Part 17 (2/2)
[Footnote 142: Professor Frank's work, pp. 29-30.]
Considering that the British army at that time was small, that Britain had no idea of annexing Belgian territory, one naturally wonders how the value of Belgium's defence system had been depreciated by conversations with British officers. In effect, Germany maintains that Belgium should have behaved as a nonent.i.ty, which is contrary to all reason.
The Berlin Government has always treated her small neighbour as a sovereign State, equal in quality, though not in power, to any State in the world. If Germany recognized Belgium's sovereignty, why should not England do the same, and, above all, why had Belgium no right to think of her self-preservation, when she knew the danger on her eastern frontier grew more menacing month by month?
Frank concludes his dissertation with his opinion of England and quotes Thucydides, V., 105, as the best applicable characterization of the British with which he is acquainted. ”Among themselves, indeed, and out of respect for their traditional const.i.tution, they prove to be quite decent. As regards their treatment of foreigners, a great deal might be said, yet we will try to express it in brief. Among all whom we know they are the most brazen in declaring what is good to be agreeable, and what is profitable to be just.”
The very offence which Germany accuses England of having premeditated, she committed herself many years before. When France seemed to threaten Belgium's existence, King Leopold I. concluded a secret treaty[143] with the king of Prussia, whereby the latter was empowered to enter Belgium and occupy fortresses in case of France becoming dangerous. The French danger pa.s.sed away, and its place was taken by a more awful menace--the pressure of German potential energy; and when Belgium in turn opened her heart (this is the unproved accusation which Germany makes to-day--Author) to England, then she has violated her neutrality and undermined the balance of power.[144] There is even a suspicion that Leopold II. renewed this treaty with Germany in 1890, in spite of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince de Chimay, in an official speech denied its existence.
[Footnote 143: Germans love anything which is ”secret.”
”Geheimniskramerei” (”affectation of mysteriousness and secrecy”) is a national and individual characteristic of the German people.--Author.]
[Footnote 144: Karl Hampe: ”Belgiens Vergangenheit und Gegenwart”
(”Belgium Past and Present”), p. 49.]
Professor Schoenborn's essay on Belgian neutrality is the least satisfactory exposition of the three professorial effusions; it is no credit to a man of learning, and is merely the work of an incapable partisan trying to make a bad cause into a good one. Schoenborn commences[145] with the customary German tactics by stating that Bethmann-Hollweg's ”sc.r.a.p-of-paper” speech, and von Jagow's (German Secretary of State) explanations to the Belgian representative in Berlin on August 3rd, 1914, are of no importance in deciding the justice of Germany's violation of her pledged word. One is led to inquire, When is a German utterance--whether given in the Reichstag by the Chancellor or on paper in the form of a treaty--final and binding?
[Footnote 145: ”Deutschland und der Weltkrieg” (”Germany and the World War”), pp. 566-8.]
Subterfuges, insinuations, distortions, even brazen falsehoods, are scattered throughout German war literature, thicker ”than Autumnal leaves in Vallombrosa's brook.” It is to be feared that just as Germans have lied for a century to prove that the English were annihilated at the battle of Waterloo, and for over forty years to show that Bismarck was not a forger, so they will lie for centuries to come in order to prove that the invasion of Belgium was not what Bethmann-Hollweg called it, a ”breach of international law.”
Like his _confreres_, Herr Schoenborn admits that Germany was pledged to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but the said neutrality was non-existent, which appears somewhat paradoxical. Yet this is not the least logical part of his case. ”The pa.s.sage of German troops through Belgium was indispensable in the interests of the preservation of the German Empire. A successful resistance to the annihilation-plans which our enemies had wrought for our downfall seemed possible only by this means. The Government regretted that, by so doing, we should commit a formal infringement of the rights of a third State (Belgium), and promised to make all possible compensation for the transgression.
”The judicial point of view which influenced the decision of the German Government is perhaps, best ill.u.s.trated by a parallel taken from the ordinary laws of the country: A forester (game-keeper) is attacked by a poacher, and in that same moment perceives a second poacher bearing a gun at full-c.o.c.k, creeping into a strange house in order to obtain a better shot at the forester. Just as he is about to enter the house the forester breaks the door open and thus forestalls him--in order to surprise and overcome him. The forester is justified in taking this step, but must make good all damage resulting to the householder.”[146]
[Footnote 146: Ibid., p. 575.]
The instance holds good in the land of _Kultur_, where law and order affords so little protection to a civilian and his property; but in countries where laws are based upon culture the author believes that the forester would receive condign punishment for breaking into another man's house, no matter under what pretext. Unconsciously the learned professor is humorous when he compares Germany to a gamekeeper and Russia and France to poachers; but he is nave to a degree of stupidity, when he makes France carry a weapon fully prepared to shoot the forester.
We will consult another German authority to show that France's weapons were not at full-c.o.c.k.
”During the last ten years France has given special attention to the fortresses on the German frontier. But those facing Belgium have been so carelessly equipped that we see clearly to what a degree she relied upon her neighbour. The forts are in the same condition as they were twenty or thirty years ago. As some of these fortifications were built fifty years ago, various points on the frontier are strategically, absolutely useless.
”A typical example of this, is Fort les Ayvelles, which is intended to protect the bridges and Meuse crossings south of Mezieres-Charleville; the fort was levelled to the ground by 300 shots from our 21-centimetre howitzers. It was built in 1878 and armed with forty cannon; of these the princ.i.p.al weapons consisted of two batteries each containing six 9-centimetre cannon, which, however, were cast in the years 1878-1880, and in the best case could only carry 4,000 yards. Then there were some 12-centimetre bronze pieces cast in 1884, and a few five-barrelled revolver cannon.
”Besides these there were old howitzers from the year 1842; muzzle-loaders with the characteristic pyramids of cannon ball by the side, such as are often used in Germany at village festivals or to fire a salute. The fort itself was a perfect picture of the obsolete and out-of-date. Apart from the crude, primitive equipment, the organization must have been faulty indeed.
”On the road leading up to the fort we saw some tree-branches which had been hurriedly placed as obstacles, and higher up wire entanglements had been commenced at the last moment. At least one battery was useless, for the field of fire was cut off by high trees, and at the last minute the garrison had tried to place the guns in a better position.
”Our artillery which fired from a north-westerly position displayed a precision of aim which is rare. One battery had had nearly every gun put out of action by clean hits. In several cases we saw the barrel of the gun yards away from its carriage, and only a heap of wheels, earth, stones, etc., marked the place where it had stood.
”Another proof of the excellent work done by the artillery, was the fact that hardly a sh.e.l.l had struck the earth in the 500 yards from the battery to the fort. After the former had been disposed of, the artillery fire was concentrated on the fort, which was reduced to a heap of rubbish. The stonework and the high walls--yards thick--had tumbled to pieces like a child's box of bricks.
”A garrison of 900 men had been placed in this useless cage, and they had fled almost at the first shot. Instead of putting these men in trenches, their superiors had put them at this 'lost post' and allowed them to suffer the moral effects of a complete, inevitable defeat.
”Near the fort I saw the grave of its commander, the unfortunate man who had witnessed the hopeless struggle. He lived to see his men save their lives in wild flight--and then ended his own.”[147]
[Footnote 147: Heinrich Binder: ”Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen,” pp.
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