Part 26 (2/2)
There cannot be any doubt that science must have freedom in teaching. But of what kind? One that is necessary and suitable. Yes, but what kind of freedom is that? Here is the crux of the question. Now we are again at the boundary line where we stood, when defining the freedom of science in general, at the parting of the ways of two contrary conceptions of man.
One is the Christian idea, and also that of unbia.s.sed reason. Man is a limited creature, depending on G.o.d, on truth and moral law, at the same time dependent on social life, hence also dependent on social order and authority; consequently he cannot claim independence, but only the freedom compatible with his position. Therefore the barriers demanded by truth and by the duty of belief are set to his research; hence his freedom in teaching can only be the one permitted by his social position; personal perception of truth _and_ consideration for the welfare of mankind will be the barriers of this freedom.
This view is opposed by another, claiming full independence for both research and teaching, a claim prompted by the modern philosophy of _free humanity_, which sees in man an autonomous being, who needs only follow the immanent impulses of his own individuality; and this especially in that activity which is deemed the most perfect, the pursuit of science: this hypostatized collective-being of the highest human pursuit is also to be the supreme bearer of autonomism. As a matter of course this results in the claim for unlimited freedom in teaching, a freedom we shall term _liberal_: in communicating his scientific view the scientist need merely be guided by his perception of truth, without any considerations for external authorities or interests, provided his communication is a scientific one, viz., observing the usual form of scientific teaching.
This latter limitation is usually added, because this freedom is to apply to the teaching of _science_ only; to the popular presentation of scientific views, appealing directly to the ma.s.ses, such a freedom is not always conceded.
”Research,” we are told, ”demands full freedom, with no other barrier but its own desire for truth, hence the academic teacher who teaches in the capacity of an investigator is likewise not to know any barriers but his inner truthfulness and propriety.” ”In this sense we demand to-day freedom in teaching for our universities. The freedom of the scientist and of the academic teacher must not be constrained by any patented truth, nor by faint-hearted consideration. We let the word of the Bible comfort us: 'if this doctrine is of G.o.d, it will endure; if not, it will pa.s.s away' ” (_Kaufmann_). Whatever the academic teacher produces from his subjective veracity must be inviolable; he may proclaim it as truth, regardless of consequences. ”The searching scientist,” so says another, ”must consider only the one question: What is truth? But inasmuch as there cannot be research without communication(?), we must go a step further: the teaching, too, must not be restricted. The scientific writer has to heed but one consideration: How can I present the things exactly as I perceive them, in the clearest and most precise manner?” (_Paulsen_).
”Scientific research and the communication of its results must, conformable to its purpose, be independent of any consideration not innate in the scientific method itself,-hence independent of the traditions and prejudices of the ma.s.ses, independent of authorities and social groups, independent of interested parties.
That this independence is indispensable needs no demonstration.”
”Nor can any limitation of the freedom of research and teaching be deduced from the official position of the scientist or teacher”
(_Von Amira_). Just as soon as he begins his research according to scientific method, _i.e._, adapts his thoughts to scientific rules, customs, and postulates, he may question Christianity, G.o.d, everything; neither state nor Church must object, no matter if thousands are led astray.
This freedom is pre-eminently claimed for philosophical and religious thought, for ideas relating to views of the world and the foundations of social order; because only in this province is absolute freedom of teaching likely to be seriously refused. In mathematics and the natural sciences, in philology and kindred sciences, there is hardly occasion for it; there only petty disputes occur, differences among compet.i.tors, things that do not reach beyond the precinct of the learned fraternity. Whether one is for or against the theory of three-dimensional s.p.a.ce, for or against the theory of ions and the like, all that touches very little on the vital questions of mankind; but the case is quite different when it comes to publicly advocating the abolition of private property, to the preaching of polygamy: it is here where great clashes threaten. Here, also, there enter into the plan the social powers, whose duty it is to s.h.i.+eld the highest possessions of human society against wanton attack.
Nevertheless the demand is for unlimited freedom in teaching. What, then, are the arguments used in giving to this exceptional claim the semblance of justification? This shall be the first question.
Unlimited Freedom in Teaching not Demanded.
1. Not by Veracity.
Veracity is appealed to first; it obligates the teacher, so it is said, to announce his own convictions unreservedly, for to ”deny one's own convictions would offend against one of the most positive principles of morals”; hence the academic teacher could not grant to the state the right to set a barrier in this respect, ”it would be a violation of the duty of veracity, which is innate to the teacher's office” (_Von Amira_).
Was it realized in making this claim what the duty of truthfulness really demands? This duty is complied with when one is not untruthful, that is to say, does not state something to be his opinion when secretly he believes the contrary to be true; to force him to do this would of course be instigating untruthfulness. Truthfulness, however, does not require any one to speak out publicly what he thinks; one may be silent. Or is cautious silence untruthfulness? It is oftentimes prudence, but not untruthfulness. There is a considerable difference between thinking and communicating thought, even to the scientist.
Or is the scientist _obliged_, for instance, to proclaim publicly views he has formed contrary to the prevailing principles of morals,-views he calls the ”results of his research,” so that mankind at last may learn the truth? Was _Nietzsche_ in duty bound to proclaim to the wide world his revolutionary ideas? Any sober-minded man might have told him he need not worry about this duty. Has the teacher of science this duty? How will he prove it? How are they going to prove that it is inc.u.mbent upon an atheistic college-professor to teach his atheism also to others? Or, must he teach that the fundamental principles of Christian marriage are untenable, if this has become his personal opinion? Is it, perhaps, impossible for him to refrain from such teaching in the lectures he is appointed to give? This view will mostly prove a delusion. A conscientious examination of his opinion would convince him that he, too, had better abandon it, since it is merely an aberration of his mind. But let us a.s.sume that he could neither correct his views nor refrain from proclaiming them, that he would declare: ”I should lie if, in discussing the question in how far this or that public inst.i.tution is morally sanctioned, I were to halt before certain inst.i.tutions; for instance if, having the moral conviction that monarchy is a morally objectionable inst.i.tution, I omitted to say so” (_Th. Lipps_).
Well, he has the option to change his branch of teaching, or to resign his office; he is not indispensable, no one forces him to retain his office.
Indeed, he owes it to _truthfulness_ to leave his post the very instant he finds he is not able to occupy it in a beneficial way; he owes it to _honesty_ to yield his position, if he has lost the proper relation to religion, state, and the people, to whom his position is to render service.
2. Not the Duty of Science.
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