Volume II Part 16 (1/2)
But as a matter of practical tactics to get votes, Marshall appears to have put this in the form of an a.s.sertion--no matter what treaty the President and Senate made, the House held the whip hand, he argued, and in the end, could do what it liked; why then unnecessarily affront and humiliate Was.h.i.+ngton by applauding the Virginia Senators for their vote against the treaty? This turn of Marshall's, thought the Republicans, ”was brought forward for the purpose of gaining over the unwary & wavering. It has never been admitted by the writers in favor of the treaty to the northward.”[391]
But neither Marshall's unanswerable argument on the treaty-making power, nor his cleverness in holding up the National House of Representatives as the final arbiter, availed anything. The Federalists offered an amendment affirming that the President and Senate ”have a right to make”
a treaty; that discussion of a treaty in a State Legislature, ”except as to its const.i.tutionality,” was unnecessary; and that the Legislature could not give ”any mature opinion upon the conduct of the Senators from Virginia ... without a full investigation of the treaty.” They were defeated by a majority of 46 out of a total of 150 members present and voting; John Marshall voting for the amendment.[392] On the main resolution proposed by the Republicans the Federalists lost two votes and were crushed by a majority of two to one; Marshall, of course, voting with the minority.[393]
Carrington hastily reported to Was.h.i.+ngton that though ”the discussion has been an able one on the side of the Treaty,” yet, ”such was the apprehension that a vote in its favor would be unpopular, that argument was lost”; and that, notwithstanding many members were convinced by Marshall's const.i.tutional argument, ”obligations of expediency” held them in line against the Administration. The sanguine Carrington a.s.sured the President, however, that ”during the discussion there has been preserved a decided respect for & confidence in you.”[394]
But alas again for the expectations of sanguinity! The Republican resolution was, as Jefferson's son-in-law had reported to the Republican headquarters at Monticello, ”a virtual censure of the President's conduct.” This was the situation at the close of the day's debate.
Realizing it, as the night wore on, Was.h.i.+ngton's friends determined to relieve the President of this implied rebuke by the Legislature of his own State. The Republicans had carried their point; and surely, thought Was.h.i.+ngton's supporters, the Legislature of Virginia would not openly affront the greatest of all Americans, the pride of the State, and the President of the Nation.
Infatuated imagination! The next morning the friends of the Administration offered a resolution that Was.h.i.+ngton's ”motives” in approving the treaty met ”the entire approbation of this House”; and that Was.h.i.+ngton, ”for his great abilities, _wisdom_ and integrity merits and possesses the undiminished confidence of his country.” The resolution came near pa.s.sing. But some lynx-eyed Republican discovered in the nick of time the word ”_wisdom_.”[395] That would never do. The Republicans, therefore, offered an amendment ”that this House do entertain the highest sense of the integrity and patriotism of the President of the United States; and that while they approve of the vote of the Senators of this State” on the treaty, ”they in no wise censure the motives which influenced him in his [Was.h.i.+ngton's] conduct thereupon.”[396]
The word ”wisdom” was carefully left out. Marshall, Lee, and the other Federalists struggled hard to defeat this obnoxious amendment; but the Republicans overwhelmed them by a majority of 33 out of a total of 145 voting, Marshall, of course, casting his vote against it.[397]
In worse plight than ever, Was.h.i.+ngton's friends moved to amend the Republican amendment by resolving: ”That the President of the United States, for his great abilities, _wisdom_, and integrity, merits and possesses the undiminished confidence of this House.” But even this, which omitted all reference to the treaty and merely expressed confidence in Was.h.i.+ngton's ”abilities, wisdom, and integrity,” was beaten by a majority of 20 out of a total of 138 voting.[398]
As soon as Jefferson got word of Marshall's support of Was.h.i.+ngton's Administration in the Legislature, he poured out his dislike which had long been distilling:--
”Though Marshall will be able to embarras [_sic_] the republican party in the a.s.sembly a good deal,” wrote Jefferson to Madison, ”yet upon the whole his having gone into it will be of service. He has been, hitherto, able to do more mischief acting under the mask of Republicanism than he will be able to do after throwing it plainly off. His lax lounging manners have made him popular with the bulk of the people of Richmond; & a profound hypocrisy, with many thinking men of our country. But having come forth in the plenitude of his English principles the latter will see that it is high time to make him known.”[399]
Such was Jefferson's inability to brook any opposition, and his readiness to ascribe improper motives to any one having views different from his own. So far from Marshall's having cloaked his opinions, he had been and was imprudently outspoken in avowing them. Frankness was as much a part of Marshall's mental make-up as his ”lax, lounging manners”
were a part of his physical characteristics. Of all the men of the period, not one was cleaner of hypocrisy than he. From Patrick Henry in his early life onward to his a.s.sociates on the bench at the end of his days the testimony as to Marshall's open-mindedness is uniform and unbroken.
With the possible exception of Giles and Roane, Jefferson appears to have been the only man who even so much as hinted at hypocrisy in Marshall. Although strongly opposing his views and suggesting the influence of supposed business connections, Madison had supreme confidence in Marshall's integrity of mind and character. So had Monroe.
Even Jefferson's most panegyrical biographer declares Marshall to have been ”an earnest and sincere man.”[400]
The House of Delegates having refused to approve Was.h.i.+ngton, even indirectly, the matter went to the State Senate. There for a week Was.h.i.+ngton's friends fought hard and made a slight gain. The Senate struck out the House resolution and inserted instead: ”The General a.s.sembly entertain the highest sense of the integrity, patriotism and wisdom of the President of the United States, and in approving the vote of the Senators of the State in the Congress of the United States, relative to the treaty with Great Britain, they in no wise mean to censure the motives which influenced him in his conduct thereupon.” To this the House agreed, although by a slender majority, Marshall, of course, voting for the Senate amendment.[401]
During this session Marshall was, as usual, on the princ.i.p.al standing committees and did his accustomed share of general legislative work. He was made chairman of a special committee to bring in a bill ”authorizing one or more branches of the bank of the United States in this commonwealth”;[402] and later presented the bill,[403] which finally pa.s.sed, December 8, 1795, though not without resistance, 38 votes being cast against it.[404]
But the Republicans had not yet finished with the Jay Treaty or with its author. On December 12, 1795, they offered a resolution instructing Virginia's Senators and Representatives in Congress to attempt to secure amendments to the Const.i.tution providing that: ”Treaties containing stipulations upon the subject of powers vested in Congress shall be approved by the House of Representatives”; that ”a tribunal other than the Senate be inst.i.tuted for trying impeachments”; that ”Senators shall be chosen for three years”; and that ”U.S. Judges shall hold no other appointments.”[405]
The Federalists moved to postpone this resolution until the following year ”and print and distribute proposed amendments for the consideration of the people”; but they were beaten by a majority of 11 out of a total vote of 129, Marshall voting for the resolution. The instruction to secure these radical const.i.tutional changes then pa.s.sed the House by a majority of 56 out of a total vote of 120, Marshall voting against it.[406]
Marshall's brother-in-law, United States Marshal Carrington, had a hard time explaining to Was.h.i.+ngton his previous enthusiasm. He writes: ”The active powers of the [Republican] party ... unveiled themselves, & carried in the House some points very extraordinary indeed, manifesting disrespect towards you.” But, he continues, when the Virginia Senate reversed the House, ”the zealots of Anarchy were backward to act ...
while the friends of Order were satisfied to let it [the Virginia Senate amendment] remain for farther effects of reflection”; and later succeeded in carrying it.
”The fever has raged, come to its crisis, and is abating.” Proof of this, argued Carrington, was the failure of the Republicans to get signatures to ”some seditious pet.i.tions [against the Jay Treaty] which was sent in vast numbers from Philadelphia” and which ”were at first patronized with great zeal by many of our distinguished anarchists; but ... very few copies will be sent to Congress fully signed.”[407]
Never was appointive officer so oblivious of facts in his reports to his superior, as was Carrington. Before adjournment on December 12, 1795, the Legislature adopted part of the resolution which had been offered in the morning: ”No treaty containing any stipulation upon the subject of powers vested in Congress by the eighth section of the first article [of the Const.i.tution] shall become the Supreme law of the land until it shall have been approved in those particulars by a majority in the House of Representatives; and that the President, before he shall ratify _any_ treaty, shall submit the same to the House of Representatives.”[408]
Carrington ignored or failed to understand this amazing resolution of the Legislature of Virginia; for nearly three months later he again sought to solace Was.h.i.+ngton by encouraging reports. ”The public mind in Virginia was never more tranquil than at present. The fever of the late session of our a.s.sembly, had not been communicated to the Country....
The people do not approve of the violent and petulant measures of the a.s.sembly, because, in several instances, public meetings have declared a decided disapprobation.” In fact, wrote Carrington, Virginia's ”hostility to the treaty has been exaggerated.” Proof ”of the ma.s.s of the people being less violent than was a.s.serted” would be discovered ”in the failure of our Zealots in getting their signatures to certain printed papers, sent through the Country almost by Horse loads, as copies of a pet.i.tion to Congress on the subject of the Treaty.”[409] But a few short months would show how rose-colored were the spectacles which Mr. Carrington wore when he wrote this rea.s.suring letter.
The ratification of the British treaty; the rage against England; and the devotion to France which already had made the Republican a French party; the resentment of the tri-color Republic toward the American Government--all forged a new and desperate menace. It was, indeed, Scylla or Charybdis, as Was.h.i.+ngton had foreseen, and bluntly stated, that confronted the National Government. War with France now seemed the rock on which events were driving the hard-pressed Administration--war for France or war from France.
The partisan and simple-minded Monroe had been recalled from his diplomatic post at Paris. The French mission, which at the close of our Revolution was not a place of serious moment,[410] now became critically--vitally--important. Level must be the head and stout the heart of him who should be sent to deal with that sensitive, proud, and now violent country. Lee thus advises the President: ”No person would be better fitted than John Marshall to go to France for supplying the place of our minister; but it is scarcely short of absolute certainty that he would not accept any such office.”[411]
But Was.h.i.+ngton's letter was already on the way, asking Marshall to undertake this delicate task:--
”In confidence I inform you,” wrote Was.h.i.+ngton to Marshall, ”that it has become indispensably necessary to recall our minister at Paris & to send one in his place, who will explain faithfully the views of this government & ascertain those of France.