Part 8 (1/2)

In the week before publication, the state department warned many of its allies about the cables' embarra.s.sing contents. But they appeared not to know that the leaked cables ceased at the end of February, believing some to be more recent. Rumours circulated that Was.h.i.+ngton had been unimpressed with David Cameron and Britain's new coalition government, which took power in May. The US amba.s.sador in London, Louis B Susman, allegedly said as much in a post-election cable. The Americans, it was gathered, had now sheepishly briefed Downing Street about its contents. They were under the impression the leaked cables went up to June 2010, the month of Manning's arrest.

The Guardian Guardian didn't have that Cameron cable. As a result Cameron survived the WikiLeaks drama relatively unscathed. ”We were amazed about how little the US knew about what we were doing,” Katz says. 'They clearly had no idea which data set we had. They ma.s.sively over-briefed about what was in the cables.” didn't have that Cameron cable. As a result Cameron survived the WikiLeaks drama relatively unscathed. ”We were amazed about how little the US knew about what we were doing,” Katz says. 'They clearly had no idea which data set we had. They ma.s.sively over-briefed about what was in the cables.”

The New York Times New York Times had decided to forewarn the state department which cables it was intending to use. The had decided to forewarn the state department which cables it was intending to use. The Guardian Guardian which worked in Britain under a peculiarly oppressive legal regime was not going to follow the Americans quite that far. The paper was willing to listen, but was already doing all it could, without official prompting, to protect sensitive human contacts from reprisal, and not to publish irresponsibly. which worked in Britain under a peculiarly oppressive legal regime was not going to follow the Americans quite that far. The paper was willing to listen, but was already doing all it could, without official prompting, to protect sensitive human contacts from reprisal, and not to publish irresponsibly.

A few days before the cables' release, two senior figures from the US emba.s.sy in Grosvenor Square called in to the Guardian Guardian's London offices for a chat. This discussion led to a surreal transatlantic telephone call on Friday 26 November two days before D-Day. Rusbridger had agreed to ring Was.h.i.+ngton. He made the conference call from the circular table in his office. On the line in Was.h.i.+ngton was PJ Crowley, the US a.s.sistant secretary of state for public affairs. The conversation began: ”OK, here's PJ Crowley. I just want you to know in this phone call we've got secretary of state Clinton's private secretary, we have representatives of the DoD, the intelligence communities, and the National Security Council.”

All Rusbridger could offer in reply was, ”We have our managing editor here ...”

Crowley then set out how the cable scandal looked from the lofty heights of US power: ”Obviously, from our perspective these are stolen doc.u.ments. They reveal sensitive military secrets and addresses that expose people to security risks.”

Crowley made his pitch. He said the US government was ”willing to help” the Guardian Guardian if the newspaper was prepared to ”share the doc.u.ments” it had in other words, tip off the state department which cables it intended to publish. Rusbridger was non-committal. He said: ”I don't think we are going to agree on that now, so why don't we return later to that.” if the newspaper was prepared to ”share the doc.u.ments” it had in other words, tip off the state department which cables it intended to publish. Rusbridger was non-committal. He said: ”I don't think we are going to agree on that now, so why don't we return later to that.”

Crowley said some special forces operations and dealings with some countries were sensitive. He then asked for a pause. He came back a couple of minutes later: ”Mr Rusbridger, we don't feel this conversation is working for us because at the moment we are just giving a lot of stories, and we are not getting a lot in return.”

Clinton's private secretary chipped in. She said: ”I've got a very direct question for you, Mr Rusbridger. You journalists like asking direct questions and I know you expect direct answers. So I'm going to ask you a direct question. Are you going to give us the numbers of the cables or not?”

”No, we're not.”

”Thank you very much.”

Rusbridger did decide to tell the Americans the Guardian Guardian's broad publication schedule. Day one, he said was to feature Iran, with North Korea on day two and Pakistan on day three. Then the conversation was over.

In Germany, the editor-in-chief of Der Spiegel Der Spiegel had taken a call from the US amba.s.sador. He told Georg Mascolo that there was huge concern at the ”highest, highest levels” about the security of sources: ”Lives could be in jeopardy.” Mascolo replied that had taken a call from the US amba.s.sador. He told Georg Mascolo that there was huge concern at the ”highest, highest levels” about the security of sources: ”Lives could be in jeopardy.” Mascolo replied that Der Spiegel Der Spiegel had done everything it could to protect sources who might be in danger. He invited the state department to share with him their areas of concern. had done everything it could to protect sources who might be in danger. He invited the state department to share with him their areas of concern.

The New York Times New York Times had been holding its own sometimes tense negotiations with US government officials. The paper's lawyers were confident that it could report on the secret doc.u.ments without violating American law. But Bill Keller felt a large moral and ethical responsibility to use the material responsibly: ”While we a.s.sumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did, let alone what would happen once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the obligation to exercise care in our own journalism. From the beginning we determined that in our articles and in any doc.u.ments we published from the secret archive we would excise material that could put lives at risk,” he wrote later. had been holding its own sometimes tense negotiations with US government officials. The paper's lawyers were confident that it could report on the secret doc.u.ments without violating American law. But Bill Keller felt a large moral and ethical responsibility to use the material responsibly: ”While we a.s.sumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did, let alone what would happen once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the obligation to exercise care in our own journalism. From the beginning we determined that in our articles and in any doc.u.ments we published from the secret archive we would excise material that could put lives at risk,” he wrote later.

The New York Times New York Times's policy was to err on the side of caution. With the Afghan and Iraq war logs, the paper redacted names of all sources who had spoken to US soldiers and diplomats, and edited out details that might have revealed continuing intelligence-gathering operations or military tactics. But because of the range of the material and the hypersensitivities of diplomacy, the emba.s.sy cables were bound to be more explosive than the war logs, Keller considered.

Dean Baquet, the New York Times New York Times's Was.h.i.+ngton bureau chief, gave the White House an early warning on 19 November. Five days later, the day before Thanksgiving, Baquet and three colleagues were invited to a windowless room in the state department, where they encountered an unsmiling crowd: representatives of the White House, the state department, the director of national intelligence, the CIA, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the FBI and the Pentagon, gathered around a conference table. Others, who never identified themselves, lined the walls. A solitary note-taker tapped away on a computer.

The meeting was off the record, but it is fair to say the mood was tense. Scott Shane, one of the reporters who partic.i.p.ated in the meeting, described ”an undertone of suppressed outrage and frustration”. Subsequent meetings and daily conference calls were less p.r.i.c.kly and more businesslike, Keller says. The US administration had three areas generally of concern. It wanted to protect individuals who had spoken candidly to US diplomats in oppressive countries something the New York Times New York Times was happy to do. It also wanted to remove references to secret American programmes relating to intelligence. Lastly, it did not want the paper to reveal candid remarks by heads of state and other top foreign officials, and feared publication would strain relations with those countries. ”We were mostly unpersuaded,” Keller recalls. was happy to do. It also wanted to remove references to secret American programmes relating to intelligence. Lastly, it did not want the paper to reveal candid remarks by heads of state and other top foreign officials, and feared publication would strain relations with those countries. ”We were mostly unpersuaded,” Keller recalls.

This was, of course, hardly the first time the New York Times New York Times had published secrets that discomfited the US government. Before the year of WikiLeaks, nothing the paper had done on Keller's watch had caused quite the agitation of two articles the paper published about tactics employed by the Bush administration after the attacks of 11 September 2001. One article, which was published in 2005 and won a Pulitzer prize, revealed that the National Security Agency was eavesdropping on domestic phone and email conversations without the legal courtesy of a warrant. The other, published in 2006, described a vast treasury department programme to screen international banking records. had published secrets that discomfited the US government. Before the year of WikiLeaks, nothing the paper had done on Keller's watch had caused quite the agitation of two articles the paper published about tactics employed by the Bush administration after the attacks of 11 September 2001. One article, which was published in 2005 and won a Pulitzer prize, revealed that the National Security Agency was eavesdropping on domestic phone and email conversations without the legal courtesy of a warrant. The other, published in 2006, described a vast treasury department programme to screen international banking records.

The editor had vivid memories of sitting in the Oval Office as President George W Bush tried to persuade him and the New York Times New York Times's publisher to withhold the eavesdropping article. Bush told him that if the paper published, it should share the blame for the next terrorist attack. Unconvinced, the paper published anyway, and the reaction from the government and conservative commentators in particular was vociferous.

This time around, the US administration reaction was different. It was, for the most part, sober and professional. The Obama White House, while strongly condemning WikiLeaks for making the doc.u.ments public, did not seek an injunction to halt publication. There was no Oval Office lecture, no plea to Keller or the publisher not to write about the doc.u.ments. ”On the contrary, in our discussions before the publication of our articles, White House officials, while challenging some of the conclusions we drew from the material, thanked us for handling the doc.u.ments with care. The secretaries of state and defence and the attorney general resisted the opportunity for a crowd-pleasing orgy of press-bas.h.i.+ng,” Keller says, adding: ”Though the release of these doc.u.ments was certainly painfully embarra.s.sing, the relevant government agencies actually engaged with us in an attempt to prevent the release of material genuinely damaging to innocent individuals or the national interest.”

From his secret hideout back in Ellingham Hall, a.s.sange sought to open his own channel of negotiations, sending a letter on 26 November to the US emba.s.sy in London. Headed ”Julian a.s.sange, editor-in-chief, WikiLeaks”, it began: ”Dear Amba.s.sador Susman, I refer to recent public statements by United States government officials expressing concern about the possible publication by WikiLeaks and other media organisations of information allegedly derived from United States government records.”

a.s.sange invited the US government to ”privately nominate” examples where publication of a cable could put an individual ”at significant risk of harm”. He promised WikiLeaks would quickly consider any US government submissions ahead of publication. The state department's legal adviser Harold Koh sent an uncompromising letter back. It stated that the cables ”were provided in violation of US law and without regard for the grave consequences of this action”.

Releasing them ”would place at risk the lives of countless individuals”, jeopardise ongoing military operations, and threaten co-operation between the US and its allies and partners, the letter said. It would hinder co-operation on ”common challenges such as terrorism, pandemic diseases and nuclear proliferation”.

The letter ordered WikiLeaks to halt plans to publish the cables, hand back the stolen files, and ”destroy all records of this material from WikiLeaks' databases.”

a.s.sange wrote to Susman again on 28 November. He made clear that WikiLeaks had no intention of putting anybody at risk, ”nor do we wish to harm the national security of the United States”. He continued: ”I understand that the United States government would prefer not to have the information that will be published in the public domain and is not in favour of openness. That said, either there is a risk or there is not. You have chosen to respond in a manner which leads me to conclude that the risks are entirely fanciful and that you are instead concerned only to suppress evidence of human rights abuses and other criminal behaviour.”

The negotiations with the state department such as they were thus terminated. All that was left was to prepare for simultaneous publication of the biggest leak in the history. What could possibly go wrong?

CHAPTER 15.

Publication day

Basel railway station, Switzerland 28 November 2010

”Launch! Launch! Launch!”

GUARDIAN NEWSROOM NEWSROOM.

It was Sunday morning at the sleepy Badischer Bahnhof. Few were around. The station sits precisely on the border between Germany and Switzerland. It is a textbook example of European co-operation with the Germans providing the trains, and the Swiss running the cafes and newspaper kiosks. This morning, however, the station would become briefly notorious for something else: a gigantic foul-up.

Early in the morning, a van rolled in, bearing 40 copies of the German news magazine Der Spiegel Der Spiegel. The weekly normally starts distributing copies to newsagents over the weekend, with revellers in Berlin able to buy it late on Sat.u.r.day night on their way home. But on this occasion as with the publication of the Afghan war logs Der Spiegel Der Spiegel was supposed to have held all copies of its edition back. The international release of the US emba.s.sy cables had been painstakingly co-ordinated for 21.30 GMT that Sunday evening. The was supposed to have held all copies of its edition back. The international release of the US emba.s.sy cables had been painstakingly co-ordinated for 21.30 GMT that Sunday evening. The Guardian Guardian, New York Times New York Times, El Pais El Pais and and Le Monde Le Monde were all waiting anxiously to push the b.u.t.ton on the world's biggest leak. were all waiting anxiously to push the b.u.t.ton on the world's biggest leak. Der Spiegel Der Spiegel had agreed to roll its stories out at the same time on its website, with the magazine only published on the following Monday morning. Everyone knew the script. had agreed to roll its stories out at the same time on its website, with the magazine only published on the following Monday morning. Everyone knew the script.

But the G.o.ds of news had decided to do things differently. At around 11.30am Christian Heeb, the editor-in-chief of the local Radio Basel, discovered a copy of Der Spiegel Der Spiegel at the station. It was dated 29/11/10. It cost 3.80. The front cover was nothing less than sensational: ”Revealed: How America Sees the world”. The strap-line confirmed: ”The secret dispatches of the US foreign ministry”. Against a red background was a photo-gallery of world leaders, each accompanied by a demeaning quotation culled from the US cables. Angela Merkel, Germany's increasingly un popular chancellor, was ”risk averse and rarely creative”. Guido Westerwelle, Merkel's disastrous foreign minister, was ”aggressive”. Then there were the others. Vladimir Putin? ”Alpha dog”. Dmitry Medvedev? ”Pale and hesitant”. Silvio Berlusconi? ”Wild parties”. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? ”Hitler”. Next to Libya's Muammar Gaddafi were the tantalising words ”Luxuriant blonde nurse”. More extraordinary revelations were promised inside. at the station. It was dated 29/11/10. It cost 3.80. The front cover was nothing less than sensational: ”Revealed: How America Sees the world”. The strap-line confirmed: ”The secret dispatches of the US foreign ministry”. Against a red background was a photo-gallery of world leaders, each accompanied by a demeaning quotation culled from the US cables. Angela Merkel, Germany's increasingly un popular chancellor, was ”risk averse and rarely creative”. Guido Westerwelle, Merkel's disastrous foreign minister, was ”aggressive”. Then there were the others. Vladimir Putin? ”Alpha dog”. Dmitry Medvedev? ”Pale and hesitant”. Silvio Berlusconi? ”Wild parties”. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? ”Hitler”. Next to Libya's Muammar Gaddafi were the tantalising words ”Luxuriant blonde nurse”. More extraordinary revelations were promised inside.

Heeb's station started to broadcast the news, saying a few early copies of Der Spiegel Der Spiegel had become available at Basel station. It was at this point that an anonymous Twitter user called Freelancer_09 decided to check out the prospect for himself. He tweeted: ” had become available at Basel station. It was at this point that an anonymous Twitter user called Freelancer_09 decided to check out the prospect for himself. He tweeted: ”Der Spiegel zu fruh am Badischen Bahnhof Basel! Mal schaun was da steht.” ( zu fruh am Badischen Bahnhof Basel! Mal schaun was da steht.” (Der Spiegel too early at Basel station! Let's see what's there.) Freelancer_09 managed to obtain one of the last two or three copies of the rogue too early at Basel station! Let's see what's there.) Freelancer_09 managed to obtain one of the last two or three copies of the rogue Spiegel Spiegel batch, just as panicked executives at the magazine's Berlin headquarters were realising something had gone horribly wrong: one of the distribution vans sent to crisscross Germany had set off for Switzerland 24 hours too early. batch, just as panicked executives at the magazine's Berlin headquarters were realising something had gone horribly wrong: one of the distribution vans sent to crisscross Germany had set off for Switzerland 24 hours too early.

Radio Basel in Switzerland received a hasty phone call from Germany. Would they come off the air in return for subsequent help with the story? But it was too late. Freelancer_09 was already at work: within minutes he had begun tweeting the magazine's contents. Merkel had a better relations.h.i.+p with US president George W Bush than with his successor Barack Obama! US diplomats have a low opinion of Germany's regional politicians! The Americans think Westerwelle is a jerk! At the start of the morning Freelancer_09 had a meagre tally of 40 Twitter followers. His own political views seemed pretty clear alternative, counter-cultural, even anarchist judging from the leftist Twitter users he followed, and from his own profile photo: a child shouting through a loud-hailer above the words: ”Police state”. Who he was exactly was uncertain. (His ident.i.ty remained mysterious; some weeks later his Twitter account went dormant.) Soon, word spread through the blogosphere that an anonymous local journalist in Basel had stumbled on the Holy Grail. Other German journalists started ”retweeting” his posts. Der Spiegel Der Spiegel frantically messaged him to make contact. He ignored them. ”His Twitter follows rapidly s...o...b..lled. We could see it was becoming a serious problem,” admits frantically messaged him to make contact. He ignored them. ”His Twitter follows rapidly s...o...b..lled. We could see it was becoming a serious problem,” admits Der Spiegel Der Spiegel's Holger Stark. ”While we were closing the hole, he had managed to get a copy of the magazine.”

Sitting helplessly in London, Alan Rusbridger realised that the 9.30pm GMT embargo for the release of the cables looked wobbly. ”You have five of the most powerful news organisations, and everything was paralysed by a little freelancer. We started having conferences on the hour wondering what to do,” Rusbridger says. There was more bad news. Rival German news organisations contacted Freelancer_09 and asked him to start scanning entire pages of Der Spiegel's edition. By about 3pm, he had 150 followers, with more joining every minute. By 4pm he had found a scanner, and was pumping the embargoed articles out onto the internet. His followers jumped to around 600. A French mirror site began translating Freelancer_09's posts. ”We realised the story wasn't going to hold. We had sprung a leak ourselves,” Rusbridger recalls wryly. It was a great irony. Rusbridger had been an early Twitter proselytiser; he had relentlessly encouraged Guardian Guardian journalists to sign up to the San Francis...o...b..sed micro-blogging site. Now Twitter had turned round and figuratively speaking skewered him in the bottom. journalists to sign up to the San Francis...o...b..sed micro-blogging site. Now Twitter had turned round and figuratively speaking skewered him in the bottom.

The previous day, Sat.u.r.day, at around 5pm a German technician from Der Spiegel Der Spiegel's own online service in Hamburg had made an earlier gaffe: he managed to go live on the website with an extract from the edition of the magazine. It gave a few intriguing early details: that there were 251,287 cables; that one cable dated back to 1966, but most were newer than 2004; that 9,005 doc.u.ments dated from the first two months of 2010. Stark apologised for the accident and said the German link was erased as soon as it was discovered. The screen shots circulated through the net for some time. Then on Sunday afternoon more material appeared on Spiegel Spiegel's popular English-language site. The rumours were now sweeping feverishly across Twitter. The antic.i.p.ation was reaching bursting point.

The New York Times New York Times soon spotted the soon spotted the Spiegel Spiegel online story. The paper's executives said the embargo was dead now effectively meaningless. ”What was so brilliant was the irony that of all the people to mess up it was the Germans,” said Katz not always the online story. The paper's executives said the embargo was dead now effectively meaningless. ”What was so brilliant was the irony that of all the people to mess up it was the Germans,” said Katz not always the Guardian Guardian's most politically correct representative. Until now, it was the Germans impeccably ethical at all times who had managed to avoid the recriminations hurled freely by a.s.sange at both the Americans and the British. Janine Gibson, editor of guardian.co.uk, the Guardian Guardian's website, compared the pratfall-strewn cables launch to Britain's 1993 Grand National. That shambolic instalment of the historic horse race was infamously cancelled after two false starts.

”It all got terribly untidy,” Rusbridger says. ”But it was the most complicated thing we have ever done, co-ordinating a Spanish morning paper with a French afternoon paper with a German weekly with an American [paper] in a different time zone and a bunch of anarchists in a bunker who would only communicate via Jabber [online instant messaging].”

By 6pm the Guardian Guardian and everyone else agreed just to publish, go with it. As though at Nasa's Mission Control Center in Houston, the and everyone else agreed just to publish, go with it. As though at Nasa's Mission Control Center in Houston, the Guardian Guardian's production staff stood poised at the newspaper's King's Cross office in front of a flickering bank of screens. Production boss Jon Ca.s.son asked: ”Will we launch?” Katz replied: ”LAUNCH!” The word was taken up and spread instantly across the back bench, the newsroom echoing with the words: ”Launch! Launch! Launch!” The world's biggest leak had gone live.

The Guardian Guardian's front-page splash made the historic dimensions of the story clear. With David Leigh's byline, it appeared on guardian.co.uk at 6.13pm. The headline proclaimed: ”US emba.s.sy cables leak sparks global diplomatic crisis.” It began: at 6.13pm. The headline proclaimed: ”US emba.s.sy cables leak sparks global diplomatic crisis.” It began: ”The United States was catapulted into a worldwide diplomatic crisis today, with the leaking to the Guardian Guardian and other international media of more than 250,000 cla.s.sified cables from its emba.s.sies, many sent as recently as February this year. At the start of a series of daily extracts from the US emba.s.sy cables many designated 'secret' the and other international media of more than 250,000 cla.s.sified cables from its emba.s.sies, many sent as recently as February this year. At the start of a series of daily extracts from the US emba.s.sy cables many designated 'secret' the Guardian Guardian can disclose that Arab leaders are privately urging an air strike on Iran and that US officials have been instructed to spy on the UN leaders.h.i.+p.” can disclose that Arab leaders are privately urging an air strike on Iran and that US officials have been instructed to spy on the UN leaders.h.i.+p.”

The story went on: ”These two revelations alone would be likely to reverberate around the world. But the secret dispatches, which were obtained by WikiLeaks, the whistleblowers' website, also reveal Was.h.i.+ngton's evaluation of many other highly sensitive international issues.”

At 6.15pm the Guardian Guardian launched a WikiLeaks live blog, to chart reaction as it came in. More live blogs would follow; they would become an innovative part of the cables coverage. The disclosures in Leigh's story were the first of many over the next four weeks. Despite its sc.r.a.ppy launch, the publication of the US state department cables amounted to the biggest leak since 1971 when Daniel Ellsberg gave the Pentagon papers to the launched a WikiLeaks live blog, to chart reaction as it came in. More live blogs would follow; they would become an innovative part of the cables coverage. The disclosures in Leigh's story were the first of many over the next four weeks. Despite its sc.r.a.ppy launch, the publication of the US state department cables amounted to the biggest leak since 1971 when Daniel Ellsberg gave the Pentagon papers to the New York Times New York Times, provoking a historic court case and revealing the White House's dirty secrets in Vietnam. This data spillage was far bigger an unprecedented release of secret information from the heart of the world's only superpower.

n.o.body could think of a bigger story certainly not one auth.o.r.ed by the media themselves. ”You could say the World Trade Center was a bigger story, or the Iraq war. But in terms of a newspaper, where by the act of publication you unleash one story that is then talked about in every single corner of the globe, and you are the only people who have got it, and you release it each day, this was unique,” Rusbridger says.