Part 2 (1/2)
It is true that the usages of everyday life do not always hold good in diplomatic dealings, but it is instructive to state the case in the terms of everyday affairs. Mr. A. (Austria) informs Mr. B. (Serbia) that he has a quarrel to settle with him and states his demands. Mr. C.
(Russia) who is a relation, patron and friend of B.'s, interferes to see fair play. Whereupon Mr. D. (Germany), a friend and relation of A.'s, informs C. in unmistakable fas.h.i.+on that he must neither speak nor act in the affair or he will be immediately thrashed. Messrs. A. and D. are unanimous in this view and repeat the threat in mutual form. Meanwhile A. attacks B. Mr. C, seeing that they will not accord him a hearing, takes steps to compel them to hear him, at which point Mr. D. fulfils his threat and falls upon C.
It is not yet clear whether Austria would have permitted Russia to take over the role of adviser and second to Serbia in her unequal struggle with Austria. But from the moment Germany appeared on the scene the situation becomes perfectly simple: Russia has absolutely no right either to speak or move in the matter. On this rock of immovable Germanic obstinacy the Russian s.h.i.+p of State, was intended to meet with diplomatic s.h.i.+pwreck. Should Russia attempt to avoid this fate, then the German sword could be trusted to arrange matters in the way desired by Germany.
The German language contains a very expressive phrase, _Stimmungsmacherei_, which means creating or preparing a certain frame of mind. How Germany's public opinion was tuned to the war melody is seen by a study of the German newspapers published between July 25th and August 1st. A great part of the German nation had welcomed Austria's expressed determination to compel Serbia ”to lick her shoes,” as a London paper put it at the time. Only the Social Democratic Party persisted in a.s.serting that Austria was the provocative and guilty party down to the evening of July 28th.
But three days earlier the process of educating public opinion against Russia commenced. In fact, it required little tuning to arouse a national chorus, which was swelled subsequently by the Social Democratic voices, demanding that Russia too must bite the dust.
At the psychological moment the terms of the alliance between Germany and Austria were launched in the Press. One paper[8] wrote: ”It is interesting at the present moment to call to mind how the treaty existing between Germany and Austria regulates the question of mutual support.” Then the various paragraphs are cited, and the article concludes: ”That is to say: (1.) a.s.suming Austria attacks Serbia, and Russia as a precautionary measure sends troops to the Austrian frontier without commencing hostilities against the latter, then Germany is under no obligation to intervene. (2.) a.s.suming that Serbia is the attacking party, and Russia gives her support by military measures which threaten Austria, then the German Empire must immediately a.s.sist the Hapsburg monarchy with the whole of her military forces.
[Footnote 8: _Munchen-Augsburger Abendzeitung_, July 27th.]
”Hence it all depends upon who attacks; the interpretation of 'attack,'
however, is debatable both in politics and international law. Again and again it has been a.s.serted that that Power which declares war is not the attacker, but the one which makes a continuance of peaceful relations impossible.”
Innumerable notices of Russia's alleged mobilization appeared and, probably with a view to encouraging Germans to stand fast, ghastly pictures of the weakness and unpreparedness of the Russian army, in a word Russian rottenness and corruption. Persistent rumours of revolutions in Russia were current.
A Vienna telegram published in Berlin[9] informed the German public that: ”News received from Warsaw deny the rumours that a revolution has broken out in Russian-Poland, but it is true that yesterday the entire citadel in Warsaw was blown up. Official Russian reports endeavour to prove that the explosion was caused by lightning. The extent of the damage is not yet known, but in any case it amounts to hundreds of thousands of roubles. It is also not certain whether any or how many lives were lost.”
[Footnote 9: _Vossische Zeitung_, July 29th.]
A few days later the German official organ _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ and the semi-official _Kolnische Zeitung_ published the following report of the explosion. ”According to the statement of the Governor of Warsaw it was caused by revolutionaries. No proof of this was forthcoming, therefore it was ascribed to lightning, and as n.o.body believed this explanation--there was not a cloud on the sky at the time--the guilt remained finally with the revolutionaries.
”Now it has been proved, not to the satisfaction of the Russian authorities of course, that Russian officers of high rank blew the magazine up, because they would have to supply the troops with ammunition after the mobilization--and the ammunition was not there. The money for the same had found its way into the officers' pockets.”
On July 30th the _Vossische Zeitung_ announced: ”To-day even more alarming news has been in the air than in the last few days. The _Lokal Anzeiger_ stated during the afternoon that an order for the mobilization of the army and navy had been signed by the Kaiser. On making inquiries in official quarters, we were informed that the 'news' is false. At three o'clock Wolff's Bureau issued an official _dementi_: 'We have received an official statement to the effect that the news published in an extra edition of the _Berliner Lokal Anzeiger_ that the Kaiser had ordered the general mobilization is untrue.' Great excitement was caused by the _Lokal Anzeiger's_ announcement, and the public visibly disquieted.”
The above report refers, of course, to incidents which happened on the preceding day. The 30th of July was marked by the suppression of three Berlin papers, including the _Berliner Neuester Nachrichten_, for divulging the fact that the 1st, 5th and 17th Army Corps had been mobilized. An account of this _faux pas_ appeared on July 31st in the _Kreuz Zeitung_ and concluded, after denying the truth of the mobilization, with the following paragraph: ”If bodies of troops have been moved to various points of our Eastern frontier, then it only means the so-called frontier protection (_Grenzschutz_), which has been made necessary by our Eastern neighbour strengthening his customary frontier guards by troops of the line. Frontier protection is not generally intended to prevent a serious attack, but means rather a kind of police action.”
Two other pa.s.sages will suffice to illuminate the mobilization question.
”Yesterday Russia gave official notification in Vienna and Berlin of mobilization against Austria. Is it to be wondered at that a feeling of disquietude is spreading throughout all cla.s.ses of the nation. By delay on our side, valuable military advantages may be lost if the people once suspect that there is an absence of that firmness and joy of responsibility (_Verantwortungsfreudigkeit_) which marked the action of the Austrian Government and was hailed with jubilation by the German nation.
”_Summa summarum_: The German Government has taken honest pains during the last week in showing its peace-loving disposition and in seeking a peaceful solution to the crisis. Nevertheless the political situation on all sides and in every respect, has become worse from day to day through the fault and according to the intention of the Triple Entente.”[10]
[Footnote 10: _Kreuz Zeitung_, July 31st.]
”The others are mobilizing. We--issue denials. We deny everything which might mean mobilization or look like preparation for that step. It is done for the sake of 'peace,' so that Russia, who is gathering her national strength together in ma.s.ses, may not be offended. Are we being led? We look to the Kaiser. The Peace Societies and some of Germany's enemies are looking to him.
”Can we remain indifferent in our hour of dread need, when the gleaming promise of a bright future appears in the distance, if the inability to resolve and dare has made Berlin its headquarters. All efforts are for 'peace' with honour. But in politics one must be able to recognize when it is impossible to continue at peace; when peace is at the cost of our friends, our own security, and the future of European peace. In view of this one must be able to act.”[11]
[Footnote 11: _Deutsche Zeitung_, July 31st.]
The internal tactics of the German Government had been successful all along the line. Insignificant Serbia had dropped out of the reckoning.
Russia must be humbled. The German nation, believing itself entirely peaceful, and convinced that its leaders had done everything possible for peace, now demanded in no unmistakable voice--action! mobilization!
war!
Announcements of mobilization on all sides (Switzerland, Holland, Belgium) doubtless added to the popular belief that Germany desired above all things--peace. Still, in spite of the warlike spirit of the nation and the burning desire to settle off Russia once and for all, there was an undercurrent of overstrained nervousness. A Dresden paper of July 30th relates that between the hours of two and four on the preceding afternoon a Berlin newspaper had been asked thirty-seven different questions on the telephone relating to rumours of a.s.sa.s.sinations, mobilization, etc.