Part 26 (2/2)
Now, Mr. Layard, when replying to Mr. Cobden's speech, stated:--
”Her Majesty's Government had been accused of supporting the Chinese” (Manchoo) ”government against the Taipings. [Cries of hear, hear!] _He had pointed out that such was not the case._”--He then qualified this sentence by saying,--”Beyond our preventing the Taepings entering the treaty ports FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM, a course which we were compelled to take.”
First, Mr. Layard denies the interference declared by Lord Palmerston, and then he admits it, attempting to justify the policy by the sweeping a.s.sertion in capitals. Now, if the ministers were ”compelled” to prevent the Ti-pings entering the treaty ports, how is it that they were allowed to capture and occupy the treaty port of Ningpo? And now, to impugn Mr.
Layard's veracity, if the Ti-pings endeavoured to enter the treaty ports ”FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM,” how is it that they held the city of Ningpo for many months and did not destroy the least particle of property within its walls?
Mr. Layard's fault is a common one, only in an uncommon position. He knew that the policy of the Government was wrong, he knew that he was wrong himself, and besides occupying the pugnacious position of buffer or breakwater to the Foreign Office, he did not like to admit it. Poor Mr. Layard's situation must be an unpleasant one sometimes. He has unpleasant work to do. Undoubtedly he has an irritable temper and a sharp tongue, but it is rather unfortunate that he has a bad memory.
After stating that her Majesty's Government had not been interfering, ”such was not the case,” beyond preventing the destruction of the treaty ports, and affirming, ”the hon. gentleman the member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), the other evening, after condemning the policy of the Government, concluded by expressing a wish, that the Government would continue to defend the treaty ports and protect British interests in China. _That was what the Government had been doing all along._” After thus expressing himself, Mr. Layard declared, ”His hon. friend had really condemned a state of things in China _which no longer existed_.”
That is to say, Mr. Layard firstly stated that the hostilities waged against the Ti-pings were only to protect British interests; in fact, simply a defensive policy; and, secondly, he stated that such policy ”no longer existed.” Therefore, the natural deduction is that the British Government ceased to protect British interests at the treaty ports; such, however, was not and is not the case. The change that took place was the abandonment of the policy ”of supporting the Chinese (Manchoo) Government against the Taepings,” and the cessation of further aggressive military and naval operations against them. This was satisfactorily proved by the Premier's speech, who sadly contradicted his subordinate's defensive theory, as the following extracts from it will show:--
”Now, it is almost unnecessary, I think, for them” (the members who had spoken against his policy) ”to have expressed their opinion with regard to the expedition of Captain Osborn, and the employment of Major Gordon and others, because we have stated on former occasions that those Orders in Council under which those officers _were employed_” (by the Manchoo Government; how about Mr. Layard's ”such was not the case”?) ”have been revoked....
Therefore that policy is at an end.” (Now the following is a plain avowal of what Mr. Cobden brought his motion against.) ”I think that we were perfectly justified in the steps we took, because it is evident that the more we can contribute to the _internal cla.s.sification_ of China, the more the trade, which everybody agrees is the main and princ.i.p.al object of our going to China, the more that trade would flourish....
”If, by allowing a British subject _to enter into the service of the Emperor_ _of China_,[77] we have been the means of strengthening the hands of the Chinese Government, and enabling them to put down in any degree or diminish the scope of that rebellion, I say we should have been rendering not only a service to China, but promoting those objects to which alone our intercourse with China ought to be confined.[78] THOSE MEASURES HAVE FAILED, and I am sorry for it.”
After this expression of opinion it is by no means surprising to find the Premier declaring a little further on, in the same speech: ”I say it is the duty of this country to endeavour by _all the means_ in her power to extend her commerce.” Under _these_ circ.u.mstances it is not difficult to account for the intervention in China, and while Englishmen, who have any respect for the principles of right and justice, may regret their late lamented statesman did not say, ”by all the” righteous or legitimate ”means in her power,” they cannot fail to feel gratified that ”those measures have failed,” even though the originator of the measures, their late popular and jaunty minister, was ”sorry for it.”
Those measures have failed! it is true. They have failed miserably; they have failed to work good, but not to do harm. England has derived no benefit from them, China has received much evil. The schemes to Anglicise the Chinese army, navy, and civil service have failed; the efforts to extinguish rebellion against the Manchoo allies of the British Government (after the last war had rendered them quite powerless and docile _for the time being_) have likewise signally failed, for rebellion is more rife than ever: but ”those measures” have been famously successful in causing an enormous sacrifice of life, in injuring the cause of Christianity and civilization, and obstructing its progress in China for the present.
The failure of Lord Palmerston's policy came all too late for rectifying the evil already perpetrated. Within two months of his public announcement that the measures of his administration had failed, Nankin, the capital and the political strength of the Ti-pings, fell into the hands of the Imperialists. a.s.sisted, as we have described, by the powerful, though underhanded, British alliance, the Manchoo forces were enabled to capture or isolate every city beyond the capital. When Chang-chow-foo was taken by the Englishman Gordon, the neighbouring cities of Tan-yang, Kin-tang, &c., became untenable, and were consequently evacuated by their garrisons. Under command of Le-s.h.i.+h-seen, the s.h.i.+-w.a.n.g (the Chung-w.a.n.g's cousin, sometimes figuratively referred to as his ”brother”), were also the troops from Hang-chow (capital of Che-kiang), Kar-sing-foo, Yih-s.h.i.+ng, Li-yang, and many smaller places. Between these forces and Nankin the vast army commanded by the Imperialist Le-Futai now intervened, but their communication with the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, at the south of the Ta-hoo lake, and strongly garrisoned by several w.a.n.gs, was still intact.
Unable to advance against the superior forces of the enemy, much less to reach Nankin and endeavour to rescue it from the besieging army of Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, at least 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the s.h.i.+-w.a.n.g commenced what seems to have been a preconcerted retreat to the south. This occurred during the month of June.
Shortly afterwards, on the 19th of July, 1864, Nankin reverted to Manchoo authority. Thus the city which had been the capital of the great Ti-ping revolution and the head-quarters of its Government during more than eleven years, and which throughout that period had defied the strongest efforts of the rulers of the greatest and most populous empire in the world, succ.u.mbed at last through the unjustifiable hostilities and crotchety, bullying, meddlesomeness of the British Government or some of its members.
Again, soon after this overwhelming disaster, the Ti-ping forces at Hoo-chow-foo, after soundly beating their immediate adversaries, evacuated that city, and followed in the rear of the s.h.i.+-w.a.n.g's army, if they did not join it during the nearly simultaneous retrograde movement.
During the months of May, June, July, and August, 1864, the remnants of Ti-pingdom continued retreating to the southern provinces.
We must now consider for a moment the loss of Nankin. Of the two other events--the retreat of the s.h.i.+-w.a.n.g's army and the retreat from Hoo-chow--it is needless to say much, as these fugitives are well known to be safe, and at present advantageously disputing the enemy in the south of China.
The only records of the fall of the Ti-ping capital are those of Imperialist origin, and the lying proclivities of the whole body of Manchoo officials are too well known to need comment.
The following particulars are condensed from the Mandarin reports; they cannot be depended upon except to a very limited extent, and are, therefore, succeeded by a version I have deduced from almost every source of European information in China, comprising the Shanghae and Hong-kong press, and intelligence gathered for me by friends on the spot. Besides this, I have carefully traced the progress of events since the fall of Nankin till the present moment, and have found my former experience of much value in disentangling contradictory and confused statements.
The Imperialist accounts of the capture of Nankin are to the following effect:--
On the 17th of August news reached the besieging army that the Tien-w.a.n.g had committed suicide by swallowing gold-leaf. The Imperialists now pushed on their works more rapidly than before, and on the 19th of the same month, having run an enormous mine under the north-east gate, they fired it, and completely destroyed a portion of the wall, about one hundred and twenty feet in length. It is also reported that 68,000 pounds of powder were used in the explosion.
The Imperialists stated that they lost 5,000 killed and wounded in the breach, but, as the _North China Market Report_ observed, ”for this a.s.sertion there is not the slightest foundation, as on the day following the a.s.sault there remained no trace of a struggle.” In similar style they declared that their losses while storming the Tien-w.a.n.g's palace were immense, but, as the European journals say, ”This a.s.sertion is in like manner utterly false. The gate must have been forced with little or no difficulty, or quietly given up, and the very citadel of Taepingdom was in the hands of the enemy.”
Now, after having poisoned the Ti-ping king with gold-leaf, the enemy very curiously burned him to death.
Immediately after the capture of Nankin, Mr. Adkins, H.M. Consul at Chin-kiang, proceeded to the city on board M.M.S. _Slaney_, in order, as he expresses himself in his despatch to Earl Russell on the subject, ”to congratulate the Chinese (Manchoo) Commander-in-Chief on the auspicious termination of his two years' siege.” Well, the commander, or some of his followers, told the officious Mr. Adkins that when they made good their entrance into the city, ”they found that the palace of the Tien-w.a.n.g _had been burnt to the ground_.”
What about the ”immense loss” of the other version, in which they do such heroic deeds to capture the palace?
<script>