Part 15 (1/2)
[47] In making this suggestion, the author is well aware that Ephemerides of the four chief asteroids have been given annually in the Greenwich Nautical Almanac; but for the object proposed they are utterly useless. Will any astronomer contend that these Ephemerides are true to ten seconds of arc? If not, they are useless for the purpose suggested above, and the theory wants revision. And it is evident that any objection against its practicability, founded on the uncertainty of the number of the asteroids themselves, as has already been urged in answer to this suggestion, is an evidence that the objector weighed the subject in the scales of his imagination only.
SECTION SIXTH.
THE POLAR ICE.
We shall conclude these pages by again referring to our theory of the weather, in connection with an event which every friend of humanity and every lover of natural science is bound deeply to deplore.
From the present position of the lunar nodes and apogee, the vortices of our earth do not ascend into very high lat.i.tudes. Now, according to the principles laid down, the frequency of storms tends to lower the temperature in the warm regions of the earth, and to elevate it in the polar regions. Let us suppose the northern limit of the vortices to be in lat.i.tude 70. There will be, in this case, a greater prevalence of northerly winds _within_ this circle of lat.i.tude, to supply the drain to the southward, and the back currents by pa.s.sing above will descend at the pole, partaking of the temperature due to that elevation. The character of the arctic seasons may therefore be considered as partly dependent on the average direction of the wind. Suppose again, the extreme limits of the vortices to be about lat.i.tude 80, the relative areas of the two circles are as 4 to 1; so that in this last case the exclusive range of the northerly winds is limited to one-fourth of the first area. South of 80 the wind will frequently come from the south, and by mixing with the local atmosphere of that lat.i.tude, will tend to ameliorate the small area to the northward. And the greater atmospheric commotion when confined to such a small circle of lat.i.tude, must a.s.sist materially to break up the polar ice; which would tend still more to equalize the temperature.
By referring to our table, we see that the mean conjunction of the pole of the lunar orbit and the moon's apogee, was in longitude 128 on April 10, 1846, and let it be remembered that when the conjunction takes place due south or in longitude 270, the vortices attain their greatest lat.i.tude north. When, on the contrary, the conjunction takes place due north or in longitude 90,[48] the northern limits of the vortices are then in the lowest lat.i.tude possible.
Sir John Franklin sailed in May 1845, and was certainly at the entrance of Wellington sound, near lat.i.tude 75, April 3d, 1846, as the dates on the graves testify. That season, according to the theory, was a cold one; for the vortices could not reach so far to the northward in that year, and consequently there were no storms, properly speaking. It would probably be late in the summer of 1846, before the expedition was liberated, and as the prevailing winds would be from the northward, he would have little choice, but to stand to the westward if the state of the ice permitted. In his instructions he was to use every effort to penetrate to the southward and westward of Cape Walker, and he probably conformed to them under the circ.u.mstances, and pa.s.sed the winter in the ice, in that neighborhood. And in 1847 we do not antic.i.p.ate, from the theory, that he would make much progress westward.
In 1848, Sir James Ross was sent out with the first relief-s.h.i.+p; but was not able to reach the entrance of Wellington channel because of compact ice from there to Leopold Island. This was about the beginning of September--a time when the northern channels are usually the most open.
On the 11th, they ran the s.h.i.+ps into Port Leopold, and the next day the ice shut them in for the winter. From the character of the season, we may infer that if Franklin did not enter Wellington channel in 1847, as is most probable, neither did he in 1848. Perhaps he was not able to get his s.h.i.+ps far to the westward, as we infer from the theory. Still, as the time was not very protracted, he would wait patiently another season and husband his resources.
In 1849, Sir James Ross cut his s.h.i.+ps clear of the ice August 28th, and crossed over to Wellington channel, where he found the land-ice still fast, showing that this season was also a bad one in accordance with the theory. On the 1st of September he met the first gale of wind, at which time the _Inner Vortex_ was at its extreme north lat.i.tude, and rapidly extending its limits by the motion of the perigee.
This vortex describes a smaller orbit than either the central or the outer vortex, and consequently reaches into higher lat.i.tudes. But the time was badly chosen, as the whole series of years since Franklin left has been unfavorable for the early rupture of the ice. Sir James Ross having been drifted out of Lancaster sound by the gale, finally bore up for England towards the close of September 1849.
The same year, the North Star with additional supplies was working up Baffin's bay; but on account of the unusual quant.i.ties of ice, and the frosts ”which glued the floes together,” she was unable to force a pa.s.sage through the middle ice, and wintered on the east side of Baffin's bay, in lat.i.tude 76 33'--her thermometer marking 64 below zero, as the coldest of the winter. In 1850, the perigee of the moon attained its northern limit, but the position of the node was bad; still this year and 1851, were the best of the series. The North Star succeeded in getting out of the ice on the 1st of August--a very early date for that high lat.i.tude--and on the 8th had crossed over to Possession bay; but being prevented by the land-ice, she bore up for Pond bay and there landed the provisions. The same year (1850) several vessels entered Lancaster sound. Sir John Ross also reached Melville Island; from which it is evident that this season was far better than any preceding. According to Captain Penny, this year a floe of ice at least two years old, filled Wellington strait; but was diminished in breadth at a subsequent visit. He also saw a boundless open sea from the _western_ entrance of Wellington strait; but of course the s.h.i.+ps could not reach it, for the floe before mentioned. Following the indications of the theory, we consider it almost certain that Franklin went to the westward and not through Wellington channel; that he made but slow progress until 1850, when finding the sea more open to the northward, and attributing it more to local influences than to any change in the season, he considered it a better course to extricate the expedition, by pus.h.i.+ng on towards Behring's straits than to attempt the frozen channels he had already pa.s.sed through. But the seasons again getting worse after 1850, he was again arrested in the polar basin by the ice and islands off the northern coast of America.
Regarding the old and new continents as in reality a connected body of land, with a polar depression, we may expect that the great range of American mountains is continued in a straight line, from the mouth of the McKenzie river, obliquely across the Polar sea, and connects with the Ural; and that along the axis of the chain, protuberant ma.s.ses will emerge above the sea level, const.i.tuting an archipelago of islands, from Nova Zembla to the McKenzie; and that these islands, causing an acc.u.mulation of ice, and arresting its general tendency to the southward, is the barrier which Sir John Franklin was finally stopped by, in a situation where he could neither advance nor return. With the map before us, and the data afforded by former voyages, and guided by these theoretical views, respecting the prevailing direction of the winds and the character of the seasons, we should locate Sir John Franklin near lat.i.tude 80, and longitude 145, in 1851; and as the seasons would afterwards become more severe, we may consider that he has not been since able to change his locality, and dare not desert his s.h.i.+ps.
No mere stranger can feel a deeper interest than the author, in view of the hard fortunes of these hardy explorers, and he would not lightly advance such opinions, did he not suppose they were in some degree reliable. In 1832, he himself crossed the Atlantic, for the purpose of offering himself to the Geographical Society of London, intending to be landed as far northward as possible, with a single companion,[49] from which point he purposed to follow the coast line on foot, with cautious discretion as to seasons, confident that, with arms and ammunition, he could support himself for many years. It has always been a grave error in all these northern land expeditions, that they have been too unwieldy, too much enc.u.mbered with the comforts and luxuries of civilization at the outset, and too much loaded with a philosophical paraphernalia, for a pioneering survey,--and cheris.h.i.+ng too fondly the idea that the wide sh.o.r.es of the Arctic sea could be explored in a single season. Had the British government established a few posts in the Arctic regions in the beginning,--one, for instance, in Lancaster sound, another in Behring's Straits, and a third near the mouth of the Coppermine, volunteers of sufficient scientific attainments might have been procured, to banish themselves to these inhospitable regions for a term of years, if a.s.sured of triennial supplies; and in this way, by summer boat-parties and winter expeditions, over land or ice, the explorations could have been gradually extended, and a greater knowledge of the polar regions might have been acquired, with an immense saving both of life and money. In 1832 the author's plan was deranged, by finding that Captain Back was about setting out in quest of Ross, who had then been some four years absent. This officer had all his party engaged when the author waited upon him in Liverpool, and no notice was taken of a modified plan which he forwarded to the Society at his suggestion. It was therefore abandoned.
The above fact is alluded to, in order to show the author's sincerity in expressing his belief that, with a previous preparation of mind and body for a sojourn in those frigid climes, a sufficient subsistence may be derived from the country itself. Advantage must, of course, be taken of the times of abundance, and due preparation made for the season of scarcity. Averaging the extremes, there is little doubt but that both land, and air, and water, afford an abundance of food for man in the Arctic zone, and that, when spurred by necessity, it is within his power to obtain it. We ought not therefore to despond, or give up efforts to rescue those who have well earned the sympathy of the world, by what they must have already suffered. _These northern seas will yet be explored._ The very difficulty of accomplis.h.i.+ng it, will itself give it a charm, which in this restless age will operate with increasing power.
And should efforts now be relaxed, and in some future time the evidence be brought to light that some of the party yet existed, long after all efforts to rescue them had been abandoned, the fact would be a dark spot on the escutcheon of England, which time could not erase.
Since these pages were written, accounts have been received from Captain McClure, of H. M. s.h.i.+p Investigator, which fully confirm the preceding remarks on the character of the seasons in the Arctic circle; and, more recently, despatches have been received from the discovery-s.h.i.+p, Amphytrite, in relation to the past season in Behring's straits, which also confirms the theory.
The Investigator (now supposed to be frozen up in lat. 74 5' N., and long 117 54' W.,--the last despatch being dated April 10, 1853) pa.s.sed round the northern sh.o.r.es of America into the channels communicating with Lancaster sound, in 1850, but was unable to extricate herself in 1852, and, probably, yet remains in the harbor she made in the winter of 1851, in the position above named. No trace of Sir John Franklin's expedition was, however, found, and, indeed, according to our theory, the Investigator was not on the most promising ground. We contend that Franklin has penetrated the pack of apparently perennial ice, which is continually pressing to the southward, and blocking up the pa.s.sages between the northern islands, or skirting the coast line of the continent; which pack has since increased, and effectually stopped all egress from the open central portions of the polar sea. If Sir John Franklin is ever heard from, this pack _must be penetrated_, and a powerful steamer ought to be sent immediately by the British government, to be ready in Behring's straits early enough to take advantage of the first openings, and make a bold push _due north_, so as to get as speedily as possible into the open waters to the north of the pack.
If the author could make himself heard at Was.h.i.+ngton, he would also urge the government to lose no time in following our own expedition under Dr.
Kane, who, if he finds a clear entrance from Smith's sound into the Arctic sea, may be induced to push on, and endeavor to make his way through the pack towards Behring's straits, and thus fall into the same snare as Franklin. According to the theory, the higher the pa.s.sage into the Arctic sea, the less will it be inc.u.mbered with ice, and, consequently, Smith's sound is the best both to enter and return by; and had the author not already smarted enough by having his professions derided, he would have submitted these views to the patrons of that expedition before it sailed.