Part 20 (2/2)

When he went to the Foreign Office it was always on business. He did not flatter and praise, bow and chat or speak to Excellencies in the third person as European representatives usually do. Gerard began at the beginning of the war a policy of keeping the United States fully informed regarding Germany. He used to report daily the political developments and the press comment, and the keen understanding which he had of German methods was proved by his many forecasts of important developments. Last September he predicted, in a message to the State Department, ruthless submarine warfare before Spring unless peace was made. He notified Was.h.i.+ngton last October to watch for German intrigue in Mexico and said that unless we solved the problem there we might have trouble throughout the war from Germans south of the Rio Grande.

[Ill.u.s.tration: AMBa.s.sADOR GERARD ARRIVING IN PARIS]

During the submarine controversies, when reports reached Berlin that the United States was divided and would not support President Wilson in his submarine policy, Amba.s.sador Gerard did everything he could to give the opposite impression. He tried his best to keep Germany from driving the United States into the war. That he did not succeed was not the fault of _his_ efforts. Germany was desperate and willing to disregard all nations and all international obligations in an attempt to win the war with U-boats.

Last Summer, during one of the crises over the sinking of a pa.s.senger liner without warning, Mr. Gerard asked the Chancellor for an audience with the Kaiser. Von Bethmann-Hollweg said he would see if it could be arranged. The Amba.s.sador waited two weeks. Nothing was done. From his friends in Berlin he learned that the Navy was opposed to such a conference and would not give its consent. Mr. Gerard went to Herr von Jagow who was then Secretary of State and again asked for an audience.

He waited another week. Nothing happened and Mr. Gerard wrote the following note to the Chancellor:

”Your Excellency,

”Three weeks ago I asked for an audience with His Majesty the Kaiser.

”A week ago I repeated the request.

”Please do not trouble yourself further.

”Respectfully,

”JAMES W. GERARD.”

The Amba.s.sador called the Emba.s.sy messenger and sent the note to the Chancellor's palace. Three hours later he was told that von Bethmann-Hollweg had gone to Great Headquarters to arrange for the meeting.

Sometimes in dealing with the Foreign Office the Amba.s.sador used the same rough-shod methods which made the Big Stick effective during the Roosevelt Administration. At one time, Alexander Cochran, of New York, acted as special courier from the Emba.s.sy in London to Berlin. At the frontier he was arrested and imprisoned. The Amba.s.sador heard of it, went to the Foreign Office and demanded Cochran's immediate release.

The Amba.s.sador had obtained Mr. Cochran's pa.s.sports, and showed them to the Secretary of State. When Herr von Jagow asked permission to retain one of the pa.s.sports so the matter could be investigated, the Amba.s.sador said:

”All right, but first let me tear Lansing's signature off the bottom, or some one may use the pa.s.sport for other purposes.”

The Amba.s.sador was not willing to take chances after it was learned and proved by the State Department that Germany was using American pa.s.sports for spy purposes.

In one day alone, last fall, the American Emba.s.sy sent 92 notes to the Foreign Office, some authorised by Was.h.i.+ngton and some unauthorised, protesting against unlawful treatment of Americans, asking for reforms in prison camps, transmitting money and letters about German affairs in Entente countries, and other matters which were under discussion between Berlin and Was.h.i.+ngton. At one time an American woman instructor in Roberts' College was arrested at Warnemuende and kept for weeks from communicating with the Amba.s.sador. When he heard of it he went to the Foreign Office daily, demanding her release, which he finally secured.

Mr. Gerard's work in bettering conditions in prison camps, especially at Ruhleben, will be long remembered. When conditions were at their worst he went out daily to keep himself informed, and then daily went to the Foreign Office or wrote to the Ministry of War in an effort to get better accommodations for the men. One day he discovered eleven prominent English civilians, former respected residents in Berlin, living in a box stall similar to one which his riding horse had occupied in peace times. This so aroused the Amba.s.sador that he volunteered to furnish funds for the construction of a new barracks in case the Government was not willing to do it. But the Foreign Office and the War Ministry and other officials s.h.i.+fted authority so often that it was impossible to get changes made. The Amba.s.sador decided to have his reports published in a drastic effort to gain relief for the prisoners. The State Department granted the necessary authority and his descriptions of Ruhleben were published in the United States and England, arousing such a world-wide storm of indignation that the German Government changed the prison conditions and made Ruhleben fit for men for the first time since the beginning of the war.

This activity of the Amba.s.sador aroused a great deal of bitterness and the Government decided to try to have him recalled. The press censors.h.i.+p instigated various newspapers to attack the Amba.s.sador so that Germany might be justified in asking for his recall, but the attack failed for the simple reason that there was no evidence against the Amba.s.sador except that he had been too vigorous in insisting upon livable prison camp conditions.

I have pointed out in previous chapters some of the things which President Wilson's notes accomplished in Germany during the war.

Suppose the Kaiser were to grant certain reforms, would this destroy the possibilities of a free Germany, a democratic nation--a German Republic!

The German people were given an opportunity to debate and think about international issues while we maintained relations with Berlin, but as I pointed out, the Kaiser and his a.s.sociates are masters of German psychology and during the next few months they may temporarily undo what we accomplished during two years. Americans must remember that at the present time all the leading men of Germany are preaching to the people the gospel of submarine success, and the anti-American campaign there is being conducted unhindered and unchallenged. The United States and the Allies have pledged their national honour and existence to defeat and discredit the Imperial German Government and nothing but unfaltering determination, no matter what the Kaiser does, will bring success. Unless he is defeated, the Kaiser will not follow the Czar's example.

In May of this year the German Government believed it was winning the war. Berlin believed it would decisively defeat our Allies before Fall. But even if the people of Germany again compel their Government to propose peace and the Kaiser announces that he is in favour of such drastic reforms as making his Ministry responsible to the Reichstag, this (though it might please the German people) cannot, must not, satisfy us. Only a firm refusal of the Allies will accomplish what we have set out to do--overthrow the present rulers and dictators of Germany. This must include not only the Kaiser but Field Marshal von Hindenburg and the generals in control of the army, the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, who did not keep his promises to the United States and the naval leaders who have been intriguing and fighting for war with America for over two years. Only a decisive defeat of Germany will make Germany a republic, and the task is stupendous enough to challenge the best combined efforts of the United States and all the Allies.

Prophecy is a dangerous pastime but it would not be fair to conclude this book without pointing out some of the possibilities which can develop from the policy which President Wilson pursued in dealing with Germany before diplomatic relations were broken.

The chief effect of Mr. Wilson's policy is not going to be felt during this war, but in the future. At the beginning of his administration he emphasised the fact that in a democracy public opinion was a bigger factor than armies and navies. If all Europe emerges from this war as democratic as seems possible now one can see that Mr. Wilson has already laid the foundation for future international relations between free people and republican forms of governments. This war has defeated itself. It is doubtful whether there ever will be another world war because the opinion of all civilised people is mobilised against war.

After one has seen what war is like, one is against not only war itself but the things which bring about war. This great war was made possible because Europe has been expecting and preparing for it ever since 1870 and because the governments of Europe did not take either the people or their neighbours into their confidence. President Wilson tried to show while he was president that the people should be fully informed regarding all steps taken by the Government. In England where the press has had such a tussle to keep from being curbed by an autocratic censors.h.i.+p the world has learned new lessons in publicity. The old policy of keeping from the public unpleasant information has been thrown overboard in Great Britain because it was found that it harmed the very foundations of democracy.

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