Part 17 (1/2)

On the 29th the German gunboat _Move_ was ordered to take part in the patrolling of the Ca.n.a.l.

On the 31st July Admiral Hoskins telegraphed that the French Admiral at Port Sad was ordered to suspend action, and the French ironclad _Thetis_ was to leave Ismailia. Rigid neutrality was to be observed.

On the 3rd August Admiral Hoskins was directed for the present to confine his operations on the Suez Ca.n.a.l to maintaining the _status quo_, and not to land except for the protection of British subjects, or in the event of any attempt being made to block the Ca.n.a.l, as to which he was allowed discretion. This reservation, he was informed, was only temporary, and was contingent upon future military requirements.

On the 5th the s.h.i.+ps of war off Port Sad comprised the _Penelope_, _Agincourt_, _Monarch_, and _Northumberland_ armoured s.h.i.+ps, the _Tourmaline_ and _Carysfort_ sloops, and the _Ready_ and Beacon gun-vessels. The _Don_ and _Dee_, river gunboats, arrived a day or two later.

What had been taking place at Suez was reported in a letter from Mr.

West, the British Consul, to Lord Granville, from which the following are extracts:--

”The whole of the British residents, with one or two exceptions, had taken refuge afloat, and were living in discomfort on board boats, barges, and lighters in the open roadstead. Her Majesty's s.h.i.+p _Euryalus_ arrived on the 29th.

”Admiral Sir William Hewett, who, on the 2nd August, had under his command in the Suez Roads the following s.h.i.+ps of Her Majesty's fleet, viz., the _Euryalus_, _Eclipse_, _Ruby_, _Dragon_, _Mosquito_, and _Beacon_, then decided to act, and I went on sh.o.r.e with a Proclamation to be delivered to the Acting Governor, informing him that the place had been occupied by British forces, which occupation was effected without opposition or resistance on the part of the native soldiers.

The town was then occupied by the marines and bluejackets, about 500 men in all. The few native soldiers in the place got away in the train that was about to leave Suez with more fugitives. The Governor's dwelling and public offices were guarded by marines; the Victoria Hospital, and commanding positions in the environs of Suez, were also held by the British forces.”

To return to Ismailia, where, as above stated, the _Orion_ had arrived on the 27th July. The place was found perfectly tranquil, but the telegraph being in the hands of Arabi's people, Captain Fitz-Roy could get no news or telegrams. The _Coquette_ was anch.o.r.ed, by Captain Fitz-Roy's orders, off the lock-gates of the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l, with orders to report everything going in and coming out. By this means information was obtained that Arabi was receiving daily several boat-loads of coal. On the 29th H.M.S. _Carysfort_ arrived from Port Sad. Lake Timsah was patrolled at night by a steam-launch with an armed crew, which moved about twice in every watch. The _Orion's_ electric light was also used during the first and middle watches of the night, and turned on the Arab guardhouse outside Ismailia.

On the 2nd August Egyptian troops, estimated at about 800, arrived at Nefiche Junction, and encamped outside the railway station. From the 6th, torpedo and picket-boats were employed to keep up communication with Suez and Port Sad. The guns of the different vessels were cleared for action every night, and the marines and small-arms men kept in readiness to land.

On the 16th the Egyptian force at Nefiche was largely reinforced.

Several refugees came off to the s.h.i.+ps.

On the 19th, with a view to a.s.sist in the contemplated landing, the compa.s.s-bearing and distance of the camp at Nefiche were taken during the day from the masthead of the _Carysfort_, and one of the _Orion's_ 25-ton guns was laid accordingly. To secure sufficient elevation to carry the projectile over the intervening sand-hills, the vessel's port boilers were emptied and shot removed, so as to give the s.h.i.+p a strong list to starboard. The same night the crews of the vessels were mustered at 8 o'clock in working dress, with ammunition and provisions all ready for landing.

The foregoing narrative brings the history of events down to the eve of the British forces taking possession of the Ca.n.a.l.

CHAPTER XVIII.

DE LESSEPS AND THE Ca.n.a.l.

The history having now been brought to the period when the Suez Ca.n.a.l was occupied by the British forces, it may be interesting to refer to the att.i.tude a.s.sumed by M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, the President of the Ca.n.a.l Company, and to show how his communications with the rebel leaders led the latter to postpone until too late the steps resolved on for the destruction of the Ca.n.a.l.

De Lesseps from the first opposed any interference with the Ca.n.a.l by the British forces. The earliest indication of his views was afforded immediately before the Alexandria bombardment. When that operation was impending, Admiral Seymour warned British s.h.i.+ps not to enter the Ca.n.a.l in case of hostilities. In consequence of this warning eleven s.h.i.+ps were stopped at Port Sad and Suez on the 10th July. M. Victor de Lesseps, the Company's agent at Ismailia, thereupon protested against what he termed ”this violation of the neutrality of the Ca.n.a.l.”

On the same day, M. de Lesseps, then in Paris, communicated to the British Amba.s.sador there, and to all the other representatives of the Powers, a copy of the telegraphic instructions which had on the 8th July been sent to the agent of the Company at Ismailia. Their effect was that any action or warlike demonstration in the Ca.n.a.l was forbidden, and that ”its neutrality had been proclaimed by the Firman of Concession, and had been recognized and acted upon during the two last wars between France and Germany and Russia and Turkey.”

A very slight examination of the question will suffice to show that the Ca.n.a.l had absolutely nothing of the neutral character so persistently claimed for it by M. de Lesseps at this time and during the subsequent operations.

Its claim to neutrality was based solely on a clause in the Concession, in which the Ca.n.a.l was declared by the Sultan to be ”a neutral highway for the s.h.i.+ps of all nations.” This clause, inserted apparently to indicate the peaceful and industrial character of the enterprise, was an expression of intention no doubt binding upon the parties to the Concession, but upon no one else. This, it is obvious, was a totally different matter from construing it, as De Lesseps sought to do, as laying down for the rest of the world a law under which, for all time and all circ.u.mstances, the Ca.n.a.l should be considered as outside the range of belligerent operations. No one can contend that the ruler of a country, by a mere _a priori_ declaration of his own, can confer the quality of neutrality upon any particular part of his territory irrespective of future eventualities. This is a matter where the rights of other States come in. Whether a country is or is not neutral is a matter which, on war breaking out, has to be determined by the application of certain well-known principles of International Law, and does not depend upon the mere declaration of the ruler, unless followed by a strict observance of neutrality.

a.s.suming that, as was practically the case, England was at war with the _de facto_ ruler of Egypt, which was Arabi, any declaration that the Sultan might choose to make that this or that portion of Egyptian territory should be considered as neutral, and therefore exempt from warlike operations, would clearly be illusory.

The most that could be done towards the so-called neutralization of the Ca.n.a.l was subsequently effected in December, 1888, when, by an agreement between Egypt and the princ.i.p.al Powers, it was arranged that (subject to certain reservations made by Great Britain) no hostilities on the part of any of the contracting Powers should take place in the Ca.n.a.l, nor, in the event of the territorial Power being itself a belligerent, should the s.h.i.+ps of that Power attack, or be attacked, in the Ca.n.a.l, nor were the entrances to the Ca.n.a.l to be blockaded. This, it will be seen, is ”neutralization” only in a limited and vague sense of the term, the employment of which was carefully avoided in the agreement.

The precedents invoked by M. de Lesseps from the Franco-German and the Russo-Turkish wars, in reality, were worth nothing. When France and Germany were at war, Egypt was at peace, and her neutrality had to be respected, neither Turkey nor Egypt being in any way mixed up with the dispute. As regards the Russo-Turkish war, it is incontestable that if Russia, in the exercise of her undoubted rights as a belligerent, had seized on the Ca.n.a.l as a piece of Ottoman territory, no other Power would have had reason to complain. Whether by doing so Russia would have made an enemy of England, and so have caused her to take part against her, was another matter; and, influenced probably by considerations of this kind, Russia was induced to abstain. This, however, in no way affects the principle involved.

But, apart from the general reasoning above mentioned, there were certain special circ.u.mstances affecting the matter which made the case of De Lesseps still weaker, and rendered the ordinary rules regarding neutrality inapplicable. By the terms of the Concession, although the Ca.n.a.l itself was to be the property of the Company for a term of years, the land through which it ran remained none the less Egyptian territory, and by Article 9 it was expressly declared that the Government should have the same right of acting for the maintenance of public security and the enforcement of the law within the limits of the Company's property as might be exercised at any other point of the Khedive's dominions.