Part 13 (1/2)
Directly it became known that Semianoff and Kalmakoff had set the Omsk Government at defiance, numerous other would-be s.e.m.e.noffs came on the scene until the very residence of the Supreme Governor and his Headquarters Staff scarcely escaped attack, and it became necessary to show the British Tommy on the side of order. This was the position up till the early days of December, 1918.
Just about this time the fact that Germany was beaten began to take shape in the j.a.panese military mind, and the fact was hammered home by the terms of the Armistice. For some days the j.a.panese Mission at Omsk flatly refused to believe the cables; their national pride refused to admit that they had so far misunderstood the power of Britain and her Allies. It was a terrible awakening to the self-styled ”Lords of the East” that all their schemes should be brought to nought, that British and American squadrons might be expected to cruise in the Sea of j.a.pan, and perhaps hold the scales fair between her and her temporarily helpless neighbour. I do not suppose it will ever come to that, but such was her fear. From this time on, while the objects of j.a.pan in Siberia were still the same, she pursued them by quite different methods.
The first sign of change was that j.a.panese soldiers were allowed to salute British officers and were no longer allowed to use the b.u.t.ts of their rifles on inoffensive Russian citizens. Their military trains no longer conveyed contraband goods to their compatriots who had _acquired_ the Russian business houses in the main trading centres along the railway. The Staff no longer commandeered the best buildings in the towns for alleged military purposes and immediately sub-let them to private traders. j.a.pan at once re-robed herself with the thin veil of Western morals and conduct which she had rapturously discarded in 1914.
While Hun methods were in the ascendancy she adopted the worst of them as her own. She is in everything the imitator _par excellence_, and therefore apparently could not help herself.
The British and French mildly protested against the att.i.tude of j.a.pan towards Semianoff and Kalmakoff, but it was continued until the anarchy created threatened to frustrate every Allied effort. Not until the Peace Conference had disclosed the situation did a change in policy take place. From this time on the conduct of j.a.pan (both civil and military) became absolutely correct. President Wilson brought forward his famous, but impossible, proposal that the different Russian belligerents should agree to an armistice and hold a conference on the Turkish ”Isle of Dogs.” If patriotism is the maintenance of such rules of human conduct and national life as will justify one man in killing another, then no Russian patriot could meet in friendly conference those who had destroyed and murdered their own country and people. Russia during the previous two years had shown that there could be no compromise between anarchy and order, or their several adherents. This was, however, the policy of America, and as such received the blessing of every representative, Jew or Gentile, of the U.S.A. in Siberia. j.a.pan saw a kink in the American armour and took full advantage of the chance to damage U.S.A. prestige. She rallied Russian patriotism to her side by advising that no notice be taken of this harebrained suggestion. j.a.pan's advice received the secret blessing of both French and English who knew the situation, though in our case we had to admit that the British Premier had stood sponsor for this international monstrosity. This gave j.a.panese diplomacy its first clear hold upon Russian patriotism and enabled her to appear as a true friend of orderly government.
American diplomacy in Russia had received its first great shock, but with careful handling it was still possible to recover the lost ground.
With the utter failure of the ”Isle of Dogs” policy, Russian rage quickly subsided and a normal condition soon returned. The Allies had received a salutary warning, and most of them took the hint, but America continued on her debatable course. Having failed diplomatically to effect a compromise, she tried to force her views by military means. The neutral zone system of her commanders was the natural outcome of President Wilson's proposal. The intention was excellent, that the results would be disastrous was never in doubt. It forced the American command to adopt a sort of local recognition of the Red Army within the zone, and enabled the j.a.panese to appear as the sole friend of Russian order. The j.a.panese were attacked by Red forces collected in these zones, with American soldiers standing as idle spectators of some of the most desperate affairs between Red and Allied troops. j.a.pan was ent.i.tled to reap the kudos such a situation brought to her side, while America could not expect to escape the severest censure.
Profiting by the blunders of her great antagonist, j.a.pan managed in six months to recover all the ground she had lost while suffering under the illusion of a great Hun victory that was to give her the Lords.h.i.+p of the East. From a bl.u.s.tering bandit she has become a humble helper of her poor, sick, Russian neighbour. In which role she is most dangerous time will show. The world as a rule has little faith in sudden conversions.
This, then, was the situation in the Far East in June, 1919. As I was leaving Vladivostok I heard that the Red forces that had been organised in the American neutral zones had at last boldly attacked their protectors. If this was correct, it may be the reason why Admiral Koltchak was able to report their defeat and rout over the Chinese border and we were back again at the point at which British and Czech co-operation had arrived a year previously.
CHAPTER XXIV
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Before we decide our policy as to withdrawal or otherwise from Russia it is necessary to know whether we have contracted any obligations to the Russian people, and what is the nature of such obligations, if any. Are they moral, military, or political?
Towards the end of 1914, when our army had been driven back behind the Marne and the future of Europe and our Empire was in the balance, frantic appeals were made by British statesmen, and even by still more august authority, asking Russia to rush to our aid and save us from destruction. This appeal was backed by British public and Labour opinion, and through our Press made a profound impression upon the Russian people. The Russian Government, regardless of their best military advice, forced their partially mobilised legions to make a rapid flying raid into East Prussia, which immediately reduced the pressure upon our own armies and made the victory of the Marne possible.