Volume II Part 6 (2/2)

An American banker here has told me of the experience of an American financial salesman in the city the day after our Note was published. His business is to make calls on bankers and other financial men, to sell them securities. He is a man of good address who is popular with his clients. The first man he called on, on that day, said: ”I don't wish to be offensive to you. But I have only one way to show my feeling of indignation toward the United States, and that is, to have nothing more to do with Americans.”

The next man said: ”No, nothing to-day, I thank you. No--nor to-morrow either; nor the next day. Good morning.”

After four or five such greetings, the fellow gave it up and is now doing nothing.

I don't attach much importance to such an incident as this, except as it gives a hint of the general feeling. These financial men probably haven't even read our Note. Few people have. But they have all read the short and sharp newspaper summary which preceded it in the English papers. But what such an incident does indicate is the prevalence of a state of public feeling which would prevent the Government from yielding any of our demands even if the Government so wished. It has now been nearly a week since the Note was published. I have seen most of the neutral ministers. Before the Note came they expressed great eagerness to see it: it would champion their cause. Since it came not one of them has mentioned it to me. The Secretary of one of them remarked, after being invited to express himself: ”It is too--too--long!” And, although I have seen most of the Cabinet this week, not a man mentioned it to me. People seem studiously to avoid it, lest they give offense.

I have, however, got one little satisfaction. An American--a half-expatriated loafer who talks ”art”--you know the intellectually affected and degenerate type--screwed his courage up and told me that he felt ashamed of his country. I remarked that I felt sure the feeling was mutual. That, I confess, made me feel better.

As nearly as I can make out, the highwater mark of English good-feeling toward us in all our history was after the President's Panama tolls courtesy. The low-water mark, since the Civil War, I am sure, is now. The Cleveland Venezuela message came at a time of no nervous strain and did, I think, produce no long-lasting effect. A part of the present feeling is due to the English conviction that we have been taken in by the Germans in the submarine controversy, but a large part is due to the lack of courtesy in this last Note--the manner in which it was written even more than its matter. As regards its matter, I have often been over what I conceive to be the main points with Sir Edward Grey--very frankly and without the least offense. He has said: ”We may have to arbitrate these things,” as he might say, ”We had better take a cab because it is raining.” It is easily possible--or it was--to discuss anything with this Government without offense. I have, in fact, stood up before Sir Edward's fire and accused him of stealing a large part of the earth's surface, and we were just as good friends afterward as before. But I never drew a lawyer's indictment of him as a land-thief: that's different.

I suppose no two peoples or governments ever quite understand one another. Perhaps they never will. That is too much to hope for. But when one government writes to another it ought to write (as men do) with some reference to the personality of the other and to their previous relations, since governments are more human than men. Of course I don't know who wrote the Note. Hence I can talk about it freely to you without implying criticism of anybody in particular.

But the man who wrote it never saw the British Government and wouldn't know it if he met it in the road. To him it is a mere legal ent.i.ty, a wicked, impersonal inst.i.tution against which he has the task of drawing an indictment--not the task of trying to persuade it to confess the propriety of a certain course of conduct. In his view, it is a wicked enemy to start with--like the Louisiana lottery of a previous generation or the Standard Oil Company of our time.

One would have thought, since we were six months in preparing it, that a draft of the Note would have been sent to the man on the ground whom our Government keeps in London to study the situation at first hand and to make the best judgment he can about the most effective methods of approach on delicate and difficult matters. If that had been done, I should have suggested a courteous short Note saying that we are obliged to set forth such and such views about marine law and the rights of neutrals, to His Majesty's Government; and that the contention of the United States Government was herewith sent--etc., etc.--Then this identical Note (with certain court-house, strong, s.h.i.+rt-sleeve adjectives left out) could have come without arousing any feeling whatsoever. Of course I have no personal vanity in saying this to you. I am sure I outgrew that foible many years ago. But such a use of an amba.s.sador--of any amba.s.sador--is obviously one of the best and most natural uses he could be put to; and all governments but ours do put their amba.s.sadors to such a use: that's what they have 'em for.

_Per contra_: a telegram has just come in saying that a certain Lichtenstein in New York had a lot of goods stopped by the British Government, which (by an arrangement made with their attorney here) agreed to buy them at a certain price: will I go and find out why the Government hasn't yet paid Lichtenstein and when he may expect his money? Is it an amba.s.sadorial duty to collect a private bill for Lichtenstein, in a bargain with which our Government has had nothing to do? I have telegraphed the Department, quite calmly, that I don't think it is. I venture to say no amba.s.sador ever had such a request as that before from his Government.

My dear House, I often wonder if my years of work here--the kind of high good work I've tried to do--have not been thrown away. I've tried to take and to busy myself with a long-range view of great subjects. The British Empire and the United States will be here long after we are dead, and their relations will continue to be one of the most important matters--perhaps the most important matter--in the world. Well, now think of Lichtenstein's bill!

To get back where I started--I fear, therefore, that, when I next meet the Admiral of the Grand Fleet (with whom I used to discuss everything quite freely before he sailed away to the war), he may forget to mention that we may have his 3,000 s.h.i.+ps at our need.

Since this present difference is in danger of losing the healing influence of a kindly touch--has become an uncourteous monster of 35 heads and 3 appendices--I see no early end of it. The British Foreign Office has a lot of lawyers in its great back offices. They and our lawyers will now b.u.t.t and rebut as long as a goat of them is left alive on either side. The two governments--the two human, kindly groups--have retired: they don't touch, on this matter, now.

The lawyers will have the time of their lives, each smelling the blood of the other.

If more notes must come--as the English papers report over and over again every morning and every afternoon--the President might do much by writing a brief, human doc.u.ment to accompany the Appendices. If it be done courteously, we can accuse them of stealing sheep and of dyeing the skins to conceal the theft-without provoking the slightest bad feeling; and, in the end, they'll pay another _Alabama_ award without complaint and frame the check and show it to future amba.s.sadors as Sir Edward shows the _Alabama_ check to me sometimes.

And it'll be a lasting shame (and may bring other Great Wars) if lawyers are now permitted to tear the garments with which Peace ought to be clothed as soon as she can escape from her present rags and tatters.

Yours always heartily,

W.H.P.

P.S. My dear House: Since I have--in weeks and months past--both telegraphed and written the Department (and I presume the President has seen what I've sent) about the feeling here, I've written this letter to you and not to the President nor Lansing. I will not run the risk of seeming to complain--nor even of seeming to seem to complain. But if you think it wise to send or show this letter to the President, I'm willing you should. This job was botched: there's no doubt about that. We shall not recover for many a long, long year. The identical indictment could have been drawn with admirable temper and the way laid down for arbitration and for keeping our interpretation of the law and precedents intact--all done in a way that would have given no offense.

The feeling runs higher and higher every day--goes deeper and spreads wider.

Now on top of it comes the _Ancona_[15]. The English press, practically unanimously, makes sneering remarks about our Government. After six months it has got no results from the _Lusitania_ controversy, which Bernstorff is allowed to prolong in secret session while factories are blown up, s.h.i.+ps supplied with bombs, and all manner of outrages go on (by Germans) in the United States. The English simply can't understand why Bernstorff is allowed to stay. They predict that nothing will come of the _Ancona_ case, nor of any other case. n.o.body wants us to get into the war--n.o.body who counts--but they are losing respect for us because we seem to them to submit to anything.

We've simply dropped out. No English person ever mentions our Government to me. But they talk to one another all the time about the political anaemia of the United States Government. They think that Bernstorff has the State Department afraid of him and that the Pacifists dominate opinion--the Pacifists-at-any-price. I no longer even have a chance to explain any of these things to anybody I know.

It isn't the old question we used to discuss of our having no friend in the world when the war ends. It's gone far further than that. It is now whether the United States Government need be respected by anybody.

W.H.P.

FOOTNOTES:

<script>