Part 11 (2/2)

9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq ”will come at some point,” although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to its Iraq policy, perhaps including both a.s.sistance and debt relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.

The Need to Resist Iran

10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. ”He told you to cut off the head of the snake,” he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. ”He told you to cut off the head of the snake,” he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003.

12. (S) Comment: Saudi att.i.tudes toward Iraq, from the King on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Amba.s.sador Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever, the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new measures in the areas of a.s.sistance and debt relief, although further discussions will be required to make these ideas a reality. End Comment.

13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus. GFOELLER

CHINA 'WOULD ACCEPT' KOREAN REUNIFICATION.

SECRET SEOUL 000272.

SIPDIS.

EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034.

TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA”>JA”>JA, CH SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS.

Cla.s.sified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Amba.s.sador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy. Beijing had ”no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK characterized as ”the most incompetent official in China” had retained his position as chief of the PRC's 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese att.i.tudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Amba.s.sador's point that a strong ROK-j.a.pan relations.h.i.+p would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations...

2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Amba.s.sador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in ”two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy; there was ”no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry's ”briefing” to the ROK emba.s.sy in Beijing on w.a.n.g Jiarui's visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had ”basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether w.a.n.g had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea ”than most people believe.” Beijing had ”no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK leaders.h.i.+p ”knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the ”brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x 4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was ”a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC's delegation. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x said it appeared that the DPRK ”must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China's 6PT chief. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x complained that Wu is the PRC's x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who ”knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn't speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming to anyone willing to listen that the PRC's economic rise represented a ”return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.

...China's ”New Generation” of Korea-Hands...

5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x Chun claimed x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x, Chun said, were ready to ”face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state a view that since North Korea's 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario...

6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly ”not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x Chun x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anch.o.r.ed to the United States in a ”benign alliance” as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, j.a.pan, and South Korea not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could ”strengthen the centrifugal forces in China's minority areas.”

...and j.a.pan

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Amba.s.sador's point that a strong ROK-j.a.pan relations.h.i.+p would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. Chun a.s.serted that, even though ”j.a.pan's preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

<script>