Part 56 (1/2)

The two brigades now advanced to a position parallel to the extreme north flank of the enemy's trenches, where they formed front and moved steadily towards the works. When within 600 yards the troops came under fire. The advance was continued without replying until within 200 yards, when the brigades, advancing by quick rushes and opening a heavy fusillade, reached the trenches and captured them at the point of the bayonet. Here the greatest slaughter took place, and the survivors, attempting to rally on their right flank, were dispersed by the 11th Soudanese, who, in their eagerness to fight, had broken their square and deployed. During the attack on the trenches, the cavalry remained on the right of the infantry, guarding their flank. The Horse Artillery Battery at this period came up and sh.e.l.led the redoubt on the south flank of the intrenchments, which had also been exposed to a heavy infantry fire from the Welsh Regiment and the 3rd Egyptian Battalion, which had advanced from their position behind the Water Forts. The two Egyptian brigades now cleared the whole line of intrenchments from north to south, and, with the Mounted Infantry on the north flank, poured steady volleys upon the Dervishes, by this time in full retreat upon Handoub.

An attempt made by the enemy's hors.e.m.e.n to work round the right flank of the attacking line at an earlier stage of the action was defeated by the 20th Hussars, who charged and drove them in disorder in the direction of Hasheen.

By 8 a.m. the whole thing was over, the position was taken, and the bugles sounded ”Cease firing.” The cavalry, however, continued to pursue the retreating enemy, whilst the rest of the troops intrenched themselves in zeribas on the captured position.

The defeat of Osman Digna's followers was most complete. Out of a force of a little over 1,500 men, they had 500 killed either in the fight or during the pursuit. On the other side the loss was insignificant, being only six killed and forty-six wounded. It must be admitted that the Dervish force was vastly inferior in point of numbers to their opponents,[144] who also possessed the advantages of superior skill and discipline. Even making every allowance for these circ.u.mstances, it is difficult to account for the trifling loss sustained by the Anglo-Egyptian troops, except on the hypothesis that they never, in point of fact, encountered any real resistance. Another circ.u.mstance was that the Dervish force was left to defend their position against greatly superior numbers without being reinforced. This may perhaps be explained by the diversion caused by the naval demonstration made at Mersa Kuwai, and which no doubt caused Osman Digna to imagine that a serious attack at that point was also contemplated.

The effect of Grenfell's victory on the local tribes must have been very great, and the idea naturally was that an immediate advance of the Egyptian troops would be made. This, however, formed no part of the General's instructions, which were simply to drive the enemy from their trenches, and on no account to advance against Osman Digna at Handoub.

Before leaving, Grenfell approved plans made for the construction of additional forts and redoubts, so as to prevent the enemy being able in future to intrench themselves within range of the town, and his mission being accomplished, he then returned to Cairo.

The British troops were next withdrawn, and Colonel Kitchener, who was left in command of the garrison of 2,000 men, maintained a purely defensive att.i.tude.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE NILE FRONTIER.

At the end of March, 1886, Mohammed-el-Kheir was still at Kermeh, with a considerable force distributed between that place and Dongola. Although there was nothing to show that the contemplated invasion of Egypt had been abandoned, there is reason to believe that the Khalifa's attention was at this time diverted by events which occurred in Kordofan, where many of the tribes broke out into open revolt against his authority.

Probably from this cause, and from troubles which arose on the Abyssinian frontier, no further move in the direction of Egypt had been attempted since the fight at Ginnis.

Seeing no further prospect of fighting, General Stephenson had quitted the Anglo-Egyptian force, which, on the 18th January, was concentrated at Kosheh, and returned to Cairo. It was now determined to fix the frontier of Egypt once more at Wady Halfa, and to this point all the troops and stores were withdrawn by the 15th April, not, however, without the loss of two steamers which were wrecked in trying to pa.s.s the Cataract. The British troops were sent back to a.s.souan, and the defence of Wady Halfa was thenceforth left entirely to the Egyptian soldiers.

As soon as the news reached Omdurman that the Anglo-Egyptian forces had retired there was great rejoicing, and fresh impetus was given to the northward movement. The Khalifa took steps to reinforce the various Emirs in command, and at the same time sent proclamations by the hands of emissaries to Egypt. These proclamations called upon the people of Upper and Lower Egypt ”to rise as one man and destroy the Turks and infidels.” They also announced that ”the Khalifa of the Mahdi would shortly take Constantinople, Mecca, and all other parts of the world.”

In pursuance of this programme, in the month of June the Dervish forces again began to advance on the Nile, and on the 15th occupied Akasheh once more, whilst a party advanced to Ambigol Wells and destroyed the railway between that point and Akasheh.

In July, the further carrying out of the project of invasion was suspended in consequence of the Khalifa receiving news that his emir Mohammed-es-Sherif had sustained a most serious defeat in Darfur.

For this, and other reasons, he was prevented from sending the reinforcements intended to his followers on the Nile. On 6th July, the commandant, Colonel Smith, reported from Wady Halfa that Mohammed-el-Kheir was retiring to Khartoum, and Wad-en-Nejumi was not coming to Dongola, whilst all the Dervishes were leaving that province and ma.s.sing at Khartoum. The Colonel added that ”in this direction all heart appears to have died out of the movement.”

In October, however, the situation took another turn, and General Stephenson, in a despatch to the British Government, reported that the force of the enemy in the Dongola district and to the north, including that on the way down from Berber, might be reckoned at from 7,000 to 10,000 fighting men, 1,500 of whom were armed with rifles; 5,000 of the number were already in Dongola and other places to the north. The force possessed two or three steamers and a fleet of native boats. The despatch stated that ”a serious advance upon the frontier may be apprehended and should be guarded against.”

On the nth November, Major-General the Hon. R. H. de Montmorency (now Lord Frankfort), commanding the British troops in Alexandria, was sent to take command of the troops at Wady Halfa.

On the 29th, the advanced guard of the enemy, under Nur-el-Kanzi, was at Abkeh, eight miles south of Wady Halfa and was estimated at about 2,000 men. The intention of the Dervishes was not to attack Wady Halfa at first, but to make a descent on the river at Argin, a few miles to the north of Halfa, thus cutting the communications, whilst the main body would besiege that place. To frustrate this design a fortified post was established at Argin, and also at Deberra, ten miles to the north of Halfa.

On the 30th, having first repaired the break which had been made in the railway, Colonel Chermside advanced with the Egyptian Cavalry, Camel Corps, and a battalion of infantry to the enemy's camp at Gemai, which he found deserted, and occupied it.

At daybreak on the 1st December, the main body, consisting of two and a half Egyptian battalions, under General de Montmorency, left Wady Halfa for Gemai, where it joined Chermside. The latter with his force then pushed on to the enemy's main position at Sarras, thirty miles south of Halfa. The Dervishes retreated across the desert before his advance, and he was only able to come up with a few stragglers. De Montmorency halted the main body at Gemai and went on with his staff to Sarras, where he arrived the same evening. His intention had been to break up Nur-el-Kanzi's force, but finding that the Dervishes refused to make a stand anywhere, after remaining at Sarras two days, the General returned with the whole force to Wady Halfa.

At the end of the year a band of Dervishes again gave trouble, occupying Sarras once more. From this point they threatened Wady Halfa and devastated the neighbouring country. They then retired, but only to return in April, 1887.

On the 27th April it was reported that the Emir Nur-el-Kanzi, with the advance guard of a formidable force, had occupied Sarras and pushed forward an outpost as far as Gemai.

Colonel Chermside, who commanded at Wady Halfa, at once despatched Major Rundle with 200 cavalry and two guns of the Camel Battery _en route_ to Sarras, with orders to march by night and to prevent the natives giving notice of the advance of the main body.

The 9th Soudanese Battalion, under Captain Borrow, and the 1st Egyptian Battalion, under Major Lloyd, moved out soon after, and early next morning concentrated at Abkah.