Part 9 (2/2)

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Footbridge over the Ca.n.a.l.]

An attack was ordered for 7 A.M. in conjunction with the French. But the French were not ready at that hour. I was told that the 6th battalion of the 295th Regiment, which had now been brought over to the north of the Ca.n.a.l, was to be under my orders; but hardly had I heard this when I received a message at 9.25 A.M. that the French were going to attack at 9.30. At noon they did so, and very pluckily. It was, however, impossible to a.s.sist them, for they (the 6/295) ran forward and attacked the Ca.n.a.l and footbridge obliquely, completely masking any action possible by the Devons They lost heavily, I fear, but it really was not our fault, though at one time they seemed to think it was.

I went to talk to Lieut.-Col. Perron, who commanded the detachment (6/295 and a few Cha.s.seurs a Cheval), in the afternoon; but the interview did not enlighten me very much. The commander of the 6/295, however, one Baron d'Oullenbourg, was most intelligent, and a gallant fellow with plenty of _nous_. He was badly wounded two days afterwards in another attempt.

I was so much struck with the plucky way in which the 6/295 pushed on under heavy fire that I sent a complimentary note both to the battalion and to General Joubert, commanding the 58th Brigade on the other side of the Ca.n.a.l--for the battalion belonged (to start with) to his brigade. They published both my notes in the _Ordre du Jour_ of the Division, and d'Oullenbourg received a Legion d'Honneur in consequence (so St Andre told me). Anyway, he thoroughly deserved it.

Meanwhile we heard that the Ches.h.i.+res, Manchesters, and K.O.S.B.'s were all held up near Violaines by a beastly sugar factory which the Germans occupied on the road north of La Ba.s.see, and they could not get on at all.

Generals Morland and Franklin turned up in the afternoon. We were perpetually being urged to advance and attack, but how could we? There was nothing to attack in front of us except La Ba.s.see, a couple of miles off, and we could not advance a yard in that direction without exposing our right flank to a deadly enfilade fire from across the Ca.n.a.l, for the Germans were still strongly holding that infernal railway triangle, and nothing availed to get them out of it.[11]

General Morland wisely, therefore, ordered me not to advance in force.

[Footnote 11: They are still there (August 1917)!]

Later on we heard that the Ches.h.i.+res had made a gain of 800 yards, but had got so extended that they asked for a Bedford company to support them, and this I sent.

In the evening I went to examine a French 75 mm. battery, and had the whole thing explained to me. The gun is simply marvellous, slides horizontally on its own axle, never budges however much it fires, and has all sorts of patent dodges besides: but it is no use painting the lily!

Wilson, of the 61st Howitzers, was, by the way, a little aggrieved by this French battery coming and taking up its position close alongside him and invading his observing stations. The captain also got on his nerves, for he was somewhat excitable, and his sh.e.l.ls were numerous that burst prematurely, whilst a house only 100 yards off, which should have been well under the trajectory of his sh.e.l.ls, was several times. .h.i.t by them. However, he doubtless caused much damage to the enemy.

On the 20th and 21st the Germans kept us fairly busy with threatened attacks, especially on the Ches.h.i.+res at Violaines; but nothing definite happened, although we were kept on the perpetual _qui vive_, and could not relieve our feelings by attacking, for we had orders to ”consolidate our position.”

By this time we occupied a line as follows:--

Ca.n.a.l from crossed swords (_v._ map) to 300 yards North (French).

Thence to Canteleux (excl.) (Devons).

Canteleux to Pt. 21[12](Norfolks).

Pt. 21 to Violaines (Do. patrols).

Violaines (Ches.h.i.+res and one company Bedfords).

Givenchy, in reserve (three companies Bedfords).

[Footnote 12: Nearly halfway to Violaines.]

On the evening of the 21st there was serious news on our left.

Although the Ches.h.i.+res were still in occupation of Violaines, it looked as if they might have to retire from it very soon, as the right of the 14th Brigade, on the Ches.h.i.+res' left, was being driven back.

Violaines, however, was very important, and to let the Germans get a footing here was most dangerous. So, with General Morland's sanction, and after communicating with the Ches.h.i.+res, who cheerily said they could hold out all right, I told the Ches.h.i.+res to stick to Violaines, throwing their left flank back in case the line to their left was penetrated.

_Oct. 22nd._

A very anxious day ensued. At 6 A.M. the Ches.h.i.+res were invaded in front and flank by a surprise attack of the enemy in great force, and had to fall back towards Rue du Marais, losing heavily. Some Dorsets (who had been for the last three days at Stink Farm and were sent as a support to the 13th Brigade) were supporting them, but they could not do much, and they also lost a number of men. From what I could gather, the Ches.h.i.+res had been digging in the dark round the southern and eastern flank of the village, and had their sentries out, but apparently not quite far enough out for such thick weather, and when the Germans appeared rus.h.i.+ng through the fog they were taken at a disadvantage, for they had cast their equipment in order to dig, and the covering party was quickly cut down.

This, at all events, was what I made out from the surviving officers, of whom one, 2nd Lieut. Pogson, was the senior. Mahony and Rich, fighting gallantly, had been killed, and Sh.o.r.e wounded and taken prisoner. About 200 men were also killed and wounded out of about 600, and a good many of the Bedfords with them, including poor Coventry (late Transport officer) killed.

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