Volume I Part 52 (1/2)

[1277] Lee to Hamilton; Hamilton MSS., Lib. Cong. The first paragraph of Lee's letter to Hamilton shows that the latter was helping his friend financially; for Lee wrote, ”G.o.d bless you & your efforts to save me from the manifold purse misfortunes which have & continue to oppress me, whenever I attempt to aid human nature. You will do what you think best, & whatever you do I will confirm--Hazard has acted the part of a decided rascal, & if I fail in my right, I may not in personal revenge.” (_Ib._)

[1278] Madison to Was.h.i.+ngton, June 13, 1788; _Writings_: Hunt, v, 179 and footnote.

[1279] Elliott, iii, 410-12.

[1280] _Ib._, 412-15.

[1281] _Ib._, 415-18.

[1282] Elliott, iii, 419-20.

[1283] Elliott, iii, 419-21.

[1284] _Ib._, 421-22.

[1285] _Ib._, 422-24.

[1286] Henry turned the tide in Marshall's favor in the latter's hard fight for Congress in 1798. (_Infra_, vol. II, chap. X.)

[1287] Elliott, iii, 434.

[1288] Elliott, iii, 431. Throughout the entire debate Henry often sounded his loudest alarms on the supreme power of Congress over the ten miles square where the National Capital was to be located; and, indeed, this seems to have been one of the chief sources of popular apprehension. The fact that the people at large looked upon the proposed National Government as something foreign, something akin to the British rule which had been overthrown, stares the student in the face wherever he turns among the records of the Const.i.tutional period. It is so important that it cannot too often be repeated.

Patrick Henry, of course, who was the supreme popular orator of our history and who drew his strength from his perfect knowledge of the public mind and heart, might have been expected to make appeals based on this general fear. But when such men as George Mason and William Grayson, who belonged to Virginia's highest cla.s.ses and who were carefully educated men of conservative temper, did the same thing, we see how deep and strong was the general feeling against any central National power.

[1289] Elliott, iii, 447-49.

[1290] _Ib._, 452-57.

[1291] Elliott, iii, 473.

[1292] It is exceedingly strange that in the debates on the Const.i.tution in the various State Conventions, so little, comparatively, was made of the debt and the speculations in it. The preciousness of ”liberty” and the danger of ”monarchy,” the security of the former through State sovereignty and the peril of the latter through National Government, received far more attention than did the economic problem.

[1293] Elliott, 472-74. And see vol. II, chap. II, of this work.

[1294] ”The recovery of the British debts can no longer be postponed and there now seems to be a moral certainty that your patrimony will all go to satisfy the unjust debt from your papa to the Hanburys.” (Tucker to his stepsons, June 29, 1788, quoted in Conway, 106; and see comment, _ib._)

[1295] Elliott, iii, 484.

[1296] _Ib._, 491.

[1297] Grayson to Dane, June 18, 1788; Dane MSS., Lib. Cong. This shows the loose management of the Anti-Const.i.tutionalist politicians: for Kentucky had fourteen votes in the Convention, instead of thirteen, as Grayson declared; and so uncertain was the outcome that to omit a single vote in calculating the strength of the contending forces was unpardonable in one who was, and was accounted to be, a leader.

CHAPTER XII

THE STRATEGY OF VICTORY

Was.h.i.+ngton's influence carried this government [Virginia's ratification of the Const.i.tution]. (Monroe to Jefferson, July 12, 1788.)

If I shall be in the minority, I shall have those painful sensations which arise from a conviction of _being overpowered in a good cause_. Yet I will be a peaceable citizen. (Henry, in his last debate.)