometimes been in reality sufficiently near each other to be connected.
Of this kind are the successive actions of the same man or of the same group of men, the habits of the same group at different epochs separated by short intervals, or of similar groups at the same epoch. It is no doubt possible that one of several a.n.a.logous facts may be true and another false; the certainty of the first does not justify the categorical a.s.sertion of the second. But yet the harmony of several such facts, each proved imperfectly, yields a kind of certainty; the facts do not, in the strict sense of the word, prove, but they _confirm_[175]
each other. The doubt which attached to each one of them disappears; we obtain that species of certainty which is produced by the interconnection of facts. Thus the comparison of conclusions which are separately doubtful yields a whole which is morally certain. In an itinerary of a sovereign, the days and the places confirm each other when they harmonize so as to form a coherent whole. An inst.i.tution or a popular usage is established by the harmony of accounts, each of which is no more than probable, relating to different times and places.
This method is a difficult one to apply. The notion of harmony is a much vaguer one than that of agreement. We cannot a.s.sign any precise general rules for distinguis.h.i.+ng facts which are sufficiently connected to form a whole, the harmony of whose parts would be conclusive; nor can we determine beforehand the duration and extent of that which may be taken to form a whole. Facts separated by half a century of time and a hundred leagues of s.p.a.ce may confirm each other in such a way as to establish a popular usage (for example, among the ancient Germans); but they would prove nothing if they were taken from a heterogeneous society subject to rapid evolution (take, for example, French society in 1750, and again in 1800, in Alsace and in Provence). Here we have to study the relation between the facts. This brings us to the beginnings of historical construction; here is the transition from a.n.a.lytical to synthetic operations.
VII. But it remains to consider cases of discordance between facts established by doc.u.ments and other facts established by other methods.
It happens sometimes that a fact obtained as an historical conclusion is in contradiction with a body of known historical facts, or with the sum of our knowledge of humanity founded on direct observation, or with a scientific law established by the regular method of an established science. In the first two cases the fact is only in conflict with history, psychology, or sociology, all imperfectly established sciences; we then simply call the fact _improbable_. If it is in conflict with a true science it becomes a _miracle_. What are we to do with an improbable or miraculous fact? Are we to admit it after examination of the doc.u.ments, or are we to pa.s.s on and shelve the question?
_Improbability_ is not a scientific notion; it varies with the individual. Each person finds improbable what he is not accustomed to see: a peasant would think the telephone much more improbable than a ghost; a king of Siam refused to believe in the existence of ice. It is important to know who precisely it is to whom the fact appears to be improbable. Is it to the ma.s.s who have no scientific culture? For these, science is more improbable than miracle, physiology than spiritualism; their notions of improbability are worthless. Is it to the man who possesses scientific culture? If so, we have to deal with that which seems improbable to a scientific mind, and it would be more accurate to say that the fact is contrary to the results of science--that there is disagreement between the direct observations of men of science and the indirect testimony of the doc.u.ments.
How is this conflict to be decided? The question has no great practical interest; nearly all the doc.u.ments which relate miraculous facts are already open to suspicion on other grounds, and would be discarded by a sound criticism. But the question of miracles has raised such pa.s.sions that it may be well to indicate how it affects the historian.[176]
The general tendency to believe in the marvellous has filled with miraculous facts the doc.u.ments of nearly every people. Historically the existence of the devil is much better proved than that of Pisistratus: there has not been preserved a single word of a contemporary of Pisistratus saying that he has seen him; thousands of ”ocular witnesses”
declare they have seen the devil; few historical facts have been established by so great a number of independent testimonies. However, we do not hesitate to reject the devil and to accept Pisistratus. For the existence of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of all the established sciences.
For the historian the solution of the problem is obvious.[177] The observations whose results are contained in historical doc.u.ments are never of equal value with those of contemporary scientists; we have already shown why. The indirect method of history is always inferior to the direct methods of the sciences of observation. If its results do not harmonise with theirs, it is history which must give way; historical science, with its imperfect means of information, cannot claim to check, contradict, or correct the results of other sciences, but must rather use their results to correct its own. The progress of the direct sciences sometimes modifies the results of historical interpretation; a fact established by direct observation aids in the comprehension and criticism of doc.u.ments. Cases of stigmata and nervous anaesthesia which have been scientifically observed have led to the admission as true of historical narratives of a.n.a.logous facts, as in the case of the stigmata of certain saints and the possessed nuns of Loudun. But history cannot aid the progress of the direct sciences. It is kept at a distance from reality by its indirect means of information, and must accept the laws that are established by those sciences which come into immediate contact with reality. In order to reject one of these laws new direct observations are necessary. Such revolutions are possible, but they must be brought about from within. History has no power to take the initiative in them.
The solution is not so clear in the case of facts which do not harmonise with a body of historical knowledge or with the sciences, still in the embryonic stage, which deal with man. It depends on the opinion we form as to the value of such knowledge. We can at least lay down the practical rule that in order to contradict history, psychology, or sociology, we must have very strong doc.u.ments, and this is a case which hardly ever occurs.
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