Part 3 (2/2)

I hope your Lords.h.i.+p will pardon my taking advantage of the present occasion to say a few words on the state of affairs in the north- west, which are now of such absorbing interest. I have been for some time impressed with the belief that the system of administration in the Punjaub has created doubts as to the ultimate intention of our Government with regard to the restoration of the country to the native ruler when he comes of age. The native aristocracy of the country seem to have satisfied themselves that our object has been to retain the country, and that this could be prevented only by timely resistance. The sending European officers to relieve the chief of Mooltan, and to take possession of the country and fort, seems to have removed the last lingering doubt upon this point; and Molraj seems to have been satisfied that in destroying them he should be acting according to the wishes of all his cla.s.s, and all that portion of the population who might aspire to employment under a native rule.

This was precisely the impression created by precisely the same means in Afghanistan; and I believe that the notion now generally prevalent is, that our professed intentions of delivering over the country to its native ruler were not honest, and that we should have appropriated the country to ourselves could we have done so.

There are two cla.s.ses of native Governments in India. In one the military establishments are all national, and depend entirely upon the existence of native rule. They are officered by the aristocracy of the country, chiefly landed, who know that they are not fitted for either civil or military office under our system, and must be reduced to beggary or insignificance should our rule be subst.i.tuted for that of their native chief. In the other, all the establishments are foreign, like our own. The Seiks were not altogether of the first cla.s.s, like those of Rajpootana and Bundelcund, but they were so for the most part; and when they saw all offices of trust by degrees being filled by Captain This and Mr. That, they gave up all hopes of ever having their share in the administration.

Satisfied that this was our error in Afghanistan, in carrying out the views of Lord Ellenborough in the Gwalior State, I did everything in my power to avoid it, and have entirely succeeded, I believe; but it has not been done without great difficulty. I considered Lord Hardinge's measures good, as they interposed Hindoo States between us and a beggarly and fanatical country, which it must be ruinous to our finances to retain, and into which we could not avoid making encroachments, however anxious the Government might be to avoid it, if our borders joined. But I supposed that we should be content with guiding, controlling, and supervising the native administration, and not take all the executive upon ourselves to the almost entire exclusion of the native aristocracy. I had another reason for believing that Lord Hardinge's measures were wise and prudent. While we have a large portion of the country under native rulers, their administration will contrast with ours greatly to our advantage in the estimation of the people; and we may be sure that, though some may be against us, many will be for us. If we succeed in sweeping them all away, or absorbing them, we shall be at the mercy of our native army, and they will see it; and accidents may possibly occur to unite them, or a great portion of them, in some desperate act. The thing is possible, though improbable; and the best provision against it seems to me to be the maintenance of native rulers, whose confidence and affection can be engaged, and administrations improved under judicious management.

The industrial cla.s.ses in the Punjaub would, no doubt, prefer our rule to that of the Seiks; but that portion who depend upon public employment under Government for their subsistence is large in the Punjaub, and they would nearly all prefer a native rule. They have evidently persuaded themselves that our intention is to subst.i.tute our own rule; and it is now, I fear, too late to remove the impression. If your Lords.h.i.+p is driven to annexation, you must be in great force; and a disposition must be shown on the part of the local authorities to give the educated aristocracy of the country a liberal share in the administration.

One of the greatest dangers to be apprehended in India is, I believe, the disposition on the part of the dominant cla.s.s to appoint to all offices members of their own cla.s.s, to the exclusion of the educated natives. This has been n.o.bly resisted hitherto; but where every subaltern thinks himself in a condition to take a wife, and the land opens no prospect to his children but in the public service, the compet.i.tion will become too great.

I trust that your Lords.h.i.+p will pardon my having written so much, and believe me, with great respect, your Lords.h.i.+p's obedient humble servant,

(Signed) W. H. SLEEMAN.

P.S.--The Commander-in-Chief has asked me, through the Quartermaster- General, whether any corps can be spared from Bundelcund. I shall say that we can spare two regiments--one from NaG.o.de, whose place can be supplied by a wing of the regiment at Nowgow, and one from Jhansee, whose place can be supplied from the Gwalior Contingent, if your Lords.h.i.+p sees no objection, as a temporary arrangement.

(Signed) W. H. SLEEMAN.

To the Right Hon.

the Earl of Dalhousie, &c. &c. &c.

Lucknow, 30th January, 1849.

My Dear Elliot,

A salute of twenty-one guns had been fired here by the King for the sadly dear victory over Shere Sing, and another has been fired to-day for the fall of Mooltan. The King continues very ill, but no danger seems to be apprehended. The disease is accompanied by very untoward secondary symptoms, which are likely ultimately to destroy him, and render his life miserable while it lasts. How much of these symptoms he derives from his birth, and how much from his own excesses, is uncertain.

The impression regarding the minister, mentioned in my last note, was from a talk with him while he was, it seems, under the influence of fever. In later conversations he has been more lucid; but he is a third-rate man, and quite unequal to the burthen that the favour of the King has placed upon him. That favour will, however, be but of short duration, for the King is said to have expressed great distrust in his capacity to do any of the things he promised, more especially to collect the immense arrears of revenue now due.

I am preparing tables of the revenue and expenditure, and of the machinery in all branches, and hope soon to submit a clearer view of the state of things than Government is in the habit of getting on such occasions; but I have to wade through vast volumes of correspondence to ascertain what has been said and done in the questions that will come under consideration, to conduct current duties, and to become acquainted with the people in my new field, European and native.

I want to ask you whether I could, with any prospect of success just now, propose a plan which I have much at heart in the Thuggee and Dacoity Department. The Lieutenant-Governor, I feel a.s.sured, will advocate it. Major Graham is about to obtain his regimental majority, with a certain prospect of soon obtaining the command of his regiment, which will give him twelve hundred a-month. I am anxious to retain him; for his services have been, and would continue to be, of vast importance to the North-West Provinces. I should like to propose that he be made superintendent of Thuggee and Dacoity in those provinces upon a salary of, say eleven hundred rupees a-month. I would at the same time propose that the Shahjehanpoor office, lately under Major Ludlow, be done up, and the duties confided to the a.s.sistant-magistrate, with a small establishment, he to receive an extra salary, say, one hundred rupees a-month. The same with regard to the Azimghur office, now under Captain Ward, who could be sent to Rajpootana. Elliot is not suited well to the work, according to those who have seen most of him and of it; and you might be able to put him to some other for which he is fitted. Should you think it desirable to retain him in Rajpootana, Captain Ward may for the present remain where he is; and the saving from the Shahjehanpoor office will more than cover the increase for Major Graham. Pray let me know as soon as you can whether such a proposal would be likely to be well received.

Graham's services have been and will be most valuable to all the local authorities at and under Agra.

I suppose the fate of the Punjaub is sealed, for though the Governor- General might wish to spare it, the home authorities and the home people will hardly brook the prospect or the chance of another struggle of the same kind, particularly if the Afghans have really joined the Seiks under Chutter Sing. The tendency to annexation, already strong at home, will become still stronger when the news of our late losses arrive. They indicate a stronger a.s.surance of national sympathy on the part of the chiefs and troops opposed to us than was generally calculated upon. The fall of Mooltan will have relieved the Governor-General's mind from much of the anxiety caused by the inartistic management of the Commander-in-Chief.

Yours sincerely, (Signed) W. H. SLEEMAN.

To H. M. Elliot, Esq., &c. &c.

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