Part 23 (2/2)

Par. 3.--”_I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for the course I am about to pursue_; but in the absence of advice, _and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk_. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful. _But the rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body_, and it will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.”

Par. 4.--”_I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave, and the Government does not support the Imperialists._ I propose to cut through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang.”

Par. 5.--”If the course I am about to pursue meets your approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect to be well rebuked. However, _I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most conducive to the interests of our Government_.

”The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself.”

Par. 6.--”_The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some extenuating circ.u.mstances in his favour, for his action_; and although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an European governor.

”This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I will answer shortly, I am, &c.,

(Signed) ”C. G. GORDON.”

Par. 7.--”P.S. _If you would let the matter drop_, and make me responsible for my action in the matter, _I think it would be more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae_.

”C. G. G.”

NOTE.--The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to review.

_a.n.a.lysis of Major Gordon's Letter._

Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to resume _friends.h.i.+p_ and _alliance_ with the faithless and barbarous wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities?

Major Gordon's duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of partic.i.p.ation in the Soo-chow treachery and ma.s.sacre, he should have repudiated both.

What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took any _action_ to fulfil his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually had the unparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, to _arrange_ terms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or communication whatever, upon a friendly basis const.i.tuted a direct condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an unqualified separation from _all_ interests and future connection imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.

Par. 2. The a.s.sertion that Gordon _knew for a certainty_ that Burgevine intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following extract from the _Friend of China_, Shanghae newspaper (issue of September 29, 1864), which, being one of the princ.i.p.al organs among a population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls, may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst; moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause.

The article referred to states:--

”As for Gordon's a.s.sertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that upwards of 300 Europeans--[This estimate is supremely absurd.

During the whole time Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]--of no character, intended to join him. This being written in February last, we know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there thirty--the tenth of 300--Europeans in this quarter available for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an impression that he was writing truth when he made this a.s.sertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say he _may_ have been under an impression that he was writing truth.

We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why, Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the a.s.sistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well, moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-ping general. The a.s.sertion--yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called--did very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz.

Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there was no possibility of contravening it at the time.”

Besides the facts--incontrovertible to those acquainted with the case--in the above refutation of Gordon's ”reasons” for his fresh blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another strong argument may be proved against his veracity:--

1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-w.a.n.g, I am quite a.s.sured on this point. 2. Then with respect to the probable action of Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition than at the period of Gordon's statement, he would, consequently, never be disposed to join when its circ.u.mstances had become desperate. 3. As for the ”300 of no character,” mercenaries would certainly not espouse a failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more ”unprofitable”

than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These propositions cannot fail to damage the ”reasons” given by Gordon, because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon's ”reasons,” while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements.

The princ.i.p.al argument is the fact that Burgevine _did not_ join the Ti-ping, and the mythical ”300” were never more heard about.

Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon's letter seems to contain about the most severe condemnation of his ”reasons” that it would be possible to imagine. He states that ”he is open to very grave censure for the course he was about to pursue,” and that, ”knowing the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done,” he had made up his mind to ”run the risk;” that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government would approve the treachery and ma.s.sacre in which the Futai had involved him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.

With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades ”the rabble,” it is well noticed in the quotation from the _Hong-Kong Daily Press_, at the end of this a.n.a.lysis.

Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the rebellion cannot last ”six months;” without that mighty warrior's hostility, it would last ”six years.” Well, Bombastes did take the field, but the ”rebellion” still flourishes. It will be seen that the blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs his value at only twelve times that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the Ti-ping.

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