Part 3 (1/2)

Church leaders in the Netherlands followed the struggle of the ”Confessing Church” in Germany, and were on the alert when they were challenged themselves.

The Church in Sweden was moved to protest by the statement issued by the Church of Norway. Church leaders in Hungary realized, when they did not carry their protest before the Hungarian public, that this course would ”incur... the reproach and accusation of the leading bodies of the Christian Churches” and stated that, if their intervention proved ineffective, they would be obliged ”to testify before the congregations of our Church and the Protestants of the world that we did not suppress the message of G.o.d”. [75]

Many of the Church leaders who took a clear stand, knew one another personally. [76] In view of the attempts of the Germans to deceive world opinion as to their ultimate aims concerning the Jews, and in view of the tendency to dismiss reports about what was going on as ”atrocity propaganda”, the importance of the information given by the World Council of Churches through its Press Service and by other means can hardly be overestimated.

The need to combine efforts and thus break through denominational barriers in order to come to a joint stand, was understood in some countries. In the Netherlands, Protestants and Roman Catholics began a new chapter in their relations.h.i.+p by protesting together. In France and Hungary there was consultation between Roman Catholics and Protestants, but it is to be regretted that they did not achieve a common front. <18>

Sometimes there existed close contact between Christian and Jewish leaders, as for example in the United States, in Great Britain, in Bulgaria and between the leaders of the World Council of Churches and the World Jewish Congress, in Geneva. Thus, again, information about what was going on was communicated and action could be co-ordinated.

The negative implication is also clear: whenever a spirit of particularism, provincialism and isolationism was strong in a Church, it did not fulfil its duty toward the persecuted Jews.

3 RESULTS

In order to ascertain the practical effects that could be expected from steps taken by the Churches, the political and geographical position of the countries concerned, as well as the time factor, must be born in mind.

Where there was a national Government, as was the case in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, protests had a better chance of some success than in countries under direct n.a.z.i control. Yet even then what Jeno Levai stated about Hungary was sometimes true:

”The Church was not in a position to promise or to threaten. Thus, in spite of their very best intentions, they could obtain only very little.

Naturally this little meant life to the persons concerned.” [77]

Typical were the differences between the Scandinavian countries: Sweden was neutral; Finland was an ally of the Germans; Denmark was occupied but it had its own King and was officially not even in a state of war with Germany; Norway's King had fled and the infamous Quisling had become Prime Minister. <19>

Geography also played an important role. The Jews in the Netherlands were in a deadly trap; Hungary was, at least for some time, a place of refuge for Jews in the neighbouring countries; Jews in Denmark and Norway had a chance to flee to Sweden and the Jews in France and Italy to Switzerland, in so far as that country was willing to admit them.

The time persecution began was a vital factor. The earlier it started, the smaller the chance of saving at least some lives. It should be noted that these three factors were utterly unfavourable in Germany.

It is difficult to a.s.sess the range of influence of any Church.

Figures have been given about members.h.i.+p in Appendix II, but one must remember that many Churches have a high percentage of nominal members who, perhaps since their baptism, never attended a church service.

Therefore it can be misleading to read that there were forty-five million Protestants in Germany, or, that 96,2 per cent of the population of Norway are members of the State Church. Only 5 per cent of the members of the Norwegian Church regularly attend Sunday services. In many other countries the situation is similar.

Many people who were not church goers may never even have known about the protests of the Church, and this is especially true of occupied Europe in those days, for there the Church could only speak from the pulpits, not through press and radio. Moreover, many nominal Christians are influenced by other outlooks on life, rather than by the Christian faith.

However, when press and radio were silenced and the Church alone could voice an open and public protest, it met with the response of many people who were outside the fold. Church services were better attended than in times of peace. The former editor-in-chief of the Dutch communist daily De Waarheid relates that he went to a church service in those days:

That church meant something to us in those black days, were it only to listen to the prayer of a man, who dared make a public address on behalf of the people tortured in the concentration camps. [78]

<20> I myself belong to the persons who, in those days, found their way back to the fold, attracted as we were by the Church's spiritual resistance to the n.a.z.is.

When attempting to a.s.sess the practical results of steps taken by Churches or Church leaders on behalf of the Jews, we distinguish between countries under German occupation, countries under a satellite government, neutral countries, and countries that were at war with Germany.

In countries under German occupation, efforts made by the Churches had hardly any direct practical result for the Jews in general. Personal intervention did not help or, at best, could only cause some delay in the deportations. The only step that had some effect on the Germans (as we now know!) was the issuing of a public protest.

Again it was evident, that the German authorities did not fear or have any step taken by the Churches as much as their protests which were read from the pulpits. Letters of protest they could throw in the dustbin or file away.

They could listen to oral protests without taking them to heart. But they tried in every way to prevent public protests (in those days the only form of public protest), fearing their effect upon the people.”[79]

The most effective protests were those, which clearly encouraged the faithful to help the Jews. Others called for non-cooperation with the Germans, and this had at least some result.

Six Roman Catholic police-agents at Utrecht informed their chief on February 24, 1943, that on the grounds of a pastoral letter read in their church on February 21, they would have to refuse if ordered to arrest Jews.

Their chief threatened to dismiss them without pension and said that ”those who do not announce their intended refusal and yet have the impudence to carry it out will be considered saboteurs, with all the serious consequences.

The Germans immediately tried to arrest these agents but they had gone into hiding. The Germans then arrested their wives and children.” [80]

<21> Generally speaking, the positive indirect effect of public protests was, that it counteracted the attempts of the Germans to separate and isolate the Jews from the non-Jewish population, in order to break their will to resist deportation and annihilation. [81]

It is impossible to count the lives saved through the activities of the Churches in the occupied territories. I agree with the opinion of Dr. Visser 't Hooft:

”So far we have only spoken of public protests. But were these protests implemented by deeds? The answer is that they were, though by no means as generally as ought to have been the case. The full story of Christian a.s.sistance to the Jews in their hour of great need will never be fully told, for in many cases individuals acted quietly and behind the scenes.” [82]

In the countries under a satellite government, actions undertaken by the Churches were of some and sometimes even of much avail. [83]