Part 8 (2/2)
DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE.
4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a pa.s.sing notice here. Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a consciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or more particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal disregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has its basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with great zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they rest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a regard to moral obligation, together with the necessity of self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect for universal rect.i.tude commanded the entire powers of their being. Yet but a slight observation will most clearly evince, that their regard for the right, the true, and the good, is wholly circ.u.mscribed by this one principle.
Still, such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in a very high degree. In reality, however, they have not made the first approach to real virtue. Their respect for this one principle, together with its specific applications, has its spring in some other department of their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire range of moral obligation.
SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE.
In preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that the Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will only, and that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the voluntary power, other states being required, only as their existence and character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power. From this, it undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the length and breadth of its requirements, finds its entire fulfilment within the sphere of the Will. A question of great importance here presents itself: By what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full harmony with the law? In the investigation of this question, we may perhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral Philosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the judgment of the writer, however, demand its introduction here.
The Moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts.
Yet, a moment's reflection will convince us that both these precepts have their basis in one common principle, and are, in reality, the enunciation of that one principle. The identical reason why we are bound to love G.o.d with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors as ourselves. So the subject is presented by our Saviour himself. After speaking of the first and great commandment, He adds, ”the second is like unto it,” that is, it rests upon the same principle as the first.
Now the question is, What is this great principle, obedience to which implies a full discharge of all obligation, actual and conceivable; the principle which comprehends all other principles of the Moral law, and of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one common principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This principle has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different philosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that I notice is this.
_It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived intrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral obligation._
Every one will readily apprehend, that the above is a correct enunciation of the principle under consideration. It expresses the fundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is binding upon us. The reason and only reason why we are bound to love G.o.d with _all the heart_, is the intrinsic and relative importance of the object presented to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite and Perfect. The reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves, is the fact, that his rights and interests are apprehended, as of the same value and sacredness as our own. In the intention under consideration, all obligation, actual and conceivable, is really met.
G.o.d will occupy his appropriate place in the heart, and the creature his. No real right or interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will intentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and relative importance demands. Every moral agent is under obligation infinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention, and no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than this.
The same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by Kant, to wit: ”So act that thy maxim of Will (intention) might become law in a system of universal moral obligation”--that is, let your controlling intention be always such, that all Intelligents may properly be required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention.
By Cousin, the same principle is thus announced: ”The moral principle being universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may be recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of not erecting the immediate motive (intention) of the particular act or resolution, into a maxim of universal legislation”--that is, we cannot but affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the same motive or intention.
It will readily be perceived, that each of these forms is really identical with that above announced and ill.u.s.trated. It is only when we are conscious of the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance, from respect to the idea of duty, that, in conformity with the principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will might become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are conscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us not to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that all Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same intention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on this point.
COMMON MISTAKE.
1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in treating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as consisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most distinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this proposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, that ”everything right or wrong in a moral agent, consists exclusively of right or wrong _feelings_”--feelings as distinguished from volitions as phenomena of Will. Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition is true, to wit: that _nothing_ right or wrong, in a moral agent, consists in any states of the Sensibility irrespective of the action of the Will. Who would dare to say, when he has particular emotions, desires, or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no further claim upon him, that all its demands are fully met in those feelings?
Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If the demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the Sensibility--which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral agents, consists of right or wrong feelings--then all moral agents, at all times, and under all circ.u.mstances, are bound to have these same feelings. For what the law demands, at one time, it demands at all times. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the theory under consideration.
LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW.
2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the _nature_ of that _love_ which is the ”fulfilling of the law.” It does not, as all admit, consist in the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally obvious and universally admitted, in any mere _convictions_ of the Intelligence. For reasons above a.s.signed, it does not consist in any states of the Sensibility. No man, when he is conscious of such feelings, can affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all circ.u.mstances, to have the same feelings that he now has. This would be true, if the love under consideration consists of such feelings. But when, from, a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is voluntarily consecrated to the promotion, in the highest degree, of universal good and when, in the pursuit of this end, there is a serious intention to esteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance; _here_ is the love which is the fulfilling of the law. Here is the intention by which all intelligents, in reference to all interests and objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled, and which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such Intelligents in every system of righteous moral legislation. Here is the intention, in the exercise of which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequently, is that love which is the fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent Chapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject presented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a necessary truth of the universal Intelligence.
IDENt.i.tY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS.
3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real ident.i.ty of moral character, in all Intelligents of true moral rect.i.tude. Their occupations, forms of external deportment, and their internal convictions and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one omnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention which is ever one and identical, directs all their moral movements. It is the intention, in the promotion of the highest good of universal being, to esteem and treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and relative importance, from regard to moral obligation. Thus moral virtue, in all Intelligents possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect ident.i.ty of character. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time, precisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control of the intention above ill.u.s.trated, const.i.tutes a perfect ident.i.ty of character in G.o.d and all beings morally pure in existence. For this reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral agents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all obligation of every kind.
CHAPTER XII.
THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.
SECTION I.
EVERY perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion, every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the action of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will's activity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless range of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the phenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly dest.i.tute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction of such phenomena, const.i.tutes _complex_ states of mind, which have a positive moral character. In all instances, the _moral_ and _voluntary_ elements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration has been overlooked by the great ma.s.s of philosophers and theologians, and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined to the action of the Will in the direction of the _natural propensities_ and _religious affections_.
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