Part 19 (1/2)

Within a few days after my arrival, the President sent for me to visit him at Shadow Lawn, at Long Branch, and I was with him for over four hours and a quarter in our first conference. I saw him, of course, after the election, before returning to Germany, and in fact sailed on the fourth of December at his special request.

Before I left I was impressed with the idea that he desired above all things both to keep and to make peace. Of course, this question of making peace is a very delicate one. A direct offer on our part might have subjected us to the same treatment which we gave Great Britain during our Civil War when Great Britain made overtures looking towards the establishment of peace, and the North answered, practically telling the British Government that it could attend to its own business, that it would brook no interference and would regard further overtures as unfriendly acts.

The Germans started this war without any consultation with the United States, and then seemed to think that they had a right to demand that the United States make peace for them on such terms and at such time as they chose; and that the failure to do so gave them a vested right to break all the laws of warfare against their enemies and to murder the citizens of the United States on the high seas, in violation of the declared principles of international law.

Nevertheless, I think that the inclination of the President was to go very far towards the forcing of peace.

Our trip from New York to Copenhagen was uneventful, cold and dark. We were captured by a British cruiser west of the Orkneys and taken in for the usual search to the port of Kirkwall where we remained two days.

The President impressed upon me his great interest in the Belgians deported to Germany. The action of Germany in thus carrying a great part of the male population of Belgium into virtual slavery had roused great indignation in America. As the revered Cardinal Farley said to me a few days before my departure, ”You have to go back to the times of the Medes and the Persians to find a like example of a whole people carried into bondage.”

Mr. Grew had made representations about this to the Chancellor and, on my return, I immediately took up the question.

I was informed that it was a military measure, that Ludendorf had feared that the British would break through and overrun Belgium and that the military did not propose to have a hostile population at their backs who might cut the rail lines of communication, telephones and telegraphs; and that for this reason the deportation had been decided on. I was, however, told that I would be given permission to visit these Belgians. The pa.s.ses, nevertheless, which alone made such visiting possible were not delivered until a few days before I left Germany.

Several of these Belgians who were put at work in Berlin managed to get away and come to see me. They gave me a harrowing account of how they had been seized in Belgium and made to work in Germany at making munitions to be used probably against their own friends.

I said to the Chancellor, ”There are Belgians employed in making sh.e.l.ls contrary to all rules of war and the Hague conventions.”

He said, ”I do not believe it.” I said, ”My automobile is at the door. I can take you, in four minutes, to where thirty Belgians are working on the manufacture of sh.e.l.ls.” But he did not find time to go.

Americans must understand that the Germans will stop at nothing to win this war, and that the only thing they respect is force.

While I was in America von Jagow, as had been predicted by his enemies in Berlin, had fallen and Zimmermann had been given his place.

I remained a day in Copenhagen, in order to arrange for the transportation to Germany of the three tons of food which I had brought from New York, and, also, in order to lunch with Count Rantzau, the German Minister, a most able diplomat.

Therefore, the President's peace note arrived in Berlin just ahead of me and was delivered by Mr. Grew a few hours before my arrival. Joseph C. Grew, of Boston, was next in command during all my stay in Berlin. He most ably carried on the work of the Emba.s.sy during my absence on the trip to America, in the autumn of 1916; and at all times was of the greatest a.s.sistance to me. I hope to see him go far in his career. This note was dated December eighteenth, 1916, and was addressed by the Secretary of State to the American Amba.s.sadors at the capitals of the belligerent powers. It commenced as follows: ”The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government to which you are accredited.

”The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the (here is inserted a designation of the government addressed) a course of action in regard to the present war which he hopes that the government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit, etc.”

In the note which was sent to the Central Powers it was stated: ”The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarra.s.sed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers.”

Of course, the President thus referred to the address made by Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag in December, in which, after reviewing generally the military situation, the Chancellor said: ”In a deep moral and religious sense of duty towards this nation and beyond it towards humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action towards peace. His Majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our Allies decided to propose to the hostile powers to enter peace negotiations.”

And the Chancellor continued, saying that a note to this effect had been transmitted that morning to all hostile powers, through the representatives of these powers to whom the interests and rights of Germany in the enemy States had been entrusted; and that, therefore, the representatives of Spain, the United States and Switzerland had been asked to forward the note.

Coincidently with this speech of the Chancellor's, which was December twelfth, 1916, the Emperor sent a message to the commanding generals reading as follows: ”Soldiers! In agreement with the sovereigns of my Allies and with the consciousness of victory, I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be accepted is still uncertain. Until that moment arrives you will fight on.”

I return to the President's note.

The President suggested that early occasion be sought to callout from all the nations now at war an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal.

He called the attention of the world to the fact that according to the statements of the statesmen of the belligerent powers, the objects which all sides had in mind seemed to be the same.

And the President finally said that he was not proposing peace, not even offering mediation; but merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that all nations might know how near might be the haven of peace for which all mankind longed.

Shortly after the publication of this note Secretary Lansing gave an interview to the representatives of the American press in which he stated that America was very near war. This interview he later explained.

As soon as possible after my return to Berlin I had interviews with Zimmermann and the Chancellor. Zimmermann said that we were such personal friends that he was sure we could continue to work, as we had in the past, in a frank and open manner, putting all the cards upon the table and working together in the interests of peace. I, of course, agreed to this and it seemed, on the surface, as if everything would go smoothly.

Although the torpedoing without warning of the _Marina_, while I was in the United States, had resulted in the death of a number of Americans on board, nevertheless there seemed to be an inclination on the part of the government and people of the United States to forget this incident provided Germany would continue to keep her pledges given in the _Suss.e.x_ Note. During all the period of the war in Germany I had been on good terms with the members of the government, namely, the Chancellor, von Jagow, Zimmermann and the other officials of the Foreign Office, as well as with Helfferich, Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, Kaempf, the President of the Reichstag and a number of the influential men of Germany such as von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, Gutmann of the Dresdener Bank, Dr. Walter Rathenau, who for a long time was at the head of the department for the supply and conservation of raw materials, General von Kessel, Over-Commander of the Mark of Brandenburg, in spite of many tiffs with him over the treatment of prisoners, Theodor Wolff, editor of the _Tageblatt_, Professor Stein, Maximilian Harden and many others.

For a long time the fight waged by the Chancellor was America's fight and a fight for peace, so much so that the newspapers which attacked the Chancellor were the same ones which had attacked President Wilson, America and Americans in general, and which had very often included me in their attacks. During every crisis between America and Germany I had acted with von Jagow and Zimmermann in a most confidential way, looking forward always to one object, namely, the preservation of peace between our respective countries.

Many suggestions were made which, I think, materially aided up to that time in the preservation of peace.