Part 6 (1/2)

This was probably an over-estimate, but the Indians were formidable. The regular troops stationed at the frontier posts were less than six hundred. To organize and equip an army sufficient to extirpate the Indians and destroy their towns, would require the raising of nineteen hundred additional men, and an expenditure of two hundred thousand dollars. This was a sum of money, says the secretary, ”far exceeding the ability of the United States to advance, consistently with a due regard to other indispensable objects.” In the third place, the government vainly imagined that it was possible to effect a peace with the Wabash tribes. The views of Secretary of War Knox were very emphatic on this subject. ”It would be found, on examination, that both policy and justice unite in dictating the attempt of treaty with the Wabash Indians; for it would be unjust, in the present confused state of injuries, to make war on those tribes without having previously invited them to a treaty, in order amicably to adjust all differences.” With these views, Was.h.i.+ngton himself concurred, observing, ”that a war with the Wabash Indians ought to be avoided by all means consistently with the security of the frontier inhabitants, the security of the troops, and the national dignity.”

Accordingly, about the first of January, 1790, Governor Arthur St.

Clair, descended the river Ohio from Marietta, opposite Fort Harmar, to Losantiville, opposite the mouth of the Licking river. Here was located Fort Was.h.i.+ngton. He changed the name of Losantiville to Cincinnati, organized the county of Hamilton, and proceeded to Fort Steuben or Clarksville, at the Falls of the Ohio. There he dispatched a messenger to Major John Hamtramck, the commandant at Vincennes, with friendly speeches to be forwarded by him to the Indians of the Wabash. A sincere and honest effort was to be made to bring about peace, although St.

Clair himself had but little faith in an amicable adjustment and expressed the opinion that the Miamis and the renegade Shawnees, Delawares and Cherokees, lying near them, were ”irreclaimable by gentle means.” The heart ”dried like a piece of dried venison” was ample proof that St. Clair was right.

The first peace messenger sent by Hamtramck was Fred Gamelin, a Frenchman. He proceeded no farther than the Vermilion river, where he was informed by an Indian that if he went any farther his life would be taken, and he returned to Vincennes. On the first of April, Hamtramck sent forward Antoine Gamelin, an intelligent French merchant. The first village he arrived at was close to Vincennes, and was named Kikapouguoi.

The Indians at this place were friendly, and he proceeded up the Wabash.

He next arrived at a town of the Vermilion Piankeshaws. The first chief of the village and all the warriors seemed to be pleased with the words of peace from the Americans, but said that they could not give a proper answer before consulting their ”eldest brethren,” the Miamis. They desired that Gamelin should go forward to Kekionga or Miamitown, and bring back a report of what the head chiefs should say. Gamelin had now fairly entered the sphere of British influence. He was told that the nations of the lake had a bad heart and were ill disposed toward the Americans; that the Shawnees of Miamitown would never receive his speech.

Gamelin now advanced to the large Indian village of the Kickapoos, situated on the Big Vermilion river, in what is now Vermilion County, Indiana. Their princ.i.p.al town was on the site of what is now known as ”The Army Ford Stock Farm,” a few miles from the present village of Cayuga. This farm has been in the possession of the old Shelby family for years. The house contains two or three old fireplaces and has been built for about a century. It stands on a high bluff facing the Vermilion river, and the view is very picturesque. In making recent excavations for gravel along the roadway to the west of the buildings, an Indian skeleton was unearthed. It was in a fair state of preservation and the teeth in the skull were still perfect. There were also several Indian arrowheads, remains of a leathern pouch with a draw-string, and parts of a gra.s.s-woven blanket. By the side of the skeleton of the savage were the bones of a dog, and also a small copper bell, which was probably worn about the dog's neck. The Kickapoos held the dog in especial veneration and at the time of the burial of the warrior, fully equipped with arms and tobacco for the happy hunting ground, the dog was probably slain to accompany his master.

No tribe of savages along the Wabash was more irreconcilable than the Kickapoos. ”They were,” says Beckwith, ”pre-eminent in predatory warfare. Small parties, consisting of from five to twenty or more, were the usual number comprising their war parties. These would push out hundreds of miles from their villages, and swoop down upon a feeble settlement, or an isolated pioneer cabin, and burn the property, kill the cattle, steal the horses, capture the women and children and be off again before the alarm could be given.” They were always strongly on the British side, and numbers of them fought against the Americans at Tippecanoe.

Gamelin at once encountered opposition. The Kickapoos first found fault with his speech and said that it contained a threat of war. Upon his eliminating the objectionable words, they said he could go farther up the river, but that they could not give a definite answer because some of their warriors were absent, and they had first to consult the Weas, who were the owners of their lands. They next found fault with Gamelin for coming among them empty-handed. They said that they expected ”a draught of milk from the great chief, and the commanding officer of the post, for to put the old people in good humor; also some powder and ball for the young men for hunting, and to get some good broth for their women and children.” They promised to keep their young men from stealing, and to send speeches to their nations in the prairies to prevent them from making expeditions.

On the fourteenth of April, Gamelin held a council with the Weas and Kickapoos at Ouiatenon. He found everything hostile. As a Frenchman he was welcome, but was plainly told that nothing could be done without the consent of the Miamis; that it was useless to ask them (the Indians) to restrain their young men, for they were ”being constantly encouraged by the British.” One of the chiefs said: ”Know ye that the village of Ouiatenon is the sepulcher of all our ancestors. The chief of America invites us to go to him, if we are at peace. He has not his leg broke, having been able to go as far as the Illinois. He might come here himself; and we should be glad to see him at our village. We confess that we accepted the axe, but it is by the reproach we continually receive from the English and other nations, which received the axe first, calling us women; at the present time they invite our young men to war.”

On the eighteenth of April, Gamelin arrived at Kenapacomaqua or L'Anguille. The head chief was absent, and the tribesmen would give no answer. However, they sent some of their men along to hear what the Miamis at Kekionga would say. On the twenty-third of April, Gamelin arrived at the head of the Maumee. The next day he got the Miamis, the Shawnees and a few Delawares in council. He presented each tribe with two branches of wampum, and began his friendly speeches before the French and English traders who had been invited to be present. After his speeches were delivered he displayed the treaty of Fort Harmar. This greatly displeased them.

Nothing can better display the treachery of the Miamis on this occasion than the statements of the princ.i.p.al chieftain, LeGris, made to Gamelin in a private conversation. After telling the Frenchman not to pay any attention to the Shawnees, as they were the ”perturbators of all the nations,” he said that he knew that the Miamis had a bad name on account of mischief done on the Ohio, but that this mischief was not occasioned by his young men, but by the Shawnees; that his young men had only gone out to hunt. This glaring falsehood was told in the face of the fact that the Little Turtle himself had been out on the warpath only the winter before, returning with captives and plunder.

On the twenty-fifth of April, Gamelin held a conference with the famous Shawnee chief, Blue Jacket. The chief was implacable. He informed Gamelin that no answer could be given to the American peace messenger without hearing from the British at Detroit. That the Shawnees had determined to give the two branches of wampum back, and to send Gamelin to Detroit, or detain him twenty days until an answer could be received from the British. The chief also stated that he believed that the Americans were guilty of deception. The next day after this conference five Potawatomi arrived at Miamitown with two captured negro slaves, which they openly sold to the British traders.

A day or two after the interview with Blue Jacket, Gamelin was told by LeGris to call at a French trader's house and receive his answer. He was there told that he might go back to Vincennes when he pleased, and that no definite answer could be given to his speeches ”Without consulting the commandant at Detroit.” LeGris professed to be pleased with Gamelin's address, and said that it should be communicated to all the confederates, but declared that the nations had resolved not to do anything without the unanimous consent of the tribes.

”The same day, Blue Jacket, chief of the Shawnees, invited me to his house for supper; and, before the other chiefs, told me that, after another deliberation, they thought necessary that I should go myself to Detroit, for to see the commandant, who would get all his children a.s.sembled for to hear my speech. I told them I could not answer them in the night; that I was not ashamed to speak before the sun.”

”The twenty-ninth of April, I got them all a.s.sembled. I told them that I was not to go to Detroit; that the speeches were directed to the nations of the river Wabash and the Miami; and that, for to prove the sincerity of the speech, and the heart of Governor St. Clair, I have willingly given a copy of the speeches, to be shown to the commandant at Detroit; and, according to a letter wrote by the commandant of Detroit to the Miamis, Shawnees, and Delawares, mentioning to you to be peaceable with the Americans, I would go to him very willingly, if it was in my directions, being sensible of his sentiments. I told them I had nothing to say to the commandant; neither him to me. You must immediately resolve, if you intend to take me to Detroit, or else I am to go back as soon as possible.”

”Blue Jacket got up and told me, 'My friend, we are well pleased with what you say. Our intention is not to force you to go to Detroit: It is only a proposal, thinking it for the best. Our answer is the same as the Miamis. We will send, in thirty nights, a full and positive answer, by a young man of each nation, by writing to Post Vincennes.' In the evening, Blue Jacket, chief of the Shawnees, having taken me to supper with him, told me, in a private manner, that the Shawnee nation was in doubt of the sincerity of the Big Knives (Americans), so called, having been already deceived by them. That they had first destroyed their lands, put out their fire, and sent away their young men, being a hunting, without a mouthful of meat; also, had taken away their women; wherefore, many of them would, with great deal of pain, forget the affronts. Moreover, that some other nations were apprehending that offers of peace would, maybe, tend to take away, by degrees, their lands; and would serve them as they did before; a certain proof that they intend to encroach on our lands, is their new settlement on the Ohio. If they don't keep this side (of the Ohio) clear, it will never be a proper reconcilement with the nations Shawnees, Iroquois, Wyandots, and perhaps many others.”

On the journey back to Vincennes, every indication along the way was threatening. At L'Anguille, Gamelin was told that one of the Eel river chieftains had gone to war with the Americans; that a few days before his arrival a band of seventy Indians, Chippewas and Ottawas from Michillimacinac, and some Potawatomi, had pa.s.sed through the village on the way to the American frontier. At Ouiatenon, the Weas said that the English commandant was their father, and that they could do nothing without his approbation. ”On the eighth day of May, Gamelin returned to Fort Knox, and on the eleventh, some traders arrived from the upper Wabash, bringing the intelligence that war parties from the north had joined the Wabash Indians; that the whole force of the savages had gone to make an attack on the settlements, and that three days after Gamelin left the Miamis, an American captive had been burned in their village.”

[Ill.u.s.tration: Map of the Harmar, St. Clair and Wayne Campaigns.

Drawing by Heaton]

Reluctant as was the government of the United States to engage in war with the Wabash Indians, no doubt now remained of their warlike intentions. Every savage town from the Vermilion Piankeshaws to ancient Kekionga, was under British control. On the first of May, 1790, Governor Arthur St. Clair transmitted to the war department a part of the report of Antoine Gamelin, written from Tippecanoe, and observed as follows: ”By this letter, you will perceive that everything seems to be referred to the Miamis, which does not promise a peaceable issue. The confidence they have in their situation, the vicinity of many other nations not very well disposed, and the pernicious counsels of the English traders, joined to the immense booty obtained by the depredations upon the Ohio, will most probably prevent them from listening to any reasonable terms of accommodation, so that it is to be feared the United States must prepare effectually to chastise them.” Shortly afterwards, St.

Clair hastened to Fort Was.h.i.+ngton at Cincinnati, and there held a military conference with General Josiah Harmar. Being empowered to call upon Virginia, then including Kentucky, for one thousand militia, and upon the State of Pennsylvania for five hundred more, it was resolved to concentrate three hundred of the Kentucky troops at Fort Steuben (Clarksville), to march from that place to Post Vincennes. From thence an expedition under Major John F. Hamtramck was to be directed against the villages on the lower Wabash, so as to prevent them from aiding the Miamis higher up. The remaining twelve hundred militiamen were to join the regulars at Fort Was.h.i.+ngton and strike directly across the country to the princ.i.p.al Miami village at Kekionga. No permanent military post was to be established, however, at the forks of the Maumee. Secretary of War Knox was fearful of results. While admitting that the Miami village presented itself ”as superior to any other position,” for the purpose of fixing a garrison to overawe the Indians at the west end of Lake Erie, on the Wabash and the Illinois, still, he was apprehensive that the establishment of a post at this place would be so opposed to the inclinations of the Indians generally as to bring on a war of some duration, and at the same time render the British garrisons ”so uneasy with such a force impending over them, as not only to occasion a considerable reinforcement of their upper posts, but to occasion their fomenting, secretly, at least, the opposition of the Indians.” How any official of the government with the report of Antoine Gamelin in his hands, could hope to soften the animosity of the tribes by the taking of half measures, or to propitiate the British by a display of timidity, is hard to conceive. Four months later the hesitating secretary changed his course.

The army with which General Harmar marched out of Fort Was.h.i.+ngton in the latter days of September, 1790, to strike the Indian towns, was a motley array. Pennsylvania had only partly filled her quota. She had sent forth subst.i.tutes, old and infirm men, and boys. The troops from Kentucky had seemingly brought into camp every old musket and rifle in the district to be repaired. There was a scarcity of camp kettles and axes. The commissariat was miserably deficient. To add to the confusion, the Kentucky militia were divided in their allegiance between a certain Colonel William Trotter and Colonel John Hardin. Hardin was fearless, but extremely rash; Trotter was wholly incompetent. In two or three days the Kentuckians were formed into three battalions, under Majors Hall, McMullen, and Ray, with Trotter at their head. Harmar, an old army officer of the revolution, who felt a contempt for all militia, was in sore dismay, for the hasty muster was totally lacking in discipline, and impatient of restraint.

In numbers, as Colonel Roosevelt observes, this army was amply sufficient to do its work. It consisted of three battalions of Kentucky militia, one battalion of Pennsylvania militia, one battalion of light troops, mounted, and two battalions of the regular army under Major John Plasgrave Wyllys, and Major John Doughty; in all, fourteen hundred and fifty-three men. There was also a small company of artillery, with three small bra.s.s field pieces, under Captain William Ferguson. But to fight the hardy and experienced warriors of the wilderness in their native woods, required something more than hasty levies, loose discipline, and inexperienced Indian fighters. Harmar was not a Wayne. The expedition was doomed to failure from the very beginning.

The details of the march along Harmar's trace to the site of the present city of Fort Wayne it is not necessary to give. The army moved slowly, and gave the British agents under Alexander McKee plenty of time to furnish the redskins with arms and ammunition. The star of the Little Turtle was in the ascendant. He was now thirty-eight years of age, and while not a hereditary chieftain of the Miamis, his prowess and cunning had given him fame. The Indians never made a mistake in choosing a military leader. He watched the Americans from the very time of their leaving Fort Was.h.i.+ngton and purposed to destroy them at the Indian town.

On the fourteenth of October the army reached the River St. Marys, described by Captain John Armstrong as a pretty stream, and Hardin was sent forward with a company of regulars and six hundred militia to occupy Miamitown. He found the villages on both banks of the St. Joseph deserted by the foe. The English and French traders had fled from the main Indian town on what is now known as the Lakeside sh.o.r.e of the St.

Joseph, and had carried away most of their valuables. John Kinzie and Antoine Laselle were among the refugees. The savages had burned the houses in their main village to prevent their occupation by the Americans, and had buried vast quant.i.ties of corn and vegetables in Indian caches. One hundred and eighty-five houses of the Delawares, Shawnees and Miamis, were still left standing in the neighboring villages. All of these were destroyed by the torch after Harmar's arrival.

On Sunday the seventeenth, the main army crossed the Maumee river from the south and encamped on the point of land formed by the junction of the St. Joseph and the Maumee. It was a beautiful spot covered by the Indian corn fields and gardens. The Kentucky militia in parties of thirty and forty, throwing aside all discipline, wandered about in search of plunder. The Indians were wary. They lurked in the woods and thickets, biding the time when they might destroy the army in detail.

Major McMullen now discovered the tracks of women and children in a pathway leading to the northwest. Harmar resolved to locate the Indian encampment and bring the savages to battle. On the morning of the eighteenth, Colonel Trotter was given the command of three hundred men, equipped with three days' provisions, and ordered to scour the country.