Part 20 (1/2)
Strigel's entire position is based on the error that a remnant of spiritual ability still remains in natural man. True, he taught that in consequence of original sin the powers of man and the proper use and exercise of these powers are greatly impeded, weakened, checked, and insulated, as it were, and that this impediment can be removed solely by the operation of the Holy Spirit. ”Through the Word the Holy Spirit restores to the will the power and faculty of believing,” Strigel declared. (Luthardt, 250.) But this restoration, he said, was brought about by liberating, arousing, inciting, and strengthening the powers inherent in man rather than by divine impartation of new spiritual powers or by the creation of a new good volition.
Strigel plainly denied that natural man is truly spiritually dead. He declared: ”The will is so created that it can expel the Holy Spirit and the Word, or, when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit, can in some manner will and obey--to receive is the act of the will; in this I cannot concede that man is simply _dead--accipere est hominis; in hoc non possum concedere simpliciter mortuum esse hominem._” (Frank 1, 199.) Natural man, Strigel explained, is indeed not able to grasp the helping hand of G.o.d with his own hand; yet the latter is not dead, but still retains a minimum of power. (678.) Again: Man is like a new-born child, whose powers must first be strengthened with nourishment given it by its mother, and which, _though able to draw this nourishment out of its mother's breast,_ is yet unable to lift itself up to it, or to take hold of the breast, unless it be given it. (Preger 2, 209.)
With special reference to the last ill.u.s.tration, Flacius declared: ”Strigel, accordingly, holds that we have the faculty to desire and receive the food, _i.e._, the benefits of G.o.d. Forsooth, you thereby attribute to corrupt man a very great power with respect to spiritual things. Now, then, deny that this opinion is Pelagian.” (209.) ”Your statements agree with those of Pelagius, yet I do not simply say that you are a Pelagian; for a good man may fall into an error which he does not see.” Pelagius held that man, by his natural powers, is able to begin and complete his own conversion; Ca.s.sia.n.u.s, the Semi-Pelagian taught that man is able merely to begin this work; Strigel maintained that man can admit the liberating operation of the Holy Spirit, and that after such operation of the Spirit he is able to cooperate with his natural powers. Evidently, then, the verdict of Flacius was not much beside the mark. Planck though unwilling to relegate Strigel to the Pelagians, does not hesitate to put him down as a thoroughgoing Synergist. (Planck 4, 683f.) Synergism, however, always includes at least an element of Pelagianism.
Strigel ill.u.s.trated his idea by the following a.n.a.logy. When garlic-juice is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672; Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: ”The example of the temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of the _Tridentinum_ to this effect: The free will of natural man may be compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters.” (1, 136.) Also the _Formula of Concord,_ evidently with a squint at Strigel, rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching ”that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice, whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment from the wall.” (865, 22.)
163. Strigel's ”Cooperation.”
When the impediment caused by original sin has been removed, and the will liberated and aroused to activity, man, according to Strigel, is able also to cooperate in his conversion. At Weimar he formulated the point at issue as follows: ”The question is whether [in conversion] the will is present idle, as an inactive, indolent subject, or, as the common saying is, in a purely pa.s.sive way; or whether, when grace precedes, the will follows the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and in some manner a.s.sents--_an vero praeeunte gratia voluntas comitetur efficaciam Spiritus Sancti et aliquo modo annuat_.” (Luthardt, 222.) Following are some of his answers to this question: When incited by the Spirit, the will is able to a.s.sent somewhat and to pray for a.s.sistance.
_Inter trepidationem utc.u.mque a.s.sent.i.tur, simul petens auxilium._ Contrition and faith, as well as other virtues, are gifts of G.o.d, ”but they are given to those only who hear and contemplate G.o.d's Word, embrace it by a.s.senting to it, strive against their doubts and in this conflict pray for the help of G.o.d.” (230.) The Holy Ghost converts those ”who hear the Word of G.o.d and do not resist stubbornly, but consent,” and G.o.d a.s.sists such only ”as follow His call and pray for a.s.sistance.” (229.) ”The will and heart do not resist altogether, but desire divine consolation, when, indeed, they are a.s.sisted by the Holy Ghost.” ”The will is neither idle nor contumacious; but, in a manner, desires to obey.” (Planck 4, 682.) ”Man is dead [spiritually] in as far as he is not able to heal his wounds with his own powers; but when the remedy is offered him by the Holy Spirit and the Word, then he, at least in receiving the benefit, is not altogether dead; for otherwise a conversion could not occur. For I cannot conceive a conversion where the process is that of the flame consuming straw (_denn ich kann mir keine Bekehrung vorstellen, bei der es zugeht, wie wenn die Flamme das Stroh ergreift_). The nature of the will is such that it can reject the Holy Spirit and the Word; or, being supported by the Holy Spirit, can in a manner will and obey. The remedy is heavenly and divine, but the will--not the will alone, but the will supported by the Holy Spirit--is able to accept it. One must ascribe at least a feeble consent and an 'Aye' to the will, which is already supported by the Holy Spirit.”
(Preger 2, 208.) ”In a betrothal, consent is necessary; conversion is a betrothal of Christ to the Church and its individual members; hence consent is required,” which the will is able to give when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit. (Luthardt, 224.)
It is, however, only a languid, wavering, and weak consent which man is able to render (_qualisc.u.mque a.s.sensio languida, trepida et imbecilla_).
”Compared with the divine operation,” Flacius reports Strigel as having said, ”the cooperation of our powers in conversion is something extremely small (_quiddam pertenue prorsus_). If, after drinking with a rich man, he paying a _taler_ and I a _h.e.l.ler,_ I would afterwards boast that I had been drinking and paying with him--such is cooperation, _talis est synergia._” (Planck 4, 677; Luthardt, 220. 222.) According to Strigel, therefore, man is not purely pa.s.sive, but plays an active part in his conversion. With Melanchthon and Pfeffinger he maintained: ”These three concur in conversion: the Holy Spirit, who moves the hearts; the voice of G.o.d; the will of man, which a.s.sents to the divine voice.
_Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae a.s.sent.i.tur._” (Tschackert, 524.)
Flacius declared with respect to the issue formulated by Strigel: ”I explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely pa.s.sive (_h.o.m.o se habet pure pa.s.sive_). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its willing and its powers, then he is purely pa.s.sive when he receives (_in accipiendo_). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this spark is not purely pa.s.sive. But the Adamic will does not only not operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart, even operates contrarily (_verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui contra operatur_).” (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished between cooperation _before_ conversion (which he rejected absolutely) and cooperation _after_ conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this point, he said to Strigel: ”I ask whether you say that the will cooperates _before_ the gift of faith or _after_ faith has been received whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy Spirit. _Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle._” (Seeberg 4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will declare it as your opinion ”that only the regenerated, sanctified, renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will.”
”Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by G.o.d, not from the will he brings with him from his natural Adam--_quod h.o.m.o cooperetur ex fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo naturali Adamo.'_” ”We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you [Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end.” Strigel, however, who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but repeated that it was only a weak a.s.sent (_qualisc.u.mque a.s.sensio languida trepida et imbecilla_) which man was able to render when his will was incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit.
(Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)
164. Objections Answered.
At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing to conversion, and therefore the will ”is purely pa.s.sive in the reception of grace.” (Preger 2, 217.) ”We are pressed hard with the sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?”
(216.) ”We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of willing and thinking of G.o.d alone?” (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that G.o.d alone converts man, said Flacius, ”does not exclude the presence of the will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the natural will in conversion (_non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in conversione_).” (Seeberg 4, 492.)
In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared: ”Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of G.o.d and of ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will.
_Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit velle aut perficere nisi n.o.bis volentibus._” Charging Strigel with ambiguity, Flacius replied: ”You speak of one kind of synergism and we of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these questions are unknown to you.” Strigel, protesting that he was unable to see the difference, answered: ”For G.o.d's sake, have a little forbearance with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it be to my discredit.--_Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's eine Schand'_.” (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that man, too, has a share in _producing_ the good volition, while Flacius understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the latter, _e.g._, writing in _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:_ ”It is certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of whom it is written: It is G.o.d who worketh in us to will. _Certum est nos velle c.u.m volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus est, qui operatur in n.o.bis velle._” (Frank 1, 238.)
In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely pa.s.sive in his conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a block or stone when he is converted. ”That is true,” said Flacius, ”for a block can neither love nor hate G.o.d, while man by nature hates G.o.d, and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus G.o.d is dealing with one whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial that man is purely pa.s.sive in conversion] is buried a popish _meritum de congruo_ and a particle of free will.” (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a stone or block (_miserior trunco_), because by his natural powers he resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4, 696f.)
Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an impossibility, a contradiction. He said: ”If the will, even when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to a.s.sent, it must of necessity resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently rejecting, should be in the same will. _Si voluntas etiam adiuta a Spiritu Sancto non potest a.s.sentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verb.u.m et Spiritum Sanctum.
Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem perstare in reiectione._” Flacius replied: You need but distinguish between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always resists, and the new consenting will implanted by G.o.d in conversion.
”Man consents with the faith given by G.o.d, but he resists with the inborn wickedness of his Old Adam.” Your error is that you acknowledge only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of one's own to do and to perform (_talis incitatio includit proprias vires ad perficiendum_). ”I plead,” said Flacius, ”that by original sin man is not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (_hominem ...
penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum_).” ”The will is free with respect to things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan.” Hence, said Flacius, in order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and created in, man by the grace of G.o.d. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff., Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)
Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of G.o.d, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied: ”Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at least to observe external decency (_Zucht_), which G.o.d earnestly demands of us, for example, to hear G.o.d's Word, to go to church more frequently than into the tavern.” ”Furthermore, there are many carnal transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he has not done.” ”G.o.d may justly hold us responsible also with respect to things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully lost through his own fault.” (Preger 2, 214f.)
Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of G.o.d. But the latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (_voluntas repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter_), but not by coercion or compulsion. Necessity to resist (_necessitas repugnandi_), Flacius explained, does not involve coercion to resist (_coactio repugnandi_), since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (_necessitas immutabilitatis_), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion, although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to remain in union with G.o.d is elevated to immutability of so willing.
Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced to resist prove that he is able also to a.s.sent to grace. The fact, said Flacius, that the wicked _willingly_ will, think, and do only what pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills.
In brief: The categories ”coercion” and ”compulsion” cannot be applied to the will. This, however, does not imply that G.o.d is not able to create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was no coercion or compulsion involved when G.o.d, creating Adam, Eve, and the angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as coercion or compulsion when G.o.d, in conversion, bestows faith and a good will upon man.
In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated what Luther had written before him, in _De Servo Arbitrio:_ ”For if it is not we, but G.o.d alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, _i.e._, man, dest.i.tute of the Spirit of G.o.d, does not sin perforce, as though seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it.
For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else, within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of immutability, _i.e._, the will cannot change itself and turn to something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being resisted, as is proved by its indignation. _Si enim non nos, sed solus Deus operatur salutem in n.o.bis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare, velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dic.u.n.t, necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est h.o.m.o c.u.m vacat Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur magis ad volendum, dum ei resist.i.tur, quod probat eius indignatio._” (E.
v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)