Part 2 (1/2)

[12] Fusilier Y. M. J., _Correspondence_. See also the letter of the sailor P. L. Y., of Audierne; ”Then, seeing that they were advancing against us in ma.s.s (they were a regiment against our single company), we were obliged to fall back 400 metres, for we could no longer hold them.

I saw the master-at-arms fall mortally wounded, and four men wounded when we got back to the railway line. There we stayed for a day and a night to keep the Boches employed, sending volleys into them when they came too near and charging them with the bayonet. It was fine to see them falling on the plain at every volley. We ceased firing on the 10th, about 4 a.m.”

[13] ”This morning we made a fine collection of dead Germans from 50 to 100 metres from our trenches. We have a few prisoners.” (Letter from Second-Lieutenant Gautier.)

[14] According to _Le Temps_ of October 18, the German losses were very much greater: ”800 Germans killed.” The hesitation and want of vigour shown in the attack seem surprising. They are perhaps to be explained by the following pa.s.sage, written by Second-Lieutenant de Blois: ”The Germans had not expected such a resistance, and even less had they thought to find us in front of them. They suspected a trap, and this paralysed their offensive, though our line was so thin that a vigorous onslaught could not have failed to break it. This they did not dare to make; several times they advanced to within a few metres of our trenches and then stopped short. We shot them down at our ease. Yet our positions were far from solid; we were on the railway embankment, and the trenches consisted of a few holes dug between the rails; the bridge had not even been barricaded by the Belgian engineers, and nothing would have been simpler than to have pa.s.sed under it. When night came, Commander Conti ordered me to see to it. I turned on a little electric pocket light; the bullets at once began to whistle about my ears; the Germans were only about 20 metres from the bridge, but they made no attempt to pa.s.s!”

[15] The first killed and the second wounded at Dixmude. Both received the Legion of Honour.

[16] He also received the Legion of Honour.

[17] Cf. Dr. Caradec, ”_La Brigade des Fusiliers Marins de l'Yser_”

(_Depeche de Brest_ for January 19, 1915).

[18] Killed at Dixmude.

[19] Killed at Dixmude.

[20] Dr. L. G., private correspondence.

[21] He won his stars as commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, and has invented a mine-sweeper adopted by the British navy.

III. RETREAT

How was the retirement to be carried out?

The operation seemed to be a very delicate one. The enemy was watching us on every side. General Capper's orders were to disengage ourselves by a night march to Aeltre, where the roads to Bruges and Thielt intersect.

The retreat began very accurately and methodically, facilitated by the precautionary arrangements the Admiral had made: first, our convoys; then, half an hour later, our troops, which were replaced temporarily in their positions by the English units. ”As we pa.s.sed through Ghent,”

writes Fusilier B., ”we were heartily cheered again, the more so as some of us had taken Prussian helmets, which they showed to the crowd. The enthusiasm was indescribable. The ladies especially welcomed us warmly.”

Fair Belgium had given us her heart; she did not withdraw it, even when we seemed to be forsaking her. Covered by the English division which followed us after the s.p.a.ce of two hours, we pa.s.sed through Tronchiennes, Luchteren, Meerendre, Hansbeke, and Bellem, a long stretch of eight leagues, by icy moonlight, with halts of ten minutes at each stage. The motor-cars of the brigade rolled along empty, all the officers, even the oldest of them, electing to march with their men.

Aeltre was not reached till dawn. The brigade had not been molested in its retreat; we lost nothing on the way, neither a straggler nor a cartridge. And all our dead, piously buried the night before by the chaplain of the 2nd Regiment, the Abbe Le h.e.l.loco, with the help of the cure and the Burgomaster, were sleeping in the little churchyard of Melle.

After s.n.a.t.c.hing a hasty meal and resting their legs for a while, the men started for Thielt. ”Twenty-five kilometres on top of the forty we had done in the night,” says a Fusilier, somewhat hyperbolically. ”And they say sailors are not good walkers!”[22]

To avoid corns, they marched bare-footed, their boots slung over their shoulders. And they had to drag the machine-guns, for which there were no teams. But Aeltre, the kindness of its inhabitants, the good coffee served out, and laced by a generous munic.i.p.al ration of rum, had revived them. ”What good creatures they are!” said a Fusilier. ”They receive us as if we were their own children!”

The brigade reached Thielt between four and five in the afternoon; the English division arrived at six, and we at once went into our temporary quarters; the roads were barricaded, and strong guards were placed at every issue. Fifty thousand Germans were galloping in pursuit of us. If they did not catch us at Thielt, we perhaps owed this to the Burgomaster of one of the places we had pa.s.sed through, who sent them on a wrong track. His heroic falsehood cost him his life, and secured a good night's rest for our men. For the first time for three days they were able to sleep their fill on the straw of hospitable Belgian farms and make up for the fatigues of their previous vigils. A Taube paid an unwelcome visit in the morning, but was received with a vigorous fusillade, and the ”beastly bird” was brought down almost immediately, falling in the English lines, to the great delight of our men. Shortly afterwards we broke up our camp and set out for Thourout, which we reached at 1 p.m. Here the English division had to leave us, to march upon Roulers, and the brigade came under the command of King Albert, whose outposts we had now reached.

The Belgian army, after its admirable retreat from Antwerp, had merely touched at Bruges, and deciding not to defend Ostend, had fallen back by short marches towards the Yser. All its convoys had not yet arrived. To ensure their safety, it had decided, in spite of its exhausted state, to deploy in an undulating line extending from Menin to the marshes of Ghistelles; the portion of this front a.s.signed to the Fusiliers ran from the wood of Vijnendaele to the railway station of Cortemarck. On the 14th, in a downpour of rain, the brigade marched to the west of Pereboom, and took up a position facing east. It was the best position open to them, though, indeed, it was poor enough, by reason of its excentricity. The enemy, who had finally got on our track, was reported to be advancing in dense ma.s.ses upon Cortemarck. The 6,000 men of the brigade, however heroic they might prove themselves, could not hope to offer a very long resistance to such overwhelming forces on a position so difficult to maintain, a position without natural defences, without cover on any side, even towards the west, where the French troops had not yet completed their extension. It was the Admiral's duty to report to the Belgian Headquarters Staff on these tactical defects; the reply was an order to make a stand ”at all costs,” a term fully applicable to the situation; but this was rescinded, and at midnight on October 15 the retreat was resumed.

It ceased only on the banks of the Yser.

FOOTNOTE: