Volume I Part 25 (1/2)
Hastily,
E.M.H.
_From Edward M. House_
Hotel Ritz, 15, Place Vendome, Paris.
June 3, 1914.
Dear Page:
I had a satisfactory talk with the Kaiser on Monday. I have now seen everyone worthwhile in Germany except the Chancellor. I am ready now for London. Perhaps you had better prepare the way. The Kaiser knows I am to see them, and I have arranged to keep him in touch with results--if there are any. We must work quickly after I arrive, for it may be advisable for me to return to Germany, and I am counting on sailing for home July 15th or 28th. . . . I am eager to see you and tell you what I know.
Yours,
E.M.H.
Colonel House left that night for Paris, but there the situation was a hopeless one. France was not thinking of a foreign war; it was engrossed with its domestic troubles. There had been three French ministries in two weeks; and the trial of Madame Caillaux for the murder of Gaston Calmette, editor of the Paris _Figaro_, was monopolizing all the nation's capacity for emotion. Colonel House saw that it would be a waste of energy to take up his mission at Paris--there was no government stable enough to make a discussion worth while. He therefore immediately left for London.
The political situation in Great Britain was almost as confused as that in Paris. The country was in a state approaching civil war on the question of Home Rule for Ireland; the suffragettes were threatening to dynamite the Houses of Parliament; and the eternal struggle between the Liberal and the Conservative elements was raging with unprecedented virulence. A European war was far from everybody's mind. It was this utter inability to grasp the realities of the European situation which proved the main impediment to Colonel House's work in England. He met all the important people--Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and others. With them he discussed his ”pact” proposal in great detail.
Naturally, ideas of this sort were listened to sympathetically by statesmen of the stamp of Asquith, Grey, and Lloyd George. The difficulty, however, was that none of these men apprehended an immediate war. They saw no necessity of hurrying about the matter. They had the utmost confidence in Prince Lichnowsky, the German Amba.s.sador in London, and Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor. Both these men were regarded by the Foreign Office as guarantees against a German attack; their continuance in their office was looked upon as an a.s.surance that Germany entertained no immediately aggressive plans. Though the British statesmen did not say so definitely, the impression was conveyed that the mission on which Colonel House was engaged was an unnecessary one--a preparation against a danger that did not exist. Colonel House attempted to persuade Sir Edward Grey to visit the Kiel regatta, which was to take place in a few days, see the Kaiser, and discuss the plan with him. But the Government feared that such a visit would be very disturbing to France and Russia. Already Mr. Churchill's proposal for a ”naval holiday” had so wrought up the French that a hurried trip to France by Mr. Asquith had been necessary to quiet them; the consternation that would have been caused in Paris by the presence of Sir Edward Grey at Kiel can only be imagined. The fact that the British statesmen entertained so little apprehension of a German attack may possibly be a reflection on their judgment; yet Colonel House's visit has great historical value, for the experience afterward convinced him that Great Britain had had no part in bringing on the European war, and that Germany was solely responsible. It certainly should have put the Wilson Administration right on this all-important point, when the great storm broke.
The most vivid recollection which the British statesmen whom Colonel House met retain of his visit, was his consternation at the spirit that had confronted him everywhere in Germany. The four men most interested--Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell, Mr. Page, and Colonel House--met at luncheon in the American Emba.s.sy a few days after President Wilson's emissary had returned from Berlin. Colonel House could talk of little except the preparations for war which were manifest on every hand.
”I feel as though I had been living near a mighty electric dynamo,”
Colonel House told his friends. ”The whole of Germany is charged with electricity. Everybody's nerves are tense. It needs only a spark to set the whole thing off.”
The ”spark” came two weeks afterward with the a.s.sa.s.sination of the Archduke Ferdinand.
”It is all a bad business,” Colonel House wrote to Page when war broke out, ”and just think how near we came to making such a catastrophe impossible! If England had moved a little faster and had let me go back to Germany, the thing, perhaps, could have been done.”
To which Page at once replied:
”No, no, no--no power on earth could have prevented it. The German militarism, which is _the_ crime of the last fifty years, has been working for this for twenty-five years. It is the logical result of their spirit and enterprise and doctrine. It had to come. But, of course, they chose the wrong time and the wrong issue. Militarism has no judgment. Don't let your conscience be worried. You did all that any mortal man could do. But n.o.body could have done anything effective.
”We've got to see to it that this system doesn't grow up again. That's all.”
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 54: Mr. and Mrs. Francis B. Sayre, son-in-law and daughter of President Wilson.]
[Footnote 55: Ex-President of the University of California, Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin, 1909-10.]
[Footnote 56: James A. O'Gorman was the anti-British Senator from New York State at this time working hard against the repeal of the Panama tolls discrimination.]
[Footnote 57: In February, 1915, William S. Benton, an English subject who had spent the larger part of his life in Mexico, was murdered in the presence of Francisco Villa.]