Volume II Part 6 (1/2)
It is impossible for us to revert with never so cursory a glance to the departure of Henry of Monmouth from his native sh.o.r.es at the head of an armament intended to recover his alleged rights in France, without finding various questions suggesting themselves, both on the mode adopted for raising and embodying the men, and for transporting the troops and military stores, and all the accompaniments of an invading army. The Kings of England had then no standing army, (p. 120) nor any permanent royal fleet.
In the present volume we have often seen that on an emergence, such as an irruption of the Scots, or the necessity of resisting the Welsh more effectually, the sheriffs of different counties were commanded to array the able-bodied men within their jurisdiction, and join the royal standard by an appointed day; and, no doubt, many a motley, and ill-favoured, and ill-appointed company were seen in the sheriff's train. We have also been reminded with how great difficulty even these musters could be collected, and kept together, and marched to the place of rendezvous; and how seldom could they be brought in time to join in the engagement for which they were destined. We have repeatedly also learned that the n.o.bles who would recommend themselves to the royal favour, or espoused heartily the cause in which they were engaged, headed their own retainers to the field, and made themselves responsible for their maintenance and pay. In the present case we have reason to believe that the army consisted mainly of volunteers; at least, that the princ.i.p.al persons in rank and fortune joined the King's standard without compulsion. A very lively and enthusiastic interest in the success of his expedition prevailed through the whole country; and the n.o.bles redeemed their pledge, without grudging, that they would aid him in their persons. The pay of the army was (p. 121) settled beforehand, at a fixed rate, from a duke downwards.[93]
[Footnote 93: But though a person were a volunteer, yet if, after ”making his muster,” he failed in his duty, the punishment was both summary and severe.
In a subsequent expedition of Henry, Hugh Annesley had made his muster in the company of Lord Grey of Codnor, and had received the King's pay from him, but tarried nevertheless in England. He was summoned before the council, and confessed his delinquency; his person was forthwith committed to the Fleet, and his estates seized into the King's hands.]
Whether there is any foundation at all in fact for the tradition of Henry's resolution to take with him no married man or widow's son, the tradition itself bears such strong testimony to the general estimate of Henry's character for bravery at once and kindness of heart, that it would be unpardonable to omit every reference to it altogether. The song of Agincourt, in which it occurs, is unquestionably of ancient origin; probably written and sung within a very few years of the expedition.[94] Internal evidence would induce us to infer that it was composed before Henry's death, and just after his marriage with Katharine:
”The fairest flower in all France, To the rose of England I give free.”
[Footnote 94: The song will be found in a note on our account of the battle of Agincourt.]
The ballad, at all events, is among the earliest of our English songs, and was delivered down from father to son in the most distant (p. 122) parts of the kingdom, when very few of those who preserved the national poetry from oblivion could read. This circ.u.mstance easily accounts for the many various readings which are found in different copies now, whilst these in their turn tend to establish the antiquity of the song. The admirable simplicity and true natural beauty of the verse will justify its repet.i.tion here, though it has already appeared in our t.i.tle-page, when it ascribes to Henry the combination of valour and high resolve, with merciful considerateness and tender feeling for others. Be the authority for this reported restriction, imposed by Henry on those who were commissioned to recruit soldiers for his expedition, what it may, (let it be founded in fact, or in the imagination of the writer,) it bears that testimony to Henry's character,[95] which the whole current of authentic doc.u.ments tends fully to establish. He was brave, and he was merciful.
[Footnote 95: Should it occur to any one, that if in this case we allow the poet to have weight when he speaks of what reflects honour on Henry's name, we ought to a.s.sign the same credit to Shakspeare; when he tells us of madcap frolics and precocious dissipation, it must be remembered, that on testing the accuracy of Shakspeare by an appeal to history, we established a striking discrepancy between them; and that Shakspeare lived more than a century after the death of Henry; whereas we are led to regard this song of Agincourt as contemporary with the events which it celebrates; and its eulogy harmonizes in perfect accordance with what history might lead us to expect.]
”Go! call up Ches.h.i.+re and Lancas.h.i.+re, (p. 123) And Derby hills,[96] which are so free; But neither married man, nor widow's son,-- No widow's curse shall go with me.”
[Footnote 96: Query, Are these counties especially mentioned as being more peculiarly Henry's own? He was Duke of Lancaster, and Earl of Chester and Derby.]
Of the numbers who went with Henry to France various accounts are delivered down, and different calculations have been made. The song of Agincourt raises the sum of the ”right good company” to ”thirty thousand stout men and three:” and probably this total, embracing servants and attendants of every kind, is not at all an exaggeration of the number actually transported from England to Normandy; though, if by ”stout men” we are to understand warriors able to handle the spear, the bow, the sword, and the battleaxe, we must not reckon them at more than one-third of that number.
The expedients which Henry found it necessary to adopt for the safe transportation of this armament, compel us to review, however briefly, the state and circ.u.mstances of English navigation at the period. The Author has already hazarded the opinion in his Preface, that Henry of Monmouth may with justice be regarded as the founder of the British navy; and he feels himself called upon to refer to some facts by which such a representation might seem to be countenanced. He gladly (p. 124) acknowledges that the idea was first suggested to him by the publication of Sir Henry Ellis; whilst every subsequent research, and every additional fact, have tended to confirm and ill.u.s.trate the same view.[97]
[Footnote 97: Mr. James, in his Naval History of Great Britain, does not seem to have carried back his researches beyond the reign of Henry VIII, to whom he ascribes ”the honour of having by his own prerogative, and at his sole expense, settled the const.i.tution of the present royal navy.” Much undoubtedly does the English navy owe to that monarch; but he would be more justly regarded as its restorer and especial benefactor, than its founder.]
Though few subjects are more interesting, or more deserve the attention of our fellow-countrymen, yet it is confessedly beyond the province of these Memoirs to enter at any length upon a dissertation on the naval affairs of Great Britain. Since, however, if satisfactorily established, the fact will recommend the hero of Agincourt to the grateful remembrance of his father-land in a department of national strength and glory in which few of us have probably hitherto felt indebted to him, it is hoped that these brief remarks may not be deemed out of place.
Unquestionably, many previous sovereigns of England had directed much of their thoughts to the maritime power of the country. From the time of Alfred himself, downwards, we may trace, at various intervals, evident marks of the measures adopted by our Kings and the legislature, and also by powerful individuals and merchant companies, to keep (p. 125) up a succession of sea-worthy vessels, and mariners to man them. Two hundred years before the date of Henry's expedition, as early as the year 1212, King John seems to have established a sort of dry covered dock at Portsmouth for the preservation of s.h.i.+ps and their rigging during the winter. But the very instances to which appeals have been made by various writers, to prove the antiquity of the naval force of South Britain, tend by their testimony to confirm the opinions we are here disposed to adopt. In every successive reign, the annals of which supply any information on the subject, the evidence is clear that the rulers of England did not contemplate the establishment of a fleet belonging to the nation as its own property. The tenures, moreover, by which many maritime towns held their charters, whilst they evince the importance attached to this department of an island's political power, coincide altogether with the view we are taking. The obligation, for example, under which the Cinque Ports lay of furnis.h.i.+ng, whenever required, fifty s.h.i.+ps, manned each with twenty-four mariners, for fifteen days, enabled the monarch indeed to calculate, from the fulfilment of such stipulated engagements, on a certain supply, adequate, it may be, to meet the usual demand; but at the same time it implied that he had no fleet of his own on which he could rely. Whilst the limited extent to which s.h.i.+ps could be supplied by the most rigid exaction of the terms of those tenures compelled the state, on (p. 126) any occasion when extraordinary efforts were requisite, to depend upon the varying and precarious supply produced by the system of impressment.[98]
[Footnote 98: See Hardy's Introduction to the Close Rolls, and Lord Lyttelton's History of Henry II.]
When Henry ascended the throne, he found still in full operation this old system of our maritime proceedings. Whenever, as we have seen, an occasion required the transport of a considerable body of men from our havens, or forces to be embarked for the protection of our sh.o.r.es and of our merchants, in addition to the contingent, which could be exacted from various chartered towns, the King's government was obliged either to hire s.h.i.+ps from foreign countries, or to lay forcible hands by way of impressment on the vessels of his own subjects. A few instances, more or less closely connected with the immediate subject of our present inquiry, will serve to ill.u.s.trate that point.
When, for example, Henry's great grandfather Edward III. was preparing for the expedition, which he headed in person, intended to relieve Roch.e.l.le, his grandfather John of Gaunt, February 10, 1372, as we find by the records of the Duchy of Lancaster, commanded all his stewards in Wales to a.s.sist Walter de Wodeburgh, serjeant-at-arms, appointed by the King to arrest all s.h.i.+ps of twenty tons' burden [and upwards?] for the pa.s.sage of the King and his army to France, and to take (p. 127) sufficient security that they be all ready by the 1st of May either at Southampton, Portsmouth, Hamel in the Rys, or Hamel Stoke.
The records of the Privy Council (11 December, probably 1405,) supply us with an instance (one out of many) which shows, at the same time, the great injury which the public service sustained by this system, and the ruinous consequences which it was calculated to entail on the merchants and the owners of s.h.i.+ps. Henry IV. had intended to proceed in person to Guienne; and for that purpose, with the advice of his council, had impressed all the s.h.i.+ps westward. His voyage was deferred; but the s.h.i.+ps were still, as they had been for a long time, under arrest. The masters had sent a deputation to him to implore some compensation for their great expenses,[99] and some means of support.
Henry then wrote to the council, praying them [vous prions] to provide some help for these poor men; and to a.s.sure them that no long time would elapse before their services would be called for, since either himself or his representative would undertake the voyage. In the same letter he prayed the council also to write under his privy seal to the King of Portugal, to beg of him a supply of galleys, sufficient to enable him to resist the malice of his enemies the French, and to protect his land and his realm.
[Footnote 99: ”Par long temps a lour grantz custages et despenses.”]
We must not suppose that the French monarch found himself under (p. 128) more favourable circ.u.mstances when he would prepare for any important affair on the sea. The same system of impressment and hiring was necessarily adopted in France. Thus we find, in 1417, when the French government resolved to make a powerful effort to crush the navy of England, the s.h.i.+ps were first to be ”hired, at a great sum of gold, from the state of Genoa.” These mercenary vessels formed the fleet over which the Earl of Huntingdon gained a decided victory immediately before Henry's second expedition to France.
Thus, too, (not to cite any more examples,) no sooner had Henry determined to a.s.sert his rights on the Continent, and to enforce them by the sword, than he despatched amba.s.sadors to Zealand and Holland to negociate with the Duke of Holland for a supply of s.h.i.+ps; doubtless a.s.sured that all which he could impress or hire in all his ports would not be sufficient for the safe transport of his troops, and ”their furniture of war.” But Henry's ardent and commanding mind soon saw how powerful an engine, both of defence and of conquest, would be found in a permanent royal navy, and how indispensable such an establishment was to any insular sovereign who desired to provide for his country the means of offering a bold front against aggression, protecting herself from insult, maintaining her rights, and taking a lead among the surrounding powers. He resolved, therefore, not to depend (p. 129) upon the precarious and unsatisfactory expedients either of hiring vessels, which would never be his own, (in a market, too, where his enemy might forestal him, and where his necessities would enhance the price,) or of compelling his merchants to leave their trading, and minister to the emergence of the state, at their own inevitable loss, and not improbable ruin. His immediate determination was to spare neither labour nor expense in providing a navy of his own, such as would be ever ready at the sovereign's command to protect the coast, to sweep the seas of those hordes of pirates which then infested them, and to bear his forces with safety and credit to any distant sh.o.r.es.
He thus thought he should best secure his own ports and provinces from foreign invasion; afford a safeguard to his own merchants, and to those traders who would traffic with his people; and generally make England a more formidable antagonist and a more respected neighbour.
This new line of policy he adopted very early in his reign. Whilst he was at Southampton, (at the date of this digression, on his first expedition to Normandy,) we find him superintending the building of various large s.h.i.+ps: and, two years afterwards, when news reached him of the victory gained by his brother the Duke of Bedford over the French fleet off Harfleur, the tidings found him making the most effectual means for securing future victories; he was at Smalhithe in Kent, personally superintending the building of some s.h.i.+ps to (p. 130) add to his own royal navy, then only in its infancy.[100]
[Footnote 100: The Pell Rolls record the payment of a pension which bears testimony to the interest taken by Henry in his infant navy, and to the kindness with which he rewarded those who had faithfully served him. The pension is stated to have been given ”to John Hoggekyns, master-carpenter, of special grace, because by long working at the s.h.i.+ps his body was much shaken and worsted.”]