Volume I Part 52 (1/2)

[Sidenote: Rationale for the Principle of Non-extradition of Political Criminals.]

-- 338. The numerous attempts[695] against the lives of heads of States and the frequency of anarchistic crimes have shaken the value of the principle of non-extradition of political criminals in the opinion of the civilised world as ill.u.s.trated by the three practical attempts described above to meet certain difficulties. It is, consequently, no wonder that some writers[696] plead openly and directly for the abolition of this principle, maintaining that it was only the product of abnormal times and circ.u.mstances such as were in existence during the first half of the nineteenth century, and that with their disappearance the principle is likely to do more harm than good. And indeed it cannot be denied that the application of the principle in favour of some criminals, such as anarchistic[697] murderers and bomb-throwers, could only be called an abuse. But the question is whether, apart from such exceptional cases, the principle itself is still to be considered as justified or not.

[Footnote 695: Not less than nineteen of these attempts have been successful since 1850, as the following formidable list shows:--

Charles II., Duke of Parma, murdered on March 26, 1854.

Prince Danilo of Montenegro, ” August 14, 1860.

President Abraham Lincoln, U.S.A., ” April 14, 1865.

Prince Michael of Servia, ” June 10, 1868.

President Balta of Peru, ” July, 1872.

President Moreno of Ecuador, ” August 6, 1872.

Sultan Abdul a.s.sis of Turkey, ” June 4, 1876.

Emperor Alexander II. of Russia, ” March 13, 1881.

President Garfield, U.S.A., ” July 2, 1881.

President Carnot of France, ” June 24, 1894.

Shah Nazr-e-Din of Persia, ” May 1, 1896.

Empress Elizabeth of Austria, ” September 10, 1898.

King Humbert I. of Italy, ” July 30, 1900.

President McKinley, U.S.A., ” September 6, 1901.

King Alexander I. of Servia and Queen Draga, ” June 10, 1903.

King Carlos I. of Portugal and the Crown Prince, ” February 15, 1908.

President Caceres of San Domingo, ” November 19, 1911.]

[Footnote 696: See, for instance, Rivier, I. p. 354, and Scott in A.J.

III. (1909), p. 459.]

[Footnote 697: ”... the party with whom the accused is identified ...

namely the party of anarchy, is the enemy of all governments. Their efforts are directed primarily against the general body of citizens.

They may, secondarily and incidentally, commit offences against some particular government, but anarchist offences are mainly directed against private citizens.” (From the judgment of Cave, J. _In re_ Meunier, L.R. [1894] 2 Q.B. 419.)--See also Diena in R.G. II. (1905), pp. 306-336.]

Without doubt the answer must be in the affirmative. I readily admit that every political crime is by no means an honourable deed, which as such deserves protection. Still, political crimes are committed by the best of patriots, and, what is of more weight, they are in many cases a consequence of oppression on the part of the respective Governments.

They are comparatively infrequent in free countries, where there is individual liberty, where the nation governs itself, and where, therefore, there are plenty of legal ways to bring grievances before the authorities. A free country can never agree to surrender foreigners to their prosecuting home State for deeds done in the interest of the same freedom and liberty which the subjects of such free country enjoy. For individual liberty and self-government of nations are demanded by modern civilisation, and their gradual realisation over the whole globe is conducive to the welfare of the human race.

Political crimes may certainly be committed in the interest of reaction as well as in the interest of progress, and reactionary political criminals may have occasion to ask for asylum as well as progressive political criminals. The principle of non-extradition of political criminals indeed extends its protection over the former too, and this is the very point where the value of the principle reveals itself. For no State has a right to interfere with the internal affairs of another State, and, if a State were to surrender reactionary political criminals but not progressive ones, the prosecuting State of the latter could indeed complain and consider the refusal of extradition an unfriendly act. If, however, non-extradition is made a general principle which finds its application in favour of political criminals of every kind, no State can complain if extradition is refused. Have not reactionary States the same faculty of refusing the extradition of reactionary political criminals as free States have of refusing the extradition of progressive political criminals?

Now, many writers agree upon this point, but maintain that such arguments meet the so-called purely political crimes only, and not the relative or complex political crimes, and they contend, therefore, that the principle of non-extradition ought to be restricted to the former crimes only. But to this I cannot a.s.sent. No revolt happens without such complex crimes taking place, and the individuals who commit them may indeed deserve the same protection as other political criminals. And, further, although I can under no circ.u.mstances approve of murder, can never sympathise with a murderer, and can never pardon his crime, it may well be the case that the murdered official or head of a State has by inhuman cruelty and oppression himself whetted the knife which cut short his span of life. On the other hand, the mere fact that a crime was committed for a political purpose may well be without any importance in comparison with its detestability and heinousness. Attempts on heads of States, such, for example, as the murders of Presidents Lincoln and Carnot or of Alexander II. of Russia and Humbert of Italy, are as a rule, and all anarchistic crimes are without any exception, crimes of that kind. Criminals who commit such crimes ought under no circ.u.mstances to find protection and asylum, but ought to be surrendered for the purpose of receiving their just and appropriate punishment.

[Sidenote: How to avoid Misapplication of the Principle of Non-extradition of Political Criminals.]

-- 339. The question, however, is how to sift the chaff from the wheat, how to distinguish between such political criminals as deserve an asylum and such as do not. The difficulties are great and partly insuperable as long as we do not succeed in finding a satisfactory conception of the term ”political crime.” But such difficulties are only partly, not wholly, insuperable. The step taken by the Swiss extradition law of 1892 is so far in advance as to meet a great many of the difficulties. There is no doubt that the adoption of the Swiss rule by all the other civilised States would improve matters more than the universal adoption of the so-called Belgian _attentat_ clause. The fact that according to Swiss law each case of complex political crime is unravelled and obtains the verdict of an independent Court according to the very circ.u.mstances, conditions, and requirements under which it occurred, is of the greatest value. It enables every case to be met in such a way as it deserves, without compromising the Government, and without sacrificing the principle of non-extradition of political criminals as a valuable rule.