Part 43 (1/2)
_Husseinyeh_ is still aground; the _Ismailia_ is at anchor. What a six hours' anxiety for me when I saw the sh.e.l.ls strike the water near the steamers from the Arabs; imagine my feelings!
Noon.--The firing has ceased, I am glad to say. I have lived years in these last hours! Had I lost the _Ismailia_ I should have lost the _Husseinyeh_ (aground), and then Omdurman and the North Fort, and then the town. One p.m.--The Arabs are firing on the steamers with their two guns. The _Husseinyeh_ still aground; that is the reason of it. 1.30 p.m.--Now has ceased.
The _Ismailia_, struck by three sh.e.l.ls, had one man killed, fifteen wounded on board of her; she did really very well. This is our first encounter with the Mahdi's personal troops. 2.45 p.m.--The _Ismailia_ tried to take _Husseinyeh_ off and got struck twice, in addition to the three times before mentioned, with sh.e.l.ls, so she desisted from the attempt. The Arabs are firing on the _Husseinyeh_. I have ordered the Krupp of (Fort) Mogrim to play on the Arab guns, and shall wait till night to take off the _Husseinyeh_. She is nearer to the left bank than to the right bank. It is not clear if she is aground or half sunk (equally a trouble). 3.30 p.m.--The Arabs are bringing their guns nearer to the aground or half-sunken _Husseinyeh_.
The _Ismailia_ reports that the two last sh.e.l.ls have done her no material damage. 4.30 p.m.--The Arabs have now three guns bearing on the _Husseinyeh_. Six p.m.--The firing has ceased. I hope to get the _Husseinyeh_ off to-night. Seven p.m.--The Arabs keep up a dropping fire on the _Husseinyeh_, who, I hear, has two sh.e.l.l holes in her, and has six men, including the captain, wounded.
”22nd November.--I am terribly anxious for the fort at Omdurman, and am trying to devise some means of occupying the Arabs and diverting their attention elsewhere.... The Arab camps are about five miles from the city.
”5th December.--I have almost given up an idea of saving the town; it is a last resource we make to open the route to the Omdurman Fort.
”6th December.--I have given up all idea of landing at Omdurman; we have not the force to do it. The Arabs fired forty-five rounds at (Fort) Mogrim and the steamers. We had two men wounded at Mogrim and one killed. This is most distressing, to have these poor fellows wounded and killed.
”13th December.--The steamers went up and attacked Arabs at Buri. Certainly this day after day delay has a most disheartening effect on every one. To-day is the two hundred and seventy-sixth day of our anxiety. The Arabs appear to have suffered to-day heavily at Buri.... We are going to send down the _Bordein_ the day after to-morrow, and with her I shall send this journal. If some effort is not made before ten days'
time, the town will fall. It is inexplicable this delay. If the expeditionary forces have reached the river, and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we require just to show themselves.”
The latest entry in the Diaries is on 14th December, and is as follows:--
”Arabs fired two sh.e.l.ls at the Palace this morning: 546 ardebs dhoora in store; also 83,525 okes of biscuits. 10.30 a.m.--The steamers are down at Omdurman engaging the Arabs. Consequently I am on 'tenterhooks.' 11.30 a.m.--Steamers returned. The _Bordein_ was struck by a sh.e.l.l in her battery. We had only one man wounded. We are going to send down the _Bordein_ to-morrow with this journal. If I was in command of the two hundred men of the expeditionary force, which are all that is necessary for the movement, I should stop just below Halfiyeh and attack the Arabs at that place before I came on here to Khartoum. I should then communicate with the North Fort, and act according to circ.u.mstances. Now, mark this, if the expeditionary force--and I ask for no more than two hundred men--does not come in ten days the town may fall, and I have done my best for the honour of our country. Good-bye.
”C. G. GORDON.”
It would be impossible to find words more simple and at the same time more pathetic than those contained in the concluding sentences of the man who so long held the attention of the world riveted upon him, and who, unaided and alone, maintained the highest traditions of British courage and fort.i.tude.
CHAPTER XLIII.
WILSON'S VOYAGE TO KHARTOUM.
”Khartoum all right, can hold on for years.--C. G. Gordon, 29: 12: '84,”
was the cheering message, written on a tiny slip of paper, which reached Sir Charles Wilson by Gordon's steamers.
With this writing came Gordon's journals, containing a narrative of events from the 10th September to the 14th December, some private letters and also some despatches addressed by him to ”the Officer Commanding H.M.'s troops,” to Sir Evelyn Baring, and others.
In one of the despatches, dated 20th October, 1884, Gordon informs the officer in command of the British troops of the sending to him of the steamers, and advises the removal from them of all Egyptians, whether pashas, beys, or privates, all of whom Gordon terms ”hens.” The letter concludes:--
”If you do not use the steamers, at least take out the hens and send them back empty. If you choose to put black troops on board, they will be welcome, but not those heroes of Tel-el-Kebir.”
In another letter, dated 21st October, addressed to ”the Chief of the Staff, Soudan Expeditionary Force,” Gordon wrote that he had tendered the resignation of his commission in the British Army, and requested that the General commanding Her Majesty's troops advancing for the relief of the garrison might be informed of this fact.
The letter addressed to Sir Evelyn Baring was dated the 12th December.
In it Gordon stated that, having been sent to Khartoum to draw up a report on the state of the Soudan, and for this purpose having been placed under the orders of Her Majesty's Minister in Egypt, he now informed him that Colonel Stewart took down this report, and that consequently Gordon's connection with the Foreign Office and Baring had ceased.
The latest letter was dated the 14th December, and was addressed to the Chief of the Staff. Its contents were as follows:--
”I send down the steamer _Bordein_ to-morrow with Vol. 6 of my private journal containing account of the events in Khartoum from 5th November to 14th December. The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after which the town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power to hold out, but I own I consider the position is extremely critical, almost desperate; and I say this without any feeling of bitterness with respect to Her Majesty's Government, but merely as a matter of fact. Should the town fall, it will be questionable whether it will be worth the while of Her Majesty's Government to continue its expedition, for it is certain that the fall of Khartoum will insure that of Ka.s.sala and Sennar.”
The writing dated 29th December, 1884, containing the expression, ”Khartoum all right, can hold on for years,” was probably intended, like Gordon's previous message to the like effect, merely to convey the information that he was still holding out.
The wording of the doc.u.ment was simply a _ruse_ in the event of the capture of the person who brought the message, on foot, to the steamer after she left Khartoum. This is apparent from the letter of the 14th December, as well as from the statements of the Egyptian officers who accompanied the steamers. They reported that they had been for some weeks stationed a short distance above Metammeh waiting for the arrival of the British column. They had a.s.sisted in getting messages into and out of Khartoum, where the situation was altogether most gloomy. Gordon himself was well, they said, but his soldiers were despairing of relief, and it was necessary that some Europeans should proceed with the utmost alacrity to Khartoum, in order to rea.s.sure the population and the troops.