Part 4 (2/2)
In peace times no German editor would dare to refuse any contribution sent to him by the military authorities. The above airman-story sufficiently ill.u.s.trates the state of affairs in war time.
”Chemnitz, August 4th. During the past night, between 3 and 4 a.m., a French airman dropped bombs on Chemnitz. Bombs exploded in the streets without, however, doing any damage. Apparently the shots fired at the aeroplane were unfortunately without result.” _Magdeburgische Zeitung_, August 5th.
This is an excellent example of how the Press trick is worked. A lying report is published in a city hundreds of miles away from the scene of the alleged occurrence. The extract where it was alleged that a French airman was shot down at Wesel, on the Dutch frontier, was published in a Munich paper, four hundred miles away.
The last and supreme lie in Bethmann-Hollweg's speech is the most insidious of all. The Chancellor sketched a truly moving picture of Germany beseeching Austria to find a _modus vivendi_ between herself and Russia. Germany claims that up to the last minute of the last fatal week she was working for peace. Bethmann-Hollweg insinuates that on July 31st a last decision was to have fallen in Vienna; he does not tell us what that decision would have been, but he maintains that Russia's military preparations forestalled it and so the decision was never arrived at.
Thus Russia destroyed the last hope of peace; the Chancellor falsely led his hearers to believe that it was a certain hope and that the European peace would have been saved.
It is useless to choose one's words in writing of German diplomacy. This is a base lie. Austria arrived at her decision previous to sending her ultimatum to Serbia. This momentous decision was, that Russia had no right to intervene in the quarrel, which means, in other words, that Russia had absolutely no right to speak or use her influence in a crisis affecting the destiny of the Slavonic peoples, neither had Russia any right to move in a crisis which would disturb the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe. It was merely these rights which Russia throughout the crisis endeavoured to establish; if they had been recognized there would have been no war.
In order to prove what the Austro-German standpoint was, and that from first to last never changed, reference must be made to the Austrian Red Book.[27] On page 24: Sir Edward Grey was informed by Count Mensdorf on July 24th, ”and I (Mensdorf) repeated to him (Grey) many times, that we should stick to that view.”
[Footnote 27: Oesterreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch. Vienna, 1915.]
Page 25. Count Czecsen in Paris informed French Minister: ”It is a question which can only be settled between Serbia and ourselves,” on July 24th.
On the same day the Austrian Amba.s.sador emphasized the same point in an interview with the Russian Foreign Minister--pp. 27-8.
During the evening Monsieur Sasonow had interviews with both the German and Austrian Amba.s.sadors. The latter telegraphed to Vienna: ”My German colleague at once pointed out to M. Sasonow that Austria would not accept any interference in her differences with Serbia and that Germany would also not permit it.”--p. 29.
That gives the situation in its simplest form, and without making further quotations, it will suffice to cite the dates on which it was re-emphasized:
July 25th in St. Petersburg, p. 89 ” 27th ” ” ” p. 101 ” 28th ” Berlin by Germany, p. 116 ” ” ” London by Austria, p. 123 ” 29th ” St. Petersburg, ” p. 128 ” 30th ” Berlin, ” p. 130 ” 30th ” St. Petersburg, ” p. 131 ” 31st ” Vienna, ” p. 133 August 1st ” St. Petersburg, ” p. 136
Moreover, no less a personage than the Kaiser's brother confirmed this view. In Prince Heinrich's telegram to the King of England, July 30th, the following pa.s.sage occurs: ”If you really and sincerely wish to prevent this terrible misfortune (a European war), may I propose that you should exercise your influence on France and Russia to keep them both neutral (in the Austro-Serbian quarrel). In my opinion this would be of the greatest service. I consider this a certain means and perhaps _the only possibility of preserving European peace_.”
Prince Heinrich expressed no hope that Austria could be persuaded to make any concession, but merely requested King George to exercise his influence to get Russia to accept a position impossible to herself and incompatible with the balance of power in Europe.
The rock of Germanic obstinacy was seated in Vienna, whether Germany was the prime mover in erecting it remains to be proved. Germany knew full well that European peace would be shattered on that rock, yet there is no fragment of evidence to show that she tried to remove it; but there is overwhelming proof that she encouraged Austria to stand by it, thus causing a European conflagration.
And as if the above were insufficient to prove that the German Imperial Chancellor was guilty of conscious falsification, Austria put one more nail in the coffin of European peace on September 24th, 1914, when it issued an official communication to the Press, reiterating that Austria had never dreamed of departing from the att.i.tude which she first took up.[28]
[Footnote 28: ”Die Schuld am Weltkriege” (”The Guilt for the World War”), by an Austrian. Vienna, 1915, p. 59.]
Germany's aim was to employ the Serajewo crime as a lever to put Russia, as a vital force, out of the domain of European politics. In spite of denials, there is reason to believe that Austria was inclined to listen to reason, but Germany forestalled and prevented this by despatching an ultimatum to Russia and then declaring war.
A few other points in Bethmann-Hollweg's speech deserve brief notice. He quotes Germany's threats, but not one word from the peaceful overtures which were so often mentioned. He fails to cite any single point which Austria had yielded at Germany's advice. Further, no proof of Germany's vaunted ”mediatory action” is discoverable either in the speech or the diplomatic doc.u.ments published by the Central Powers.
In regard to his justification of the violation of Belgian neutrality, the civilized world has already pa.s.sed judgment, and in this place it only remains to point out that the four hundred members of the Reichstag cheered the Chancellor's announcement. This alone is a sufficiently severe comment on the conceptions of right and justice which direct the proceedings of Germany's highest legislative body.
It evidently did not occur to the Reichstag or Germany's Imperial Chancellor that, if necessity knows no law which respects a neutrality guaranteed by Germany, then at a later date necessity would also recognize no law which protected Belgian territory after Germany had conquered it. A lamb in the jaws of a lion is in a truly dangerous position, and although the outlook may be black, it is still wiser for the lamb to try and avoid the lion's jaws.
Bethmann-Hollweg saw the mote of Greater-Serbianism in Serbia's eye, but he was peculiarly anxious not to perceive the beam of Pan-Germanism which has blinded Germany's vision for a generation, and is the one and only cause for the rapid increase in European armaments.
Before consigning the German Chancellor's Pecksniffian oration to well-deserved oblivion, there is one other fact to state, because it is of immediate interest to Great Britain. In the person of Bethmann-Hollweg the German Government stood before the world on August 4th, 1914, and endeavoured to prove that Germany was attacked, and that her conscience was clear. There are even Britons who have got stuck in Bethmann-Hollweg's peace-lime. Yet it would be interesting if the German Government would explain why the civilian population was ordered to leave Heligoland on the afternoon of Friday, July 31st. They were allowed twenty-four hours within which to leave the island, and one who was in the exodus describes the scene in the _Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten_ for August 12th. Early on Sat.u.r.day morning the civilians proceeded on to the landing-stage, where several steamers were waiting.
”Suddenly the _Konigin Luise_ started off without taking any pa.s.sengers on board, and soon disappeared under full steam.”
This was the boat which laid mines round the mouth of the Thames.
Although the German Chancellor protested his desire for peace with England as late as August 4th, it seems quite evident from the events in Heligoland that war with this country had been decided upon on July 31st.
<script>