Part 14 (2/2)
For the moment, and in the present stage, it is, for this very reason, of special value to the Social Democrats, as it supplies a method of completely crippling the forces opposed to them in the existing order.
For it will be sufficient in the day of fulfilment, _i.e._ when all is ripe for the intended change, to give one shake, so to speak, in order to burst open the half capitalistic chrysalis, and let the b.u.t.terfly of a Social Democratic ”People's State” fly out.
The half capitalistic organisation would, I repeat, be of the greatest value at present, in the early preparatory work of the Social Democrats.
First, because the working cla.s.s would become practically and thoroughly accustomed to co-operation instead of to subordination as. .h.i.therto; this is the transition step which cannot be avoided, to the supremacy of the working cla.s.s over the employers' cla.s.s. Then, too, the proposed organisation would offer an excellent opportunity for pa.s.sing through the transition step by step, by the continued weakening of the capitalist order of society in all its joints. The struggle with capital would have the sanction and the organised force of legislation. It would receive legal organisation, and would even be legally enjoined. This legalised battle would proceed over the whole circuit of industrial activity, including trade and transport, and including also the state regulated portion of it.
In addition to this the organisation would be peculiarly fitted to cripple even the least objectionable bulwarks of capital, even the altogether unbia.s.sed and nonpartisan operation of the local and district, and probably even ultimately of the imperial courts.
The apparently equal coupling of the influence of both cla.s.ses would lead to the result that the cla.s.s which had the more energetic representatives and the slighter interest in the maintenance of the ”working rules” would be able at any moment and at any point in the national industrial life, to bring everything to a deadlock. The labour councillor would be dependent on the Labour Chambers, and they in turn would be entirely dependent on the leaders of labour. By the provision that the president shall have no vote, and a tie in voting shall therefore count as a defeat, the workmen's electorate hold in their hands the power to obstruct at will any resolution, and especially to obstruct the issue of the working rules in any business, since the rules must be submitted to the approval of the Labour Chambers.
The function of ”supporting the Labour Boards by advice and active help in all questions touching the industrial life of their district,” might very easily, by virtue of the above provision, be so abused by the Labour Chambers as to deprive individual industrial inspectors of all possibility of just and independent action, and hence by degrees to entirely cripple and destroy the value of the inspectorate as a whole; there can, I think be no doubt that before very long these powers would intentionally be used for this purpose.
The action of a positive Social policy would be hopelessly crippled by an equally balanced cla.s.s representation, while at the same time the existing order of industrial life would be disturbed and shaken down to the very last and smallest branches of industry.
Nor would this be all, for such an organisation would secure fixed salaries for the staff of agitators in the Labour party, since the representatives would receive daily pay and defrayment of travelling expenses from the Imperial exchequer. Debates and discussions might be carried on without intermission, the pay continuing all the time, for each Labour Chamber would be convened, not only once a month, but also at any time at the request of one-third of the members of the Labour Chamber, therefore of two-thirds of the labour representatives in the chamber. By virtue of the provision which gives them unlimited right of intervention, pretexts for convening frequent meetings would never be wanting.
Hence it is evident that no more effectual machinery could be devised for the legal preparation for leading up the existing social order directly to the threshold of the ”People's State.” The attempt to convert the hybrid Capitalist-Socialist state to a pure Socialist state would be a perfectly simple matter, both in the Empire, the provinces, and the local districts, as soon as we had allowed Social Democracy one or two decades in which to turn the two-fold cla.s.s representation to their own ends. By a single successful revolutionary ”_coup_” in the chief city of the Empire, or in the chief cities of several countries simultaneously, representation of capital in the Labour Courts might be thrown overboard, and the ”People's State” would be ready; the parliament of a purely popular government would hold the field, and the present representation of the nation which includes all cla.s.ses and watches over the spiritual and material interests of the whole nation, might without difficulty be swept away from Empire, province, district and munic.i.p.ality.
The construction of a complete system of ”collective” production would be easy, for it would find the framework ready to its hand, complete from base to summit, fully mapped out on the plan.
Perhaps the leaders themselves are not fully conscious of the lengths to which their proposed organisation may carry them. One can quite understand how from their standpoint they fail to see the end. They have pursued the path that seemed the most likely to lead to their goal of a radical change of the existing social order. The whole responsibility will rest with the parties in power, if they do more than hold out their little finger, which they have already done, to help Social Democracy along this path of organisation.
CHAPTER XII.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORGANISATION.
In spite of all that can be urged against them, however, we may gather much, not merely negative, but also positive, knowledge from the proposals of Social Democracy. An organisation which shall be equipped with full authority, which shall be independent, complete in all its parts, which shall prevail uniformly and equally over the whole nation; an organisation which shall avoid the disintegration of collective aids to labour, which shall encourage industrial representation and prevent the division of authority amongst many different courts: such is the root idea of the proposal, and this idea is just, however unacceptable may appear to us the form in which it is clothed in the Auer Motion.
Nothing is omitted in the Auer Motion except the a.s.signment of their various duties to the various branches of the territorial representative bodies, and the working out of an elementary local organisation. I shall therefore try to work out the idea into a legitimate and possible form of development. In order to do this I must distinguish between the organisation required for executive and for representative bodies.
As regards the executive organs, neither in Germany nor elsewhere is the industrial inspectorate at present furnished with a sufficient number of paid head-inspectors and sub-inspectors. Scarcely any of the sub-inspectors are drawn from the labouring cla.s.s except in the case of England. Industrial inspection in Germany has not yet attained uniform extension over the whole Empire. The inspectors of the different provinces, and the chief provincial inspectors of the whole Empire require to be brought into regular communication with each other and with a Central Bureau adapted for all forms of aid to labour, including Labour Protection--an organ which of course must not interfere with the imperial, const.i.tutional, and administrative independence of the States of the _Bund_. If the individual inspectors were everywhere carefully chosen, the a.s.sembling of all inspectors for deliberation with the Provincial and Imperial Central Bureaux of Labour Protection would in nowise r.e.t.a.r.d, but on the contrary would serve to promote the complete and equitable administration of Labour Protection and all forms of aid to labour. This is the really fruitful germ contained in the idea of an ”Imperial Labour Board.”
A Provincial Labour Board might effect much in the same direction. We are not without the beginnings of a uniform const.i.tution of this kind: England has an Inspector-General, Austria a Central Inspector; in Switzerland the inspectors hold regular conferences; in France a comprehensive scheme of inspectoral combination is projected.
The choice of persons as head and sub-inspectors, which is a matter of such great importance, might be subject to nomination by the united provincial inspectorate, coupled with instructions to direct particular attention to the selection of persons of practical experience, without social bias, well versed in knowledge of technical and hygienic matters, and suited to the special needs of the several posts.
But the mere development of the inspectorate would not be the only step in the progress of the organisation of Labour Protection. We must go much further than this. The combined interests of economy, simplicity, efficiency, and permanence of service, point to the necessity of relieving as far as possible the regular governmental courts of the Empire, of the province, and of the munic.i.p.ality, of the extra burden of judicial and police administration involved in special branches of Labour Protection, and in all other special forms of aid to labour. The same considerations involve the necessity of gradually developing a better organisation of a.s.sociated labour boards, an imperial board, and provincial, district, and munic.i.p.al boards. We should thus get rid of the present confusion of divided authority without entirely depriving Labour Protection, both individual and general, of the a.s.sistance of the ordinary administrative courts. This is the task that I have repeatedly insisted upon as imperatively requiring to be taken in hand in connexion with Labour Insurance. The Auer Motion attempts to meet this necessity.
Much also that is very just and very practical is contained in the idea of extending the sphere of operations of the Imperial Labour Board and of the District Boards so as to embrace not only Labour Protection but every form of aid to labour. Complaint is made that the organisation of Labour Insurance, in spite of all caution, has frequently proved a unpractical and costly piece of patchwork administration. Would it not then be more to the point, and would it not more easily fulfil the object of Labour Insurance and Labour Protection, and later on also of dwelling reform, inspection of work, etc., to create munic.i.p.al district and provincial boards, with a great Imperial Central Bureau at the head?
In order that each special branch of protection might receive proper attention, care would have to be taken in appointing to the offices of the collective organ, to insure the inclusion of the technical, juristic, police, hygienic, and statistic elements, and it would be necessary to group these elements into sections without destroying the unity of the service. There would be no lack of material, and it would not be difficult to secure a good, efficient, and economical working staff.
No less reasonable is the idea of a ”guild” of the eldest in the trade, or of a factory committee for the several large works with representation of both cla.s.ses to appoint the district, provincial, and imperial labour councils. So far from being extreme in this respect, the Auer Motion is rather to be reproached with incompleteness, and a lack of provision for local Labour Councils and Labour Chambers, a point which we have already mentioned. But the representative bodies would have a significance extending far beyond the limits of Labour Protection--following the example of Switzerland the _von Berlepsch_ Bill admits factory labour-committees for dealing with matters concerning the factory working rules--they would be agencies for the care of labour, for the insurance of social peace, the protection of morality, the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of order in the factory, for the instruction and discipline of apprentices, for the control of the administration of protective legislation, for dealing with the wage question, in a word for softening the severe autocracy of the employers and their managers by the co-operation and advice of the workers. And in this case I have nothing further to add to what I have already said on the matter in a former article.
But the supporter of even the most comprehensive scheme of labour representation does not stand committed to any such system of parliamentary management of industry by democratic majority as is proposed in the Auer Motion. The appointment and the working of the Labour Councils and Labour Chambers seems to me to introduce quite another element into the scheme.
The regular, not merely the accidental and occasional, meeting of the inspectors with the body of employers and workers is a recognised practical necessity; a less bureaucratic system of industrial management is demanded on all sides. Regularly appointed ordinary and special meetings with the Labour Chambers would no doubt accomplish much. The inspector ought to be accessible to the expression of all wishes, advice, and complaints; but, on the other hand, he should not yield blind obedience to the rulings and representations of such organs. The industrial inspector must be, and must remain, an officer of the State, capable of acting independently of either cla.s.s, appointed by government; only under these circ.u.mstances can he perform the duties of his office with firmness and impartial justice; in his appointment, in his salary, and in the exercise of his official duties he should be furnished with every guarantee to insure the independence of his judgment. It is nowise incompatible with this that he should be open to receive representations, whether in the way of advice, information, or complaint. The more he lays himself open to such in the natural course of work, the more important will his duties and position become, both on his circuits and in his office. The right of appeal to higher courts can always be secured to the Labour Chambers in cases of complaint. But how should representative bodies of this kind be formed?
In answering this question care must be taken above all not to confound such public Labour Chambers as are suggested in the Auer proposals with voluntary joint committees of both cla.s.ses. Each of these representative organs requires its own special const.i.tution.
<script>