Part 9 (1/2)

II. SOMETIMES TOO LATE TO MEND

The English parliament, becoming suddenly aware of the growing power in the American subjects, now conceded every right asked for by the colonists, and enacted those rights into law. But it was too late. The middle-cla.s.s ma.s.s of property owners and business men began to see the vision of an American republic and the tide swelled toward success. As the cutting off of supplies from the colonies had been the chief cause of American weakness, England tried to prevent supplies being sent to America, with the result that Denmark, Sweden, Russia and Holland declared an armed neutrality to enforce their right to sell military supplies to America. The dispute led to a war with Holland in 1780, so that by the close of that year Great Britain had not a friend on earth and was confronted by the united armies and navies of France, Spain, Holland and America. At the same time there was rebellion in India against the English rule, insurrections in Ireland, and so deep the discontent in England itself that a London mob was able for several days to make itself master of the city. The English lost control of the sea before the close of 1780, and on October 19, 1781, Cornwallis surrendered his army to Was.h.i.+ngton, from which historic hour a world-champion of the rights of man over the divine rights of kings was born in the Western world.

The difficulties which Was.h.i.+ngton had encountered and overcome in Virginia previous to the French and Indian war were in full exercise throughout New England at the opening of the Revolutionary War. They could act together in small, free groups for a particular object of their will, but to obey superior officers and to sacrifice their own private judgment to higher authority, which was so necessary in war and such a war as this, was utterly repugnant to their dispositions.

That subserviency to authority was the very reason they were opposing the idea of taxation without representation, and why should they be required to do the very thing they were fighting against! That quandary and query has been the puzzle of every mind unable to see the vision of means necessary to future results. It is the blindness always of the fanatical pacifist who would sacrifice nothing for peace, and of the non-resistant doctrine that right and moral law have no need for material might in a material world.

The colonists had never known of anything but local patriotism. They seemed to be unable to distinguish between English king-made authority and American people-made authority, notwithstanding how much had been discussed the relations of representation and taxation. That difficulty has always existed concerning American militarism. It almost defeated Lincoln during the Civil War. It almost delivered the Union to Secession. If democratic militarism cannot be different from dynastic militarism, then American freedom and human liberty will be lost in the next American or world war.

The colonist would fight with the heroism he displayed in Indian warfare, but when the enemy was driven away from his neighborhood, it was the duty of the next neighborhood to take care of itself. Besides, the New Englander with a home had the same idea as the Virginian soldier twenty years before, and this was that, when he wanted to go home, why shouldn't he! He was not a deserter, and in no sense a coward, but the discipline of army service was mere enslavement and any compulsion was despotism. To understand the making up of an efficient army under such circ.u.mstances is the only measure to estimate the greatness of Was.h.i.+ngton and the debt to him of the liberty-loving world.

Curtis, in his history of American Commonwealth, says, ”Was.h.i.+ngton overcame these difficulties by dint of a patience and a selflessness almost without parallel in history, which gradually communicated itself to his fellow countrymen. In seven years he created a continental army which ended the war at Yorktown.”

III. SELECTING THE LEADER OF LIBERTY FOR AMERICA

Was.h.i.+ngton had to write many letters, endeavoring to spur up the really patriotic leaders to consistent work for the cause. In his letter to Joseph Reed he was almost in despair over the indifference of people from whom he expected the most patriotic service.

”It grieves me,” he wrote, ”to see so little of that patriotic spirit which I was taught to believe characteristic of this people.” But this did not mean that the so-called ”spirit of '76” was not strong among them. Was.h.i.+ngton needed so much of the patriotic spirit that a little would not be any, and, to half-heal the wounds of a friend, was not very friendly to the cause, nor a sufficient friends.h.i.+p toward the needs of Was.h.i.+ngton's work for America.

Ten years later, when Was.h.i.+ngton had matured, through the mind-making experiences of revolutionary times, he wrote to John Jay, saying, ”Experience has taught us that men will not adopt and carry into execution measures the best calculated for their own good without the intervention of coercive power.” This meant that human society requires law, and the right of law is devoid of appreciation or application unless it is clothed with the might to keep its forms and values true.

Lecky says, ”The common saying that you cannot make people virtuous by law is a dangerous half-truth. The virtue innate in a people may be utterly destroyed by bad inst.i.tutions, for 'the virtue,' as Jay wrote to Was.h.i.+ngton, 'like the other resources of a country, can only be drawn to a point by strong circ.u.mstances ably managed, or strong governments ably administered.'”

When it came to a question of who should be commander-in-chief of all the armies, the disruptions and jealousies of the sections seemed dangerously near wrecking any united action, which obviously must be fatal to any independence more than they then had from Great Britain.

The Southern leaders were unanimous for Was.h.i.+ngton, and, with the efficiency of shrewd politicians, supported measures largely according to the pressure they brought to bear in the cause of having Was.h.i.+ngton for the commander-in-chief. But this support did not bring together any antagonism, because it was not made by any faction of admirers or supporters. Was.h.i.+ngton himself, though present, refused to lend any aid to the presentation of his own name.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Mount Vernon--Was.h.i.+ngton's Residence, Virginia.]

It was John Adams, the whole-souled patriot from Ma.s.sachusetts who was the leader in advocating the selection of Was.h.i.+ngton. In his diary, during these consequential times, Adams wrote, ”I had no hesitation to declare that I had but one gentleman in my mind for that important command, and that was a gentleman from Virginia, who was among us, and very well known to us; a gentleman whose skilled experience as an officer, whose independent fortune, great talents, and excellent universal character would command the approbation of all America, and unite the cordial exertions of all the colonies better than any other person in the Union.”

There were many men who were able leaders, and who had already made great sacrifices in the cause of liberty, who believed with their friends that they were ent.i.tled to be selected for the head of the Army. Nevertheless, when the nomination was made, the election by ballot was unanimous for Was.h.i.+ngton.

The salary of Commander-in-Chief had been set at five hundred dollars a month, but Was.h.i.+ngton in his address of acceptance, while declaring that no salary could have been made large enough to tempt him from the comforts and business interests of his home, said he would accept no salary, but would keep an exact account of his expenses, which they would no doubt refund to him.

”There is something charming to me,” said John Adams, who became the second president of the United States, when writing at the time to a friend, ”in the conduct of Was.h.i.+ngton, a gentleman of one of the first fortunes upon the continent, leaving his delicious retirement, his family and friends, sacrificing his ease, and hazarding all in the cause of his country. His views are n.o.ble and disinterested.”

Was.h.i.+ngton now wrote to his half-brother, Augustine Was.h.i.+ngton, a characteristic letter.

”I am now to bid adieu to you, and to every kind of domestic ease for a while. I am embarked on a wide ocean, boundless in its prospect, and in which, perhaps, no safe harbor is to be found. I have been called upon by the unanimous voice of the Colonies to take command of the Continental army; an honor I neither sought after nor desired, as I am thoroughly convinced it requires great abilities, and much more experience than I am master of.”

But he added his belief that the Divine Providence, which had called him into such a dangerous duty, was wisely ordering the affairs of men, and would enable him in due course of time to perform all his tasks justly and with success.

What that task was through the revolutionary war can be appreciated only in the details of events that require volumes of description in telling. One cannot read it through with its ign.o.ble intrigues, unpatriotic dissentions, and dangerous rivalries without feeling that Was.h.i.+ngton combined great manhood, great leaders.h.i.+p, great statesmans.h.i.+p and great generals.h.i.+p, and that no other man of less character and genius than that could ever have welded together such discordant and diversified elements into a means sufficient to achieve the independence and liberty of America.

CHAPTER XIII

LARGE BODIES MOVE SLOWLY

I. THE FIRST COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF