Part 40 (2/2)

If America is to be saved from destruction-specincatiy, from dictators.h.i.+p-she will be saved by her sense of life.

[”Don't Let It Go,” PWNI, 251; pb 206.]

A sense of life is not a subst.i.tute for explicit knowledge. Values which one cannot identify, but merely senses implicitly, are not in one's control. One cannot tell what they depend on or require, what course of action is needed to gain and/or keep them. One can lose or betray them without knowing it.

[Ibid., 256; pb 210.]

See also AMERICA; ART; ARTISTIC CREATION; BENEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; EMOTIONS; ENLIGHTENMENT, AGE OF; ENVY/ HATRED of the GOOD for BEING the GOOD; ESTHETIC ABSTRACTIONS; ESTHETIC JUDGMENT; LOVE; MALEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; METAPHYSICAL VALUE-JUDGMENTS; METAPHYSICS; PHILOSOPHY; s.e.x; SUBCONSCIOUS.

Service. The concept of ”service” has been turned into a collectivist ”package-deal” by means of a crude equivocation and a cruder evasion. In the language of economics, the word ”service” means work offered for trade on a free market, to be paid for by those who choose to buy it. In a free society, men deal with one another by voluntary, uncoerced exchange, by mutual consent to mutual profit, each man pursuing his own rational self-interest, none sacrificing himself or others; and all values-whether goods or services-are traded, not given away.

This is the opposite of what the word ”service” means in the language of altruist ethics: to an altruist, ”service” means unrewarded, self-sacrificial, unilateral giving, while receiving nothing in return. It is this sort of selfless ”service” to ”society” that collectivists demand of all men.

[”How Not to Fight Against Socialized Medicine,” TON, March 1963, 12.]

See also ALTRUISM; CAPITALISM; COLLECTIVISM; ”PACKAGE-DEALING,” FALLACY of; SACRIFICE; SELFISHNESS; TRADER PRINCIPLE.

s.e.x. s.e.x is a physical capacity, but its exercise is determined by man's mind-by his choice of values, held consciously or subconsciously. To a rational man, s.e.x is an expression of self-esteem-a celebration of himself and of existence. To the man who lacks self-esteem, s.e.x is an attempt to fake it, to acquire its momentary illusion.

Romantic love, in the full sense of the term, is an emotion possible only to the man (or woman) of unbreached self-esteem: it is his response to his own highest values in the person of another-an integrated response of mind and body, of love and s.e.xual desire. Such a man (or woman) is incapable of experiencing a s.e.xual desire divorced from spiritual values.

[”Of Living Death,” TO, Oct. 1968, 2.]

Just as an idea unexpressed in physical action is contemptible hypocrisy, so is platonic love-and just as physical action unguided by an idea is a fool's self-fraud, so is s.e.x when cut off from one's code of values.... Only the man who extols the purity of a love devoid of desire, is capable of the depravity of a desire devoid of love.

[”The Meaning of s.e.x,” FNI, 120; pb 100.]

The man who despises himself tries to gain self-esteem from s.e.xual adventures-which can't be done, because s.e.x is not the cause, but an effect and an expression of a man's sense of his own value ...

The men who think that wealth comes from material resources and has no intellectual root or meaning, are the men who think-for the same reason-that s.e.x is a physical capacity which functions independently of one's mind, choice or code of values. They think that your body creates a desire and makes a choice for you-just about in some such way as if iron ore transformed itself into railroad rails of its own volition. Love is blind, they say; s.e.x is impervious to reason and mocks the power of all philosophers. But, in fact, a man's s.e.xual choice is the result and the sum of his fundamental convictions. Tell me what a man finds s.e.xually attractive and I will tell you his entire philosophy of life. Show me the woman he sleeps with and I will tell you his valuation of himself. No matter what corruption he's taught about the virtue of selflessness, s.e.x is the most profoundly selfish of all acts, an act which he cannot perform for any motive but his own enjoyment-just try to think of performing it in a spirit of selfless charity!-an act which is not possible in self-abas.e.m.e.nt, only in self-exaltation, only in the confidence $of being desired and being worthy of desire. It is an act that forces him to stand naked in spirit, as well as in body, and to accept his real ego as his standard of value. He will always be attracted to the woman who reflects his deepest vision of himself, the woman whose surrender permits him to experience-or to fake-a sense of self-esteem.... Love is our response to our highest values-and can be nothing else.

[Ibid., 118; pb 99.]

The doctrine that man's s.e.xual capacity belongs to a lower or animal part of his nature ... is the necessary consequence of the doctrine that man is not an integrated ent.i.ty, but a being torn apart by two opposite, $antagonistic, irreconcilable elements; his body, which is of this earth, and his soul, which is of another, supernatural realm. According to that doctrine, man's s.e.xual capacity-regardless of how it is exercised or motivated, not merely its abuses, not unfastidious indulgence or promiscuity, but the capacity as such-is sinful or depraved.

[”Of Living Death,” TO, Sept. 1968, 1.]

s.e.x is one of the most important aspects of man's life and, therefore, must never be approached lightly or casually. A s.e.xual relations.h.i.+p is proper only on the ground of the highest values one can find in a human being. s.e.x must not be anything other than a response to values. And that is why I consider promiscuity immoral. Not because s.e.x is evil, but because s.e.x is too good and too important....

[s.e.x should) involve ... a very serious relations.h.i.+p. Whether that relations.h.i.+p should or should not become a marriage is a question which depends on the circ.u.mstances and the context of the two persons' lives. I consider marriage a very important inst.i.tution, but it is important when and if two people have found the person with whom they wish to spend the rest of their lives-question of which no man or woman can be automatically certain. When one is certain that one's choice is final, then marriage is, of course, a desirable state. But this does not mean that any relations.h.i.+p based on less than total certainty is improper. I think the question of an affair or a marriage depends on the knowledge and the position of the two persons involved and should be left up to them. Either is moral, provided only that both parties take the relations.h.i.+p seriously and that it is based on values.

[”Playboy's Interview with Ayn Rand,” pamphlet, 8.]

See also ABORTION; BIRTH CONTROL; EMOTIONS; FEMININITY; FREUD; LOVE; MARRIAGE; PHILOSOPHY; RELIGION; SELF-ESTEEM; SELFISHNESS; SENSE of LIFE; SOUL-BODY DICHOTOMY; VALUES.

Similarity. The element of similarity is crucially involved in the formation of every concept; similarity, in this context, is the relations.h.i.+p between two or more existents which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or degree....

Similarity is grasped perceptually; in observing it, man is not and does not have to be aware of the fact that it involves a matter of measurement. It is the task of philosophy and of science to identify that fact.

[ITOE, 15.].

See also CONCEPT-FORMATlON; MEASUREMENT; PERCEPTION.

Singing. See Performing Arts.

Skepticism. ”We know that we know nothing,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are claiming knowledge-”There are no absolutes,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are uttering an absolute-”You cannot prove that you exist or that you're conscious,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that proof presupposes existence, consciousness and a complex chain of knowledge: the existence of something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproved.

[GS, FNI, 192; pb 154.]

In the history of philosophy-with some very rare exceptions-epistemological theories have ... taught either that knowledge is impossible (skepticism) or that it is available without effort (mysticism). These two positions appear to be antagonists, but are, in fact, two variants on the same theme, two sides of the same fraudulent coin: the attempt to escape the responsibility of rational cognition and the absolutism of reality-the attempt to a.s.sert the primacy of consciousness over existence....

The mystic is usually an exponent of the intrinsic (revealed) school of epistemology; the skeptic is usually an advocate of epistemological subjectivism.

[ITOE, 105.].

The crusading skepticism of the modern era; the mounting attack on absolutes, certainty, reason itself; the insistence that firm convictions are a disease and that compromise in any dispute is men's only recourse-all this, in significant part, is an outgrowth of Descartes' basic approach to philosophy. To reclaim the self-confidence of man's mind, the first modern to refute is Kant (see Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology); the second is Descartes.

Observe that Descartes starts his system by using ”error” and its synonyms or derivatives as ”stolen concepts.”

Men have been wrong, and therefore, he implies, they can never know what is right. But if they cannot, how did they ever discover that they were wrong? How can one form such concepts as ”mistake” or ”error” while wholly ignorant of what is correct? ”Error” signifies a departure from truth; the concept of ”error” logically presupposes that one has already grasped some truth. If truth were unknowable, as Descartes implies, the idea of a departure from it would be meaningless.

The same point applies to concepts denoting specific forms of error. If we cannot ever be certain that an argument is logically valid, if validity is unknowable, then the concept of ”invalid” reasoning is impossible to reach or apply. If we cannot ever know that a man is sane, then the concept of ”insanity” is impossible to form or define. If we cannot recognize the state of being awake, then we cannot recognize or conceptualize a state of not being awake (such as dreaming). If man cannot grasp X, then ”non-X” stands for nothing.

Fallibility does not make knowledge impossible. Knowledge is what makes possible the discovery of fallibility.

(Leonard Peikoff, ” 'Maybe You're Wrong,' ” TOF, April 1981, 8.]

It is possible, the skeptic argument declares, for man to be in error; therefore, it is possible that every individual is in error on every question. This argument is a non sequitur; it is an equivocation on the term ”possible.”

What is possible to a species under some circ.u.mstances, is not necessarily possible to every individual member of that species under every set of circ.u.mstances. Thus, it is possible for a human being to run the mile in less than four minutes; and it is possible for a human being to be pregnant. I cannot, however, go over to a crippled gentleman in his wheelchair and say: ”Perhaps you'll give birth to a son next week, after you've run the mile to the hospital in 3.9 minutes-after all, you're human, and it is possible for human beings to do these things.”

The same principle applies to the possibility of error-or of truth. If someone maintains that New York City is made of mushroom soup, he cannot defend his idea by saying: ”It is possible for human beings to reach the truth. I am human, so maybe this is the truth.” No matter what is possible under some conditions, a man cannot be ”possibly” right when he is blatantly wrong. By the same token, no skeptic can declare that you are possibly wrong, when you are blatantly right. ”It is possible for- man...” does not justify ”It is possible that you . . .” The latter claim depends on the individual involved, and on the conditions.

”Maybe you're wrong” is an accusation that must be supported by specific evidence. It cannot be uttered without context, grounds, or basis, i.e., arbitrarily.

[Ibid., 10.]

Doubting without a basis is the equivalent of-is indeed a form of-a.s.serting without a basis. Both procedures, being arbitrary, are disqualified by the very nature of human cognition. In reason, certainty must precede doubt, just as a grasp of truth must precede the detection of error. To establish a claim to knowledge, what one must do is to prove an idea positively, on the basis of the full context of evidence available; i.e., a man must prove that he is right. It is not inc.u.mbent on anyone-nor is it possible-to prove that he is not wrong, when no evidence of error has been offered.

[Ibid., 12.]

See also ABSOLUTES; AGNOSTICISM; ARBITRARY; AXIOMS; CERTAINTY; CONTEXT; EPISTEMOLOGY; FALSEHOOD; KANT, IMMANUEL; MYSTICISM; ”OPEN MIND” and ”CLOSED MIND”; PERCEPTION; POSSIBLE; PROOF; REASON; SELF-EVIDENT; ”STOLEN CONCEPT,” FALLACY of; SUBJECTIVISM; TRUTH.

Social System. A social system is a set of moral-political-economic principles embodied in a society's laws, inst.i.tutions, and government, which determine the relations.h.i.+ps, the terms of a.s.sociation, among the men living in a given geographical area. It is obvious that these terms and relations.h.i.+ps depend on an identification of man's nature, that they would be different if they pertain to a society of rational beings or to a colony of ants. It is obvious that they will be radically different if men deal with one another as free, independent individuals, on the premise that every man is an end in himself-or as members of a pack, each regarding the others as the means to his ends and to the ends of ”the pack as a whole.”

There are only two fundamental questions (or two aspects of the same question) that determine the nature of any social system: Does a social system recognize individual rights?-and: Does a social system ban physical force from human relations.h.i.+ps? The answer to the second question is the practical implementation of the answer to the first.

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