Volume II Part 9 (1/2)
When General Grant was before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives during the impeachment investigation, this question was put to him:
”Have you at any time heard the President make any remark in regard to the admission of members of Congress from rebel States in either House?”
”I cannot say positively what I have heard him say. I have heard him say as much in his public speeches as anywhere else. I have heard him say twice in his speeches that if the North carried the election by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, the majority, why should they not be the Congress of the United States? I have heard him say that several times.”
That answer was followed by this question:
”When you say the North, you mean the Democratic Party of the North, or, in other words, the party advocating his policy?”
General Grant replied:
”I meant if the North carried enough members in favor of the admission of the South. I did not hear him say that he would recognize them as the Congress, I merely heard him ask the question, 'Why would they not be the Congress?'”
At this point, and without further discussion of the purpose of Mr.
Johnson in regard to the reorganization of the Government, I think it may be stated without injustice to him, that while he was opposed to secession at the time the Confederate Government was organized, and thenceforward and always without change of opinion, yet he was also of opinion that the act of secession by the several States had not disturbed their legal relations to the National Government. Acting upon that opinion, he proceeded to reorganize the State governments, and with the purpose of securing the admission of their Senators and Representatives without seeking or accepting the judgment of Congress upon the questions involved in the proceeding. On one vital point he erred seriously and fundamentally as to the authority of the President in the matter. From the nature of our Government there could be no escape in a legal point of view from the conclusion that, whatever the relations were of the seceding States to the General Government, the method of restoration was to be ascertained and determined by Congress, and not by the President acting as the chief executive authority of the nation. In a legal and const.i.tutional view, that act on his part, although resting upon opinions which he had long entertained, and which were entertained by many others, must be treated as an act of usurpation.
The facts embodied in the charges on which Mr. Johnson was impeached by the House and arraigned before the Senate were not open to doubt, but legal proof was wanting in regard to the exact language of his speeches. The charges were in substance these: That he had attacked the integrity and the lawful authority of the Congress of the United States in public speeches made in the presence of the country. The second charge was that he had attempted the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, and that, without the concurrence of the Senate, he had so removed him, contrary to the act of Congress, known as the Tenure of Office Act. In the first investigation into the conduct of Andrew Johnson, he was described in the resolution as ”Vice-President of the United States, discharging at present the duties of President of the United States.” The resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives the seventh day of March, 1867. A large amount of testimony was taken, and the report of the committee, in three parts, by the different members, was submitted to the House the fourth day of the following December. The majority of the committee, consisting of George S. Boutwell, Francis Thomas, Thomas Williams, William Lawrence, and John C. Churchill, reported a resolution providing for the impeachment of the President of the United States, in these words: ”Resolved, that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors.” It will be observed that in the resolution for his impeachment he is described as ”President of the United States,” while in the resolution authorizing the inquiry into his conduct he is described as ”Vice- President, discharging at present the duties of the President of the United States.” This question received very careful consideration by the committee, and the conclusion was reached that he was the President of the United States, although he had been elected only to the office of Vice-President. As that question was not raised at the trial by demurrer or motion, it may now be accepted as the established doctrine that the Vice-President, when he enters upon the duties of President, becomes President of the United States. The extended report that was made by the majority of the committee was written by Mr. Williams.
The summary, which was in the nature of charges, was written by myself.
That summary set forth twenty-eight specifications of misconduct on the part of the President, many of which, however, where abandoned when the articles of impeachment were prepared in February, 1868.
In the discussion of the committee there were serious differences of opinion upon provisions of law. The minority of the committee, consisting of James F. Wilson, who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Frederick E. Woodbridge, S. S. Marshall, and Charles R.
Eldridge, maintained the doctrine that a civil officer under the Const.i.tution of the United States was not liable to impeachment except for the commission of an indictable offence. This doctrine had very large support in the legal profession, resting on remarks found in Blackstone. On the other hand, Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, had given support to the doctrine that a civil officer was liable to impeachment who misdemeaned himself in office. The provision of the Const.i.tution is in these words:
”The President, Vice-President, and all Civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”
The majority of the Judiciary Committee, in the controversy which arose in the committee and in the House of Representatives, maintained that the word ”misdemeanors” was used in a political sense, and not in the sense in which it is used in criminal law. In support of this view attention was called to the fact that the party convicted was liable only to removal from office, and therefore that the object of the process of impeachment was the purification and preservation of the civil service. In the opinion of the majority, it was the necessity of the situation that the power of impeachment should extend to acts and offences that were not indictable by statute nor at common law. The report of the Judiciary Committee, made the twenty-fifth day of November, was rejected by the House of Representatives.
The attempt of the President to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War revived the question of impeachment, and on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of February, 1868, the House of Representatives ”resolved to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.” The articles of impeachment were acted on by the House of Representatives the second day of March, and on the fourth day of March they were presented to the Senate through Mr. Bingham, chairman of the managers, who was designated for that duty.
The articles were directed to the following points, namely: That the President, by his speeches, had attempted ”to set aside the rightful authority and powers of Congress”; that he had attempted ”to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States and the several branches thereof”; and ”that he had attempted to incite the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by them duly and const.i.tutionally enacted.” Further, it was alleged that he had declared in speeches that the ”Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Const.i.tution of the United States to exercise legislative power in the same.”
A further charge, and on which greater reliance was placed, was set forth in these words: ”That he had denied and intended to deny the power of the Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the Const.i.tution of the United States.” These articles were in substance the articles that had been rejected by the House of Representatives in 1867. Finally, as the most important averment of all, the President was charged with an ”attempt to prevent the execution of the act ent.i.tled 'An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices,'
pa.s.sed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving and attempting to contrive means by which he could prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the function of the office of the Secretary for the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of the said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War.” In various forms of language these several charges were set forth in the different articles of impeachment--eleven in all. The eleventh article, which was prepared by Mr. Stevens, embodied the summary of all the charges mentioned. It is to be observed that in the eleventh article there is no allegation that the President had committed an offence that was indictable under any statute of the United States or that would have been indictable at common law. It may be a.s.sumed, I think, that for this country, at least, the question that was raised at the beginning and argued with great force, and by which possibly the House of Representatives may have been influenced in the year 1867, has been settled in accord with the report of the majority of the Judiciary Committee. The House decided that the President was impeachable for misdemeanors in office. With stronger reason it may be said that every other civil officer is bound to behave himself well in his office. He cannot do any act which impairs his standing in the place which he holds, or which may bring discredit upon the public, and especially he may not do any act in disregard of his oath to obey the laws and to support the Const.i.tution of the country. The eleventh article was the chief article that was submitted to a vote in the Senate. The question raised by that article is this in substance: Is the President of the United States guilty in manner and form as set forth in this article? On that question thirty- five Senators voted that he was guilty, and nineteen Senators voted that he was not guilty. Under the Const.i.tution the President was found not guilty of the offences charged, but the majority given may be accepted, and probably will be accepted, as the judgment of the Senate that the President of the United States is liable to impeachment and removal from office for acts and conduct that do not subject him to the process of indictment and trial in the criminal courts. At this point I express the opinion that something has been gained, indeed that much has been gained, by the decision of the House of Representatives, supported by the opinions of a large majority in the Senate.
The answer of the respondent, considered in connection with the arguments that were made by his counsel, sets forth the ground upon which the Republican members of the Senate may have voted that the President was not guilty of the two princ.i.p.al offences charged, viz: that in his speeches he had denounced and brought into contempt, intentionally, the Congress of the United States; and, second, that his attempted removal of Edwin M. Stanton was a violation of the Tenure of Office Act. In the President's answer to article ten, which contained the allegation that in his speech at St. Louis, in the year 1866, he had used certain language in derogation of the authority of the Congress of the United States, it was averred that the extracts did not present his speech or address accurately. Further than that, it was claimed that the allegation under that article was not ”cognizable by the court as a high misdemeanor in office.” Finally, it was claimed that proof should be made of the ”actual” speech and address of the President on that occasion. The managers were not able to meet the demand for proof in a technical sense. The speech was reported in the ordinary way, and the proof was limited to the good faith of the reporters and the general accuracy of the printed report in the newspapers. In this situation as to the charges and the answer, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that members of the Senate had ground for the vote of not guilty upon the several charges in regard to the speeches that were imputed to the President.
Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to the article in which the President was charged with the violation of the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The proviso of the statute was in these words: ”Provided that the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal by and with the advice of the Senate.” The proviso contained exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate were secure in their places unless the Senate should a.s.sent to their removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor.
The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during his term.
There were incidents in the course of the proceedings that possess historical value. By the Const.i.tution the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is made the presiding officer in the Senate when the President is put upon trial on articles of impeachment. Chief Justice Chase claimed that he was to be addressed as ”Chief Justice.” That claim was recognized by the counsel for the President and by some members of the Senate. The managers claimed that he was there as the presiding officer, and not in his judiciary capacity. He was addressed by the managers and some of the Senators as ”Mr. President.”
There was a difference of opinion in the Senate, and a difference between the managers and the counsel for the respondent, as to the right of the presiding officer to rule upon questions of law and evidence arising in the course of the trial. Under the rule of the Senate as adopted, the rulings of the President were to stand unless a Senator should ask for the judgment of the Senate.
Other instances occurred which do not possess historical value, but were incidents unusual in judicial proceedings. When the Judiciary Committee of the House was entering upon the investigation of the conduct of President Johnson, General Butler expressed the opinion that upon the adoption of articles of impeachment by the House the President would be suspended in his office until the verdict of the Senate. As this view was not accepted by the committee, I made these remarks in my opening speech to the House after a review of the arguments for and against the proposition:
”I cannot doubt the soundness of the opinion that the President, even when impeached by the House, is ent.i.tled to his office until he has been convicted by the Senate.”
This view was accepted.