Part 52 (2/2)
On the 14th April Wolseley telegraphed that in the event of the Government determining to withdraw the troops from the Soudan, before completion of arrangements he must know whether it was intended to retain Dongola, Wady Halfa, Korosko, or a.s.souan, as the frontier post.
He said that if the position on the southern frontier of Egypt was to be exclusively one of defence, he would hold Wady Halfa and Korosko as outposts, with a strong brigade at a.s.souan. There would be no difficulty in withdrawing troops, but for the position in Egypt it was most essential that the announcement of withdrawal should be accompanied by an authoritative statement that the Government was determined to maintain a British garrison.
The next day Wolseley telegraphed his opinion on the question of withdrawal, strongly advising the retention of Dongola. His message, omitting irrelevant pa.s.sages, was as follows:--
”At, and south of a.s.souan, I have about 7,500 British fighting soldiers. Retreat policy will require at least 2,500 on the frontier, leaving 5,000 available. For the sake of this handful, is it advisable to reverse Soudan policy? Retreat from Dongola hands that province over to the Mahdi, and renders loyalty of Ababdehs and other frontier tribes very doubtful. Withdraw Graham's force if necessary; this will not seriously disturb Egypt; but hold on to Dongola province.”
There are few unprejudiced persons who will not agree in the soundness of the views above expressed. The reply was as follows:--
”_War Office, April 15th, 1885._
”Your telegrams of the 14th and 15th received. Decision will probably be to adopt proposal for defence of Egyptian frontier at Wady Halfa and a.s.souan, as in your telegram of 14th. It is desirable that troops not required for this purpose should be concentrated as soon as possible, and available for any other service.”
The Government at this time had fully made up their minds to withdraw from the Soudan altogether as early as possible.
Wolseley, on the other hand, was anxious that before this step should be finally taken, the Mahdi should be crushed once for all, and in a very able despatch, dated the 16th April, set forth his views.
The doc.u.ment, which reads very like a protest against the policy of the Gladstone Cabinet, omitting some pa.s.sages, is as follows:--
”Both from a military and financial point of view, and also with regard to the general well-being of Egypt proper, the growing power of the Mahdi must be met, not by a purely defensive policy on the frontier, whether at a.s.souan or Wady Halfa, but by his overthrow in the neighbourhood of Khartoum.”
The despatch concludes:--
”To sum up. The struggle with the Mahdi, or rather, perhaps, with Mahdi-ism, must come sooner or later. We can accept it now, and have done with it once and for all, or we can allow all the military reputation we have gained at the cost of so much toil and hard fighting, all the bloodshed and all the expenditure of the past campaign, to go for nothing, and try and stave the final struggle off for a few years. These years will be years of trouble and disturbance for Egypt, of burden and strain to our military resources, and the contest that will come in the end will be no less than that which is in front of us now. This is all we shall gain by a defensive policy.”
The Afghan question still troubled the Ministry, and on the 20th April Lord Hartington telegraphed that the ”Government were about to announce that it was necessary to hold all the military resources of the Empire, including the forces in the Soudan, available for service wherever required. The Government would not,” he said, ”therefore make provision for further offensive operations in the Soudan, or for military preparations for an early advance on Khartoum, beyond such as could not be stopped with advantage, and did not involve hostile action, viz., river steamboats contracted for, and the completion of the Wady Halfa Railway. As to ulterior steps, the Government reserved their liberty of action. With the cessation of active operations on the Nile, any considerable extension of the Souakim-Berber Railway was to be suspended; but as Souakim must be held for the present, it might be necessary to occupy one or more stations in the neighbourhood, and the Government would retain a garrison in Egypt, and defend the frontier.”
On the 23rd April Wolseley proposed that he should go to Souakim in order to form an opinion on the spot as to the points which it would be desirable to hold.
This was approved by the Government, and on the 24th Wolseley communicated the arrangements made for the disposition of the Nile force in his absence as follows:--
”On 1st June, troops at Merawi start for Dongola, at which place and Abu Fatmeh I propose to concentrate force now up the Nile.
This movement will be completed by 1st July.
”In the meantime, railway to Ferket will be in a forward state, and able to a.s.sist greatly in the movement of troops and Civil Government officers on Wady Halfa. At present nearly all the troops are in huts; to move them in this present hot weather will be very trying to their health.
”When troops are concentrated at Dongola and Abu Fatmeh I shall expect orders before I move them to Wady Halfa.”
On the 27th April Wolseley was informed that he was to act in accordance with the proposals contained in his telegram of the 24th. The concentration, he was instructed, should be deliberate, but the movement from Merawi was to begin at once.
Wolseley and his staff left Cairo on April 29th and immediately embarked for Souakim.
General Buller and Sir Charles Wilson being asked their opinions, both reported strongly against a withdrawal from Dongola, and their views were supported by Sir Evelyn Baring.
All argument, however, was in vain. The Government remained unconvinced.
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