Part 26 (2/2)
This disaster was followed by an almost unbroken series of defeats for the Egyptian forces at Shaha Fozia, Shatt, and other places.
In April, as already stated, the Gheddeer field force of 3,500 men was concentrated at Kaha, under Nubir Yussef Pasha. His original intention was to march at once to attack the Mahdi at Gheddeer. Finding, however, that the direct route was difficult and water scarce, he brought his force to Fashoda on the 22nd of April. Here they halted till the 20th of May, thereby allowing themselves to be overtaken by the rainy season, which much increased the difficulty of advancing through the marshy and thickly wooded country which lay between them and their destination. On the 7th of June the force came in contact with the enemy. The Egyptian troops formed a square, which was a.s.sailed by the Mahdi's followers. It was broken, and the whole force annihilated.
The situation throughout the Soudan was now very critical, but fortunately the Mahdi, instead of following up his success and marching on Obeid or Khartoum, remained at Gheddeer, thus giving Abdel Kader, who had by this time taken charge at Khartoum, a chance of organizing new means of resistance.
Abdel Kader, by drawing upon the garrisons at a distance from the scene of operations, by forming battalions of black slaves, and other like measures, managed, though with the greatest difficulty, to get together a fairly respectable force. This, as soon as it was somewhat organized, was applied in strengthening the various garrisons at the more exposed places, and in preparing for eventualities in general.
For a short time the Government forces had a fair share of good fortune, and in various engagements, of no great importance, came off victorious over the Mahdists. This, however, did not last long. On the 17th of July a force sent to attack the Hamar Arabs, on the Darfur frontier, had, although victorious, to be recalled to Obeid to strengthen the garrison, news having come in that the Mahdi had broken up his camp at Gheddeer and was marching to attack that important town. The Mahdi reached Obeid on the 3rd of September with an enormous force, and at once summoned the garrison of about 6,000 soldiers to surrender. Many of the inhabitants flocked to his standard, believing the defence to be hopeless; but the garrison resolved to hold out, and intrenched themselves in the Government buildings. Here they were attacked on the morning of the 14th, the a.s.sault lasting from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. Though repulsed, the attack was renewed on each of the two succeeding days, with the same result. Eventually the Mahdi, after having sustained heavy losses, withdrew, and devoted his energies to the blockade of both Obeid and Bara.
The success of the Government troops at Obeid was, however, doomed to be followed by disasters in other directions. When Obeid and Bara were known to be in peril, a relief expedition of two regular battalions[86]
and some Bas.h.i.+-Bazouks started on the 24th of September from Duem, on the White Nile, for Bara. After two days' march they were attacked, but defeated the enemy with heavy loss. On the 6th October the expedition reached a place called Kan, where there was a well, situated in the midst of a thick forest. The soldiers, after making a weak ”zeriba,” or breastwork of bushes, rushed, according to their custom, to the well for water. They were at once attacked, and over a thousand of them killed, the remainder escaping to Bara. On the 9th Bara was attacked, but the enemy were repulsed, and the same thing happened the following day; after which the a.s.sault was not renewed.
The Mahdi then, to prevent a.s.sistance being sent to Obeid, despatched emissaries to cross the White Nile, to stir up the embers of rebellion and secure more adherents to his cause.
The foregoing brings the narrative down to the time of Abdel Kader's pressing demand for reinforcements. At this period the relief expedition had been all but annihilated. Obeid was held by 3,500 men and Bara by 2,000. Both garrisons were short of food and in a depressed condition.
Many of the officers and men had deserted to the enemy. The Mahdi, with the bulk of his forces, had encamped round Bara, and Amr-el-Makashef was at the same time operating on the Nile.
The latest reports from Darfur were six months old, and the Governor reported that the province was disaffected, and that he could not maintain order without the aid of additional troops.
CHAPTER XXVII.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE.
The att.i.tude of the European Powers towards the English occupation of Egypt was, at the opening of the year 1883, one of acquiescence tempered by expediency.
On the 3rd of January, 1883, Lord Granville issued a Circular Note to the Powers on the Egyptian question. In it he recalled the fact that events had compelled Her Majesty's Government to undertake the task of repressing the Egyptian rebellion, a task which England would have willingly shared with other Powers. His Lords.h.i.+p added that, although for the present a British force remained in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, the British Government wished to withdraw its troops as soon as a system capable of protecting the authority of the Khedive should be organized. In the meantime, they considered it a duty to give the Khedive advice, with the object of securing that the order of things to be established should be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress.
Lord Granville further declared that the danger which threatened the Suez Ca.n.a.l during Arabi's revolt, its occupation by British troops in the name of the Khedive, its employment as a base of operations against the rebels, as well as the att.i.tude of the Ca.n.a.l Company at a critical moment in the campaign, const.i.tuted strong reasons for seeking an international settlement of this question in order to avoid similar dangers in the future. Her Majesty's Government thought that free navigation on the Ca.n.a.l, and its protection against damage and obstruction resulting from military operations, were questions of general interest. His Lords.h.i.+p, in consequence, proposed to the Powers to come to a common understanding to insure the freedom of pa.s.sage through the Ca.n.a.l for every description of vessel, under all circ.u.mstances, with this reserve in the event of war, that the s.h.i.+ps of war belonging to one of the belligerent nations which might be in the Ca.n.a.l while hostilities were proceeding could disembark neither troops nor warlike munitions.
As regards financial arrangements, Her Majesty's Government thought it possible to arrange for greater economy and greater simplicity in the administration by modifications which would not in any way diminish the guarantees of the creditors. His Lords.h.i.+p hoped that he would soon be able to submit definite proposals on this subject to the Powers. The Government relied on the co-operation of the Powers to place foreigners on the same footing as natives as regards taxation.
The public papers contain no reply or acknowledgment of the communication on the part of the French Government.
The first of the other Powers to express any opinion on the despatch was Austria. Sir Henry Elliot called on Count Kalnoky on the 16th of January to ask what impression had been made upon him by the doc.u.ment; and his reply was to the effect that, though he could not be expected to p.r.o.nounce upon it off-hand, he would repeat a.s.surances already given that his Government continued to be animated by the most sincere wish not to embarra.s.s Her Majesty's Government in the reorganization of the administration of Egypt. A week later the Austrian Foreign Minister had another interview with the British Amba.s.sador, and the conversation left on Sir Henry Elliot's mind the impression that Count Kalnoky would make no observations upon the Circular except with reference to the proposal to subject Europeans to the same taxation as natives. He admitted the justice of this proposal, and Sir Henry believed he would not object to it; but it was, he said, a subject that required full examination before it was decided. The suggestions of Her Majesty's Government about the Suez Ca.n.a.l appeared quite to satisfy him.
On the 25th, Count Herbert Bismarck, the German _charge d'affaires_ in London, called on Lord Granville, and stated that his Government accepted generally the arrangement regarding Egypt and the Suez Ca.n.a.l proposed in the despatch, and was prepared to await the further information promised respecting the internal reorganization of Egypt. He went on to say that the German Government would continue to preserve the same friendly att.i.tude towards Her Majesty's Government in regard to Egyptian affairs which they had maintained during the summer.
On the 24th January, Count Hatzfeldt informed Lord Ampthill that he was about to instruct Count Herbert Bismarck to inform Lord Granville that the German Government accepted and agreed in principle to the policy laid down in the Circular of the 3rd respecting the reorganization of Egypt.
The Italian Government took much longer time before giving any answer.
It was not till the 7th February that Count Nigra called on Lord Granville to state their opinion. It was to the effect that they wished to reserve any detailed expression of their views till the English proposals were communicated in a more definite shape; but he was able to say at once that they concurred generally in those proposals.
The Russian reply was yet later and very indefinite. Sir Edward Thornton asked M. de Giers on the 7th February what he had to say, and the reply was that the Imperial Government considered the views expressed in the circular despatch as ”generally satisfactory,” and ”they had not for the present any objection to make to them.”
The minor Powers were addressed in a Circular dated the 24th January, and enclosing Lord Granville's despatch of the 3rd. The respective Foreign Ministers were informed that, as their Governments were interested in the condition of Egypt, and in the questions relating to the Suez Ca.n.a.l, Her Majesty's Government had thought that it might be agreeable to them ”to have cognizance of the communication which has been made by Great Britain on these subjects to the Porte and the other Powers represented in the recent Conference at Constantinople.”
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