Part 24 (1/2)
To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies German partic.i.p.ation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that Germany was aware of its contents. Germany merely left Austria a free hand in the matter. Oncken endeavours to show that Austria's demands were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers found them exorbitant. He does not mention the fact that a large section of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.
His comment on Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace is characteristic: ”England claims that she did everything possible to preserve the peace.
It cannot be denied that Grey made a series of mediation proposals. But mere good-will is not everything. It is much more important to weigh their practical importance, and the goal at which they aimed: Whether they were intended to preserve the world's peace under conditions honourable for all parties, or calculated to obtain for the _Entente_ a one-sided diplomatic victory which would have established its future predominance.”[199]
[Footnote 199: ”Deutschland und der Weltkrieg,” p. 544.]
”Grey considered the moment suitable for a mediation proposal. On the evening of July 26th, after obtaining Russia's consent, he proposed to the Governments of France, Germany and Italy that their London amba.s.sadors should meet in London to confer on a peaceful solution of the conflict.
”The proposal was unacceptable to Austria, because it would have been an indirect recognition on her part of Russia's interest in the conflict.
”Only those who had followed the growing intimacy of the mutual obligations between the Entente Powers, and their organization to a 'London Centre' during the summer of 1914, are able to estimate the role--to say nothing of Italy--which Russia's two comrades would have played in the conference. During its course Russia would have continued her military preparations, while Germany would have had to pledge herself not to mobilize.
”Finally, no unprejudiced observer would dare a.s.sert that the man (Sir Edward Grey) who was ready to transform himself at a suitable opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian mobilization. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.
”Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line.”[200]
[Footnote 200: Ibid., p. 545 _et seq_.]
An a.n.a.lysis of Professor Oncken's theses gives the following results: First, Britain's efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to mention any friendly advances to meet them. Secondly, the fundamental principle underlying the Germanic att.i.tude is again exposed, viz., that Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe (_vide_, p. 63). Thirdly, a diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the two groups of Powers.
In weighing the second point it would be wrong to a.s.sume that the Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable consequence.
If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M.
de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and it may be safely a.s.sumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.
The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a decade--the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited a.s.sertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual Alliance would have survived the shock.
Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in Germany as a man of peace--_the_ man who had prevented the Balkan War from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same nation of being the originator of the world war.
Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey initiated only two members of the Cabinet--Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane--into the details of the agreement with France, and these three gentlemen he refers to as the ”inner circle.” King Edward, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy, succeeded in harnessing the _revanche idee_ and the spirit of Russian aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of friends.h.i.+p made by this country were insincere. (The professorial pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France, Oncken remarks: ”The declaration was just as true formally as it was a lie in essentials.”
[Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G.
B. Shaw and the _Labour Leader_.--Author.]
Following the development of events after the conference proposal had been dropped, Oncken writes: ”Meanwhile the Russian Government endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this false conception, _i.e._, openly joining Russia and France.
”It is noteworthy how quickly Grey a.s.similated this train of thought.
Disregarding the suggestions of the British Amba.s.sador in St.
Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning England's eventual att.i.tude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to energetic measures.
”But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia. On the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands--and in truth with England's co-operation--to such a degree that their acceptance would have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy.
”And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision (mobilization). The certainty which she had gained from the moves of English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France's support and with it England's, turned the scale--against peace.
”That this calculation was decisive for Russia's change of front is confirmed by a witness whose impartiality even our opponents will admit.”[202]
[Footnote 202: ”Deutschland und der Weltkrieg,” pp. 553-4.]
Professor Oncken then supports his argument with quotations from a letter written by the Belgian Legation Secretary in St. Petersburg to his Government. The letter was doubtless stolen while in transit by the Berlin postal authorities. Monsieur B. de l'Escaille wrote the letter on July 30th, despatched it by courier to Berlin, where it was posted on the following day. The outside envelope was addressed to Madame Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles; inside was a letter addressed to M. Darignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. German writers state that no letters were forwarded to foreign countries after martial law was proclaimed on July 31st (a statement which is untrue), thus it fell into their hands.