Part 16 (1/2)

Finally, Prof. Ghani said, 'Next time we will come prepared with our ideas.'

That was that, and they agreed to meet that June.

The problem was that the Hurriyat was unwilling to bell the cat. Suppose in that meeting, the Mirwaiz had repeated the three points he had mentioned to me over dinner in May 2003, and asked if they could be done. That would have put Advani and the government in an awkward position, for they would have had to deliver. Instead, they kept asking for vague things, like confidence-building measures by releasing twelve persons.

The problem was that the separatist leaders.h.i.+p has let down Kashmir time and again. Suppose Farooq were representing the Hurriyat or the separatists, he would have said what he felt he was required to say. Simply because he is not answerable to Pakistan.

After the second meeting I went to Srinagar in May to prepare for the third meeting, and I spent nearly a week with these gentlemen, talking to them. 'Professor Saheb, kucch toh indication de dijiye,' I said. 'Are you going to bring the map, give me some idea.'

'I am preparing it,' Prof. Ghani said.

The truth is that naksha kabhi taiyyar nahin hoga. If you ask me about autonomy, I have dealt with Kashmir for so long, and I have asked at the highest level, is autonomy doable, and I have been told: yes. It is doable. I have never offered anything beyond the Const.i.tution to anybody. I have told different separatists that there are various types of azaadi, but who am I to talk of anything outside the Const.i.tution? And who would have believed me?

And if Delhi has not been sincere about giving Kashmir anything of consequence or substance, then the Kashmiri leaders.h.i.+p also does not have the gumption to extract anything. Maybe Delhi was insincere, but then it was up to the Kashmiris to check them out, instead of time and again backing out, whether it was Shabir Shah or Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. The government's game plan would have been to get the Hurriyat engaged, then get Shabir into it, then get Yasin Malik into it. The only person who would have stayed aloof would have been Geelani and that wouldn't have mattered. All that was now required was sincerity and a bit of aggressiveness of purpose, and in another four meetings or so with the Hurriyat, things would well and truly have been on their way.

I returned on 13 May from Srinagar and the next day the results of the Lok Sabha election were to be counted and announced. I had told the Mirwaiz, 'You've got to come to Delhi.'

'Yeah, yeah, we'll come,' he said. 'But what happens if these guys lose?'

I laughed. 'How does it matter?'

'No,' the Mirwaiz said. 'What if Mulayam Singh is the prime minister?'

'Mulayam Singh will be more keen than Advani,' I said.

And to the great misfortune of the Kashmiris, Vajpayee's team lost the elections.

16.

MANMOHAN SINGH'S LOST DECADE

By about 1:30 in the afternoon of 14 May 2004, it became clear that the NDA government headed by Vajpayee was not going to return to power, and that the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) would be replacing it. I went to Brajesh Mishra's room, and found him standing by his cupboard, fiddling with things. He looked at me and said, 'Haan, bolo.' 'Sir, ab kya hoga?' I asked.

'Hum sab jayenge,' he said. 'Bistra bandhenge, chalenge.'

And he left the next day. As did everybody else: nicely, neatly, graciously.

I figured it would be appropriate to resign since this government appointed me. I drew up a letter in which I said I would like to be relieved and gave it to Brajesh Mishra. 'You don't have to do this,' he said. 'You're not a political appointee.'

Nonetheless he wrote an instruction on the letter: 'Brief the new prime minister and take further orders.' It thus required me to hang around till the new prime minister came in.

I went back to my room and called my old DIB, M.K. Narayanan, who was in London. Just for that brief moment I may have had second thoughts on quitting. Narayanan gave me the impression that he was not part of the government-formation process, but promised to look me up when he returned to Delhi. Ultimately he joined on 31 May as the advisor (internal security), but in between he did come to Delhi and meet Sonia Gandhi. But he did not meet me.

In the meantime I hung around at the PMO, the last man left, visualising my meeting with the person I thought was going to be the new prime minister: Sonia Gandhi. And I was quite excited about it.

On 17 May, it was announced that J.N. 'Mani' Dixit would be the new NSA. He came down to the PMO and I went and met him. 'Are you serious about leaving?' he asked.

When I said yes, he said he respected my choice, and then said, 'Keep in touch.' He sent for me once in July and enquired about Kashmir and how best to move forward. But that was it. Soon after he pa.s.sed away.

I b.u.mped into Narayanan at the PMO a day before the swearing-in. Sonia Gandhi was not going to be the prime minister. It would be Dr Manmohan Singh, whom I had first met in the mid-'90s when he was finance minister and I had taken Shabir Shah for a meeting with him at the behest of the prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao.

'I'm joining your set-up,' Narayanan said.

'I'm leaving,' I said.

The new PMO came to their offices on 23 May, which was a Sunday. I figured I didn't need to go in on a Sunday, so I did not. When I went in on Monday, I was told, 'You didn't come to welcome the prime minister.'

'It was Sunday,' I said. 'In any case, I'm leaving, I'll meet the prime minister separately.'

When I went to meet the new prime minister, I took along a note I had prepared on Kashmir because Brajesh Mishra had said, brief him, and I did not know how much time I would have. 'Put it down over there,' he said. 'Now tell me.'

We spent 45 minutes in discussion and finally he said, 'We have to continue this conversation.'

'Sir, I will come whenever you want,' I said. 'But I won't be in the PMO, I've put in my papers.'

Dr Singh dismissively waved his hand at my statement. 'Don't worry about that,' he said.

However, I had already sent my letter to the new princ.i.p.al secretary, T.K.A. 'Kutty' Nair. The new gang must have said, Dulat has put it down in writing, why give him so much importance. It was processed and that was that.

Now that I was officially leaving the PMO it was time to make a call on Vajpayee. On one of my last days I went to see him at Race Course Road. One thing about the man was that he was good with his time and you never had to wait more than five to ten minutes, because he did not meet too many people and he never kept anyone waiting. That day I was summoned in immediately.

The old man looked extremely relaxed. What the h.e.l.l do I say now, I thought. How do I start this conversation. Finally: 'Sir, yeh kya ho gaya?' I asked.

Typical Vajpayee, he laughed heartily. 'Yeh unko bhi nahin maloom ki kya ho gaya,' he said, referring to the Congress party, equally stunned by its win.

We spent a half-hour in relaxed conversation. 'Koi aisi baat nahin,' he said. He was in his light-hearted best element, and there was not an iota of regret.

Then Vajpayee mentioned Gujarat. 'Woh hamare se galti hui,' he said. Perhaps he felt that was the reason he lost power; because he did not stop the 2002 riots.

My last day was 31 May, the day Narayanan joined. We met, and he asked why I was going. 'Sir,' I said. 'This gang brought me here with them so I thought I should go with them. In any case, I never knew you were coming here.'

'Who's going to do this?' he asked, about Kashmir.

'You have two options,' I said. 'Either Ajit Doval or K.M. Singh, these guys are the most contemporary.' In fact, K.M. had just returned from an innings in Srinagar.

'Doval can't be spared,' Narayanan said. 'He's going to be DIB.' That was the first I heard that Doval would become the IB chief.

Eventually no one was put in my job and I don't think they wanted anyone there.

Before I left I also went and met the new minister of state in the PMO, Prithviraj Chavan, who had taken over from Vijay Goel and who would later become the chief minister of Maharashtra. We had two discussions on Kashmir before I left the PMO and he asked me what ought to be the next step. 'There has been a beginning and an opening has been provided,' I said. 'You must take it forward.' I told him he was ideally suited to do so. 'You're the minister here and Kashmiris like to believe that the prime minister or the PMO is dealing with Kashmir.'

'What about the home minister?' he asked.

'Of course you can talk it over with him,' I said. But what mattered to the Kashmiri was that the PMO was involved, which is why Narasimha Rao created a department of J&K affairs directly reporting to him. 'You need to talk this over with the PM on how you want to do it.'