Volume II Part 18 (1/2)
_To Edward M. House_
London, June 29, 1917.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
I never put any particular value on my own prophecies nor on anybody else's. I have therefore no pride as a prophet. Yet I do think that I hit it off accurately a year or a year and a half ago when I said that we could then have ended the war without any appreciable cost. And these are my reasons:
If we had then come in and absolutely prevented supplies from reaching Germany, as we are now about to do, the war would then have been much sooner ended than it can now be ended:
(1) Our supplies enabled her to go on.
(2) She got time in this way to build her great submarine fleet.
She went at it the day she promised the President to reform.
(3) She got time and strength to overrun Rumania whence she got food and oil; and continues to get it.
(4) During this time Russia fell down as a military force and gave her more time, more armies for France and more supplies. Russian guns have been sold to the Germans.
If a year and a half ago we had starved her out, it would have been over before any of these things happened. This delay is what will cost us billions and billions and men and men.
And it cost us one thing more. During the neutrality period we were as eager to get goods to the little neutral states which were in large measure undoubtedly bound to Germany as we are now eager to keep them out. Grey, who was and is our best friend, and who was unwilling to quarrel with us more than he was obliged to, was thrown out of office and his career ended because the blockade, owing to his consideration for us, was not tight enough. Our delay caused his fall.
But most of all, it gave the Germans time (and to some extent material) to build their present fleet of submarines. They were at work on them all the while and according to the best opinion here they continue to build them faster than the British destroy them; and the submarines are destroying more merchant s.h.i.+ps than all the s.h.i.+pbuilding docks of all the world are now turning out. This is the most serious aspect of the war--by far the most serious. I am trying to get our Government to send over hundreds of improvised destroyers--armed tugs, yachts, etc., etc. Admiral Sims and the British Admiralty have fears that unless such help come the full fruits of the war may never be gathered by the Allies--that some sort of a compromise peace may have to be made.
It is, therefore, true that the year and a half we waited after the _Lusitania_ will prove to be the most costly year and a half in our history; and for once at least my old prophecy was quite a good guess. But that water has flowed over the dam and it is worth mentioning now only because you challenged me....
That part of Page's letter which refers to his retirement had a curious history. It was practically a resignation and therefore called for an immediate reply, but Mr. Wilson did not even acknowledge its receipt.
For two months the Amba.s.sador was left in the dark as to the att.i.tude of Was.h.i.+ngton. Finally, in the latter part of January, 1917, Page wrote urgently to Mr. Lansing, asking him to bring the matter to the President's attention. On February 5, 1917, Mr. Lansing's reply was received. ”The President,” he said, ”under extreme pressure of the present situation, has been unable to consider your communication in regard to your resignation. He desires me to inform you that he hopes that, at the present time, you will not press to be relieved from service; that he realizes that he is asking you to make a personal sacrifice, but he believes that you will appreciate the importance, in the crisis which has developed, that no change should be made. I hardly need to add my personal hope that you will put aside any thought of resigning your post for the present.”
At this time, of course, any idea of retiring was out of the question.
The President had dismissed Bernstorff and there was every likelihood that the country would soon be at war. Page would have regarded his retirement at this crisis as little less than the desertion of his post.
Moreover, since Mr. Wilson had adopted the policy which the Amba.s.sador had been urging for nearly two years, and had sent Bernstorff home, any logical excuse that may have existed for his resignation existed no longer. Mr. Wilson had now adopted a course which Page could enthusiastically support.
”I am happy to serve here at any sacrifice”--such was his reply to Mr.
Lansing--”until after the end of the war, and I am making my arrangements to stay for this period.”
The months that intervened between the Presidential election and the declaration of war were especially difficult for the American Emba.s.sy in London. Page had informed the President, in the course of his interview of September 22nd, how unfavourably Great Britain regarded his efforts in the direction of peace; he had in fact delivered a message from the Foreign Office that any Presidential attempt to ”mediate” would be rejected by the Allies. Yet his earnest representation on this point had produced no effect upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was bringing to bear upon Was.h.i.+ngton was apparently irresistible. Count Bernstorff's memoirs, with their accompanying doc.u.ments, have revealed the intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most startling fact revealed by the German Amba.s.sador is that the Kaiser, on October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words, that, unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the German Government ”would be forced to regain the freedom of action which it has reserved to itself in the note of May 4th last[49].” It is unlikely that the annals of diplomacy contain many doc.u.ments so cool and insolent as this one. It was a notification from the Kaiser to the President that the so-called ”Suss.e.x pledge” was not regarded as an unconditional one by the Imperial Government; that it was given merely to furnish Mr.
Wilson an opportunity to bring the war to an end; and that unless the Presidential attempt to accomplish this were successful, there would be a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious developments of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly because the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously and slowly, and Germany became impatient. The successful campaign against Rumania, resulting in the capture of Bucharest on December 6th, and the new vista which it opened to Germany of large food supplies, strengthened the Teutonic purpose. Perhaps Germany, with her characteristic lack of finesse, imagined that her own open efforts would lend emphasis to Mr. Wilson's pacific exertions. At any rate, on December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing to launch his own campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached her enemies with a proposal for a peace conference. A few days afterward Page, as the representative of Germany, called at the Foreign Office to deliver the large white envelope which contained the Kaiser's ”peace proposal.” In delivering this to Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting as Foreign Secretary in the temporary absence of Mr. Balfour, Page emphasized the fact that the American Government entirely disa.s.sociated itself from its contents and that he was acting merely in his capacity of ”German Amba.s.sador.” Two communications from Lord Robert to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Amba.s.sador at Was.h.i.+ngton, tell the story and also reveal that it was almost impossible for Page, even when engaged in an official proceeding, to conceal his contempt for the whole enterprise:
_Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice_
Foreign Office,
December 18, 1916.
SIR:
The American Amba.s.sador came to see me this morning and presented to me the German note containing what is called in it the ”offer of peace.” He explained that he did so on instructions of his Government as representing the German Government, and not in any way as representing their own opinions. He also explained that the note must be regarded as coming from the four Central Powers, and as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who were represented by the United States.