Part 24 (1/2)
[Sidenote: New England disaffected.]
As at New Orleans, so throughout the war, the greater part of the fighting was done by State militia hastily a.s.sembled, imperfectly disciplined, and serving only for short terms. From the beginning, however, the New England States had refused to furnish militia on the call of the general government. They did not interfere with volunteer recruiting, and Ma.s.sachusetts alone supplied as many troops as came from Virginia and North and South Carolina; but they declined officially to take part in offensive military operations. The war was very unpopular to the New Englanders because of the great losses to their commerce, and because they paid more than half the expense; nor had New England any sympathy with that invasion of Canada which was so popular in the West.
[Sidenote: Militia refused.]
As soon as war broke out, the Secretary of War authorized General Dearborn to summon twenty thousand militia from the New England States. Care was taken in sending the call to ask for small detachments of the militia, so as to rid the United States of the general militia officers appointed by the States. The result of these combined causes was that the Governor of Connecticut refused to send militia, declaring that he must ”yield obedience to the paramount authority of the Const.i.tution and the laws.”
The Ma.s.sachusetts House voted that the ”war is a wanton sacrifice of our best interests;” and the Governor of Ma.s.sachusetts informed the President that since there was no invasion, there was no const.i.tutional reason for sending the militia. New Hamps.h.i.+re took similar ground, and the governor of Rhode Island congratulated the legislature on the possession of two cannon, with which that State might defend itself against an invader. On Nov. 10, 1813, Governor Chittenden of Vermont ordered the recall of a brigade which had been summoned outside the boundary of the State, declaring it to be his opinion that ”the military strength and resources of this State must be reserved for its own defence and protection exclusively.”
[Sidenote: National government hampered.]
[Sidenote: New England attacked.]
The general government had no means of enforcing its construction of the Const.i.tution. It did, however, withdraw garrisons from the New England forts, leaving those States to defend themselves; and refused to send them their quota of the arms which were distributed among the States. This att.i.tude was so well understood that during the first few months of the war English cruisers had orders not to capture vessels owned in New England. As the war advanced, these orders were withdrawn, and the territory of Ma.s.sachusetts in the District of Maine was invaded by British troops. An urgent call for protection was then made upon the general government; but even in this crisis Ma.s.sachusetts would not permit her militia to pa.s.s under the control of national military officers.
115. SECESSION MOVEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND (1814).
[Sidenote: Federalist successes.]
[Sidenote: Opposition to the war.]
More positive and more dangerous opposition had been urged in New England from the beginning of the war. Besides the sacrifice of men, Ma.s.sachusetts furnished more money for the war than Virginia. In the elections of 1812 and 1813 the Federalists obtained control of every New England State government, and secured most of the New England members of Congress. The temper of this Federalist majority may be seen in a succession of addresses and speeches in the Ma.s.sachusetts legislature. On June 15, 1813, Josiah Quincy offered a resolution that ”in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea-coast and soil.” As the pressure of the war grew heavier, the tone in New England grew sterner. On Feb. 18, 1814, a report was made to the Ma.s.sachusetts legislature containing a declaration taken almost literally from Madison's Virginia Resolution of 1798 (-- 90), that ”whenever the national compact is violated, and the citizens of the State oppressed by cruel and unauthorized laws, this legislature is bound to interpose its power and wrest from the oppressor his victim.”
[Sidenote: Impotence of Congress.]
[Sidenote: Resistance threatened.]
The success of the British attacks in August and September, 1814, seemed to indicate the failure of the war. Congress met on September 19 to confront the growing danger: but it refused to authorize a new levy of troops; it refused to accept a proposition for a new United States Bank; it consented with reluctance to new taxes. The time seemed to have arrived when the protests of New England against the continuance of the war might be made effective. The initiative was taken by Ma.s.sachusetts, which, on October 16 voted to raise a million dollars to support a State army of ten thousand troops, and to ask the other New England States to meet in convention.
[Sidenote: A convention called.]
On Dec. 15, 1814, delegates a.s.sembled at Hartford from Ma.s.sachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, with unofficial representatives from New Hamps.h.i.+re and Vermont. The head of the Ma.s.sachusetts delegation was George Cabot, who had been chosen because of his known opposition to the secession of that State. As he said himself: ”We are going to keep you young hot-heads from getting into mischief.” The expectation throughout the country was that the Hartford convention would recommend secession, Jefferson wrote: ”Some apprehend danger from the defection of Ma.s.sachusetts. It is a disagreeable circ.u.mstance, but not a dangerous one.
If they become neutral, we are sufficient for one enemy without them; and, in fact, we get no aid from them now.”
[Sidenote: Hartford Convention.]
[Sidenote: Secession impending.]
After a session of three weeks, the Hartford Convention adjourned, Jan.
14, 1815, and published a formal report. They declared that the Const.i.tution had been violated, and that ”States which have no common umpire must be their own judges and execute their own decisions.” They submitted a list of amendments to the Const.i.tution intended to protect a minority of States from aggressions on the part of the majority. Finally they submitted, as their ultimatum, that they should be allowed to retain the proceeds of the national customs duties collected within their borders. Behind the whole doc.u.ment was the implied intention to withdraw from the Union if this demand were not complied with. To comply was to deprive the United States of its financial power, and was virtually a dissolution of the const.i.tution. The delegates who were sent to present this powerful remonstrance to Congress were silenced by the news that peace had been declared.
116. THE PEACE OF GHENT (1812-1814).
[Sidebar: Russian mediation.]
[Sidebar: American commissioners sent.]
Three months after the war broke out, the Russian government had offered mediation; it regretted to see the strength of the English allies wasted in a minor contest with America. Madison eagerly seized this opportunity, and on May 9, 1813, Gallatin and Bayard were sent as special commissioners. On arriving in Russia they found that the British government had refused the offer of mediation. The immediate effect was to take Gallatin out of the Treasury, and he was followed by Secretary Campbell, to whose incompetence the financial impotence of the war is partly due. Toward the end of 1813 an offer of direct negotiation was made by the British government, and John Quincy Adams, Jonathan Russell, and Henry Clay were added to the negotiators. The absence of Clay, who had exercised such influence as Speaker of the House, accounts for the apathy of Congress in 1814.
[Sidebar: The effect of European peace.]
[Sidenote: Impressment.]