Part 17 (2/2)
Regarding this point, that good works are necessary to justification in so far as they must be present, the Majorists appealed to Luther, who, however, had merely stated that faith is never alone, though it alone justifies. His axiom was: ”Faith alone justifies, but it is not alone-- _Fides sola iustificat, sed non est sola._” According to Luther good works, wherever they are found, are present in virtue of faith; where they are not present, they are absent because faith is lacking; nor can they preserve the faith by which alone they are produced. At the Altenburg Colloquy (1568 to 1569) the theologians of Electoral Saxony insisted that, since true faith does not and cannot exist in those who persevere in sins against their conscience, good works must not be altogether and absolutely excluded from justification, at least their necessity and presence must not be regarded as unnecessary. (189.) The theologians of Ducal Saxony, however, denied ”that in the article and act of justification our good works are necessary by necessity of presence. _Sed impugnamus istam propositionem, in articulo et actu iustificationis bona nostra opera necessaria esse necessitate praesentiae._” ”On the other hand, however, they, too, were solicitous to affirm the impossibility of faith's coexisting with an evil purpose to sin against G.o.d in one and the same mind at the same time.” (237; Gieseler 3, 2, 251.) In the _Apology of the Book of Concord_ the Lutheran theologians declared: ”The proposition (Justification of faith requires the presence of good works) was rejected [in the _Formula of Concord_] because it cannot be understood otherwise than of the cause of justification. For whatever is present in justification as necessary in such a manner that without its presence justification can neither be nor occur, that must indeed be understood as being a cause of justification itself.” (238)
148. Major's Concessions Not Satisfactory.
In order to put an end to the controversy, Major offered a concession in his ”_Confession concerning the Article of Justification,_ that is, concerning the doctrine that by faith alone, without any merit, for the sake of Christ, a man has forgiveness of sins, and is just before G.o.d and an heir of eternal salvation,” 1558. Here he states that he had not used the controverted formula for several years and, in order not to give further cause for public contention, he promised ”not to employ the words, 'Good works are necessary to salvation,' any more, on account of the false interpretations placed upon it.” (Preger 1, 396.) In making this concession, however, Major did not at all intend to retract his teaching or to condemn his proposition as false. He promised to abstain from its use, not because he was now convinced of his error and viewed his propositions as false and incorrect as such, but merely because it was ambiguous and liable to abuse, and because he wished to end the conflict. (Frank 2, 166f. 223.)
Nor did Major later on ever admit that he had erred in the matter. In an oration delivered 1567 he boasted of his intimate relation and doctrinal agreement with Luther and Melanchthon, adding: ”Neither did I ever deviate, nor, G.o.d a.s.sisting me, shall I ever deviate, from the truth once acknowledged. _Nec discessi umquam nec Deo iuvante discedam ab agnita semel veritate._” He had never thought or taught, said he, that good works are a cause of justification. And concerning the proposition, ”Good works are necessary to salvation,” he had expressly declared that he intended to abstain from its use ”because it had offended some on account of its ambiguity, _c.u.m propter ambiguitatem offenderit aliquos._” He continued: ”The facts show that we [the professors of Wittenberg University] are and have remained guardians of that doctrine which Luther and Melanchthon ... delivered to us, in whose writings from the time of the [Augsburg] Confession there is neither a dissonance nor a discrepancy, either among themselves or from the foundation, nor anything obscure or perplexing.” (Frank 2, 224. 167.)
Also in his Testament (_Testamentum Doctoris Georgii Majoris_), published 1570, Major emphatically denied that he had ever harbored or taught any false views concerning justification, salvation, and good works. Of his own accord he had also abandoned the phrases: ”Good works are necessary to salvation; it is impossible to be saved without good works; no one has ever been saved without good works--_Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem; impossibile est, sine bonis operibus salvum fieri; nemo umquam sine bonis operibus salvatus est._” He had done this in order to obviate the misapprehension as though he taught that good works are a cause of salvation which contribute to merit and effect salvation. According to this _Testament,_ he desired his doctrines and writings to be judged. In future he would not dispute with anybody about these phrases. (168.) Thus in his _Testament,_ too, Major withdrew his statements not because they were simply false, but only because they had been interpreted to mean that good works are the efficient cause of justification and salvation. And while Major in later writings did eliminate the appendix ”_ad salutem,_ to salvation,” or ”_ad vitam aeternam,_ to eternal life,” he retained, and continued to teach, essentially the same error in another garb, namely, that good works are necessary in order to retain faith. Enumerating, in his _Explanation of the Letter to the Galatians,_ of 1560, the purposes on account of which good works ought to be rendered, he mentions as the ”first, in order to retain faith, the Holy Spirit, the grace bestowed, and a good conscience.” (218.)
Thus Major was willing to abandon as dangerous and ambiguous, and to abstain from the use of the formula, ”Good works are necessary to salvation,” but refused to reject it as false and to make a public admission and confession of his error. This, however, was precisely what his opponents demanded; for they were convinced that they could be satisfied with nothing less. As a result the controversy continued till Major's death, in 1574. The Jena professors, notably Flacius, have been charged with prolonging the controversy from motives of personal revenge. (Schaff, 276.) No doubt, the Wittenbergers had gone to the very limit of rousing the animosity and resentment of Flacius (who himself, indeed, was not blameless in the language used against his opponents).
Major had depicted Flacius as a most base and wicked man, as a cunning and sly adventurer; as a tyrant, who, after having suppressed the Wittenbergers, would, as a pope, lord it over all Germany; as an Antinomian and a despiser of all good works, etc. (Preger 1, 397.) In the address of October 18, 1567 already referred to, Major said: ”There was in this school [Wittenberg] a vagabond of uncertain origin, fatherland, religion, and faith who called himself Flacius Illyricus....
He was the first one to spew out against this school, against its princ.i.p.al Doctors, against the churches of these regions, against the princes themselves, the poison which he had brewed and imbibed some time ago, and, having gnawed and consumed with the bite of a serpent the womb of his mother, to destroy the harmony of these churches, at first by spreading his dreams, fables, and gossip but now also by calumnies and manifest lies.” (Frank 2, 217.) Melanchthon, too, had repeatedly written in a similar vein. In an _Opinion_ of his, dated March 4, 1558, we read: ”Even if they [Flacius and his adherents] condemn and banish me, I am well satisfied; for I do not desire to a.s.sociate with them, because I well know that the said Illyricus with his adherents does not seek the honor of G.o.d, but publicly opposes the truth, and as yet has never declared himself concerning the entire sum of Christian doctrine.” (_C.
R._ 9, 463. 476. 311.) In an _Opinion_ of March 9, 1559, Melanchthon even insinuated that Flacius denied the Trinity. (763.) Before this, August, 1549, he had written to Fabricius: ”The Slavic runagate (Slavus drapetes) received many benefits from our Academy and from me. But we have nursed a serpent in our bosom. He deserves to be branded on his forehead as the Macedonian king did with a soldier: 'Ungrateful stranger, xevnos acharistos.' Nor do I believe that the source of his hatred is any other than that the place of Cruciger was not given to him. But I omit these disagreeable narrations.” (7, 449. 478 ff.) This personal abuse, however, was not the reason why Flacius persisted in his opposition despite the concessions made by Major and Menius,-- concessions with which even such moderate men as Martin Chemnitz were not satisfied.
Flacius continued his opposition because he could not do otherwise without sacrificing his own principles, compromising the truth, and jeopardizing the doctrine of justification. He did not yield because he was satisfied with nothing less than a complete victory of the divine truth and an unqualified retraction of error. The truly objective manner in which he dealt with this matter appears from his _Strictures on the Testament of Dr. Major (Censura de Testamento D. Majoris)_. Here we read, in substance: In his _Testament_ Major covers his error with the same sophism which he employed in his former writings. For he says that he ascribes the entire efficient cause, merit, and price of our justification and salvation to Christ alone, and therefore excludes and removes all our works and virtues. This he has set forth more fully and more clearly in his previous writings, saying that the proposition, ”Good works are necessary to salvation,” can be understood in a double sense; _viz._, that they are necessary to salvation as a certain merit, price, or efficient cause of justification or salvation (as the Papists understand and teach it), or that they are necessary to salvation as a certain debt or an indispensable cause (_causa sine qua non_), or a cause without which it is impossible for the effect of salvation to follow or for any one to obtain it. He now confesses this same opinion.
He does not expressly eliminate ”the indispensable cause, or the obligation without the fulfilment of which it is impossible for any one to be preserved, as he a.s.serted repeatedly before this, from which it appears that he adheres to his old error. _Et non diserte tollit causam sine qua non seu debitum, sine cuius persolutione sit impossibile quemquam servari, quod toties antea a.s.seruit; facile patet, eum pristinum illum suum errorem retinere._” (Schlb. 7, 266; Preger 1, 398.) Flacius demanded an unqualified rejection of the statement, ”Good works are necessary to salvation”--a demand with which Major as well as Melanchthon refused to comply. (_C. R._ 9, 474 f.)
The _Formula of Concord_, however, sanctioned the att.i.tude of Flacius.
It flatly rejected the false and dubious formulas of Melanchthon, Major, and Menius concerning the necessity of good works to salvation, and fully restored Luther's doctrine. Luther's words concerning ”good works”
are quoted as follows: ”We concede indeed that instruction should be given also concerning love and good works, yet in such a way that this be done when and where it is necessary, namely, when otherwise and outside of this matter of justification we have to do with works. But here the chief matter dealt with is the question not whether we should also do good works and exercise love, but by what means we can be justified before G.o.d and saved. And here we answer with St. Paul: that we are justified by faith in Christ alone, and not by the deeds of the Law or by love. Not that we hereby entirely reject works and love, as the adversaries falsely slander and accuse us, but that we do not allow ourselves to be led away, as Satan desires, from the chief matter, with which we have to do here, to another and foreign affair, which does not at all belong to this matter. Therefore, whereas and as long as we are occupied with this article of justification, we reject and condemn works, since this article is so const.i.tuted that it can admit of no disputation or treatment whatever regard ing works. Therefore in this matter we cut short all Law and works of the Law.” (925, 29.)
The _Formula of Concord_ rejects the Majoristic formula, not because it is ambiguous, but because it is false. Concerning ambiguous phrases it declares: ”To avoid strife about words, _aequivocationes vocabulorum, i.e._, words and expressions which are applied and used in various meanings, should be carefully and distinctly explained.” (874, 51.) An ambiguous phrase or statement need not be condemned, because it may be made immune from error and misapprehension by a careful explanation. The statement, ”Good works are necessary to salvation,” however, does not admit of such treatment. It is inherently false and cannot be cured by any amount of explanation or interpretation. Because of this inherent falsity it must be rejected as such. Logically and grammatically the phrase, ”Good works are necessary to salvation,” reverses the correct theological order, by placing works before faith and sanctification before justification. It turns things topsy-turvy. It makes the effect the cause; the consequent, the antecedent, and vice versa.
Not personal animosity, but this fundamental falsity of the Majoristic formula was, in the last a.n.a.lysis, the reason why the explanations and concessions made by Major and Menius did not and could not satisfy their opponents. They maintained, as explained above, that the words ”necessary to” always imply ”something that precedes, moves, effects, works,” and that, accordingly, the obnoxious propositions of Major ”place good works before the remission of sins and before salvation.”
(Preger 1, 377.) Even Planck admits that only force could make the proposition, ”Good works are necessary to salvation,” say, ”Good works must follow faith and justification.” ”According to the usage of every language,” says he, ”a phrase saying that one thing is necessary to another designates a causal connection. Whoever dreamt of a.s.serting that heat is necessary to make it day, because it is a necessary effect of the rays of the sun, by the spreading of which it becomes day.” (4, 542.
485.) Without compromising the truth and jeopardizing the doctrine of justification, therefore, the Lutherans were able to regard as satisfactory only a clear and unequivocal rejection of Majorism as it is found in the _Formula of Concord._
149. Absurd Proposition of Amsdorf.
Nicholas Amsdorf, the intimate and trusted friend of Luther, was among the most zealous of the opponents of Majorism. He was born December 3, 1483; professor in Wittenberg; 1521 in Worms with Luther; superintendent in Magdeburg; 1542 bishop at Naumburg; banished by Maurice in 1547, he removed to Magdeburg; soon after professor and superintendent in Jena; opposed the Interimists, Adiaphorists, Osiandrists, Majorists, Synergists, Sacramentarians, Anabaptists, and Schwenckfeldians; died at Eisenach May 14, 1565. Regarding the bold statements of Major as a blow at the very heart of true Lutheranism, Amsdorf antagonized his teaching as a ”most pernicious error,” and denounced Major as a Pelagian and a double Papist. But, alas, the momentum of his uncontrolled zeal carried him a step too far--over the precipice. He declared that good works are detrimental and injurious to salvation, _bona opera perniciosa_ (noxia) _esse ad salutem._ He defended his paradoxical statement in a publication of 1559 against Menius, with whose subscription to the Eisenach propositions, referred to above, he was not satisfied; chiefly because Menius said there that he had taught and defended them also in the past. The flagrant blunder of Amsdorf was all the more offensive because it appeared on the t.i.tle of his tract, reading as follows: ”_Da.s.s diese Propositio: 'Gute Werke sind zur Seligkeit schaedlich,'
eine rechte, wahre christliche Propositio sei,_ durch die heiligen Paulum und Lutherum gelehrt und gepredigt. Niclas von Amsdorf, 1559.
That this proposition, 'Good works are injurious to salvation,' is a correct, true, Christian proposition taught and preached by Sts. Paul and Luther.” (Frank 2, 228.)
Luther, to whose writings Amsdorf appealed, had spoken very guardedly and correctly in this matter. He had declared: Good works are detrimental to the righteousness of faith, ”if one presumes to be justified by them, _si quis per ea praesumat iustificari._” Wherever Luther speaks of the injuriousness of good works, it is always _sub specie iustificationis,_ that is to say, viewing good works as entering the article of justification, or the forgiveness of sins. (Weimar 7, 59; 10, 3, 373. 374. 387; E. 16, 465. 484; Tschackert, 516.) What vitiated the proposition as found in Amsdorf's tract was the fact that he had omitted the modification added by Luther. Amsdorf made a flat statement of what Luther had a.s.serted, not flatly, _nude et simpliciter,_ but with a limitation, _secundum quid._
Self-evidently the venerable Amsdorf, too, who from the very beginning of the Reformation had set an example in preaching as well as in living a truly Christian life, did not in the least intend to minimize, or discourage the doing of, good works by his offensive phrase, but merely to eliminate good works from the article of justification. As a matter of fact, his extravagant statement, when taken as it reads, flatly contradicted his own clear teaching. In 1552 he had declared against Major, as recorded above: ”Who has ever taught or said that one should or need not do good works?” ”For we all say and confess that after his renewal and new birth a Christian should love and fear G.o.d and do all manner of good works,” etc. What Amsdorf wished to emphasize was not that good works are dangerous in themselves and as such, but in the article of salvation. For this reason he added: ”_ad salutem,_ to salvation.” By this appendix he meant to emphasize that good works are dangerous when introduced as a factor in justification and trusted in for one's salvation.
Melanchthon refers to the proposition of Amsdorf as ”filthy speech, _unflaetige Rede._” In 1557, at Worms, he wrote: ”Now Amsdorf writes: Good works are detrimental to salvation.... The Antinomians and their like must avoid the filthy speech, 'Good works are detrimental to salvation.'” (_C. R._ 9, 405 ff.) Though unanimously rejecting his blundering proposition, Amsdorf's colleagues treated the venerable veteran of Lutheranism with consideration and moderation. No one, says Frank, disputed the statement in the sense in which Amsdorf took it, and its form was so apparently false that it could but be generally disapproved. (2, 176.) The result was that the paradox a.s.sertion remained without any special historical consequences.
True, Major endeavored to foist Amsdorf's teaching also on Flacius. He wrote: Flacius ”endeavors with all his powers to subvert this proposition, that good works are necessary to those who are to be saved; and tries to establish the opposite blasphemy, that good works are dangerous to those who are to be saved, and that they area hindrance to eternal salvation--_evertere summis viribus hanc propositionem conatur: bona opera salvandis esse necessaria. Ac contra stabilire oppositam blasphemiam studet: Bona opera salvandis periculosa sunt et aeternae saluti officiunt._” Major continues: ”Let pious minds permit Flacius and his compeers, at their own risk, to prost.i.tute their eternal salvation to the devils, and by their execrations and anathemas to sacrifice themselves to the devil and his angels.” (Frank 2, 221.) This, however, was slander pure and simple, for Flacius was among the first publicly to disown Amsdorf when he made his extravagant statement against Menius.
(Preger 1, 392. 384.)
The _Formula of Concord_ most emphatically rejects the error of Amsdorf (the bare statement that good works are injurious to salvation) ”as offensive and detrimental to Christian discipline.” And justly so; for the question was not what Amsdorf meant to say: but what he really did say. The _Formula_ adds: ”For especially in these last times it is no less, needful to admonish men to Christian discipline and good works, and remind them how necessary it is that they exercise themselves in good works as a declaration of their faith and grat.i.tude to G.o.d, than that works be not mingled in the article of justification; because men may be d.a.m.ned by an Epicurean delusion concerning faith, as well as by papistic and Pharisaical confidence in their own works and merits.”
(801, 18.)
150. Other Points of Dispute.
Is it correct to say: G.o.d requires good works, or, Good works are necessary, and, Christians are obliged or in duty bound to do good works (_bona opera sunt necessaria et debita_)? This question, too, was a point of dispute in the Majoristic controversy. Originally the controversy concerning these terms and phrases was a mere logomachy, which, however, later on (when, after the error lurking in the absolute rejection of them had been pointed out, the phrases were still flatly condemned), developed into a violent controversy. The _Formula of Concord_ explains: ”It has also been argued by some that good works are not _necessary (noetig)_, but are _voluntary (freiwillig)_, because they are not extorted by fear and the penalty of the Law, but are to be done from a voluntary spirit and a joyful heart. Over against this the other side contended that good works are _necessary_. This controversy was originally occasioned by the words _necessitas_ and _libertas_ [”_notwendig_” und ”_frei_”], that is, necessary and free, because especially the word _necessitas,_ necessary, signifies not only the eternal, immutable order according to which all men are obliged and in duty bound to obey G.o.d, but sometimes also a coercion, by which the Law forces men to good works. But afterwards there was a disputation not only concerning the words, but the doctrine itself was attacked in the most violent manner, and it was contended that the new obedience in the regenerate is not necessary because of the above-mentioned divine order.” (939, 4f.)
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