Part 14 (1/2)
The allied loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded, including three Europeans!
And this may be taken as a fair sample of all the succeeding battles with the British, French, and other disciplined and artillery-supplied forces. The Ti-pings have always done all that men of flesh and blood were capable of doing, but, without artillery to resist or reply to that overwhelming arm of the enemy (supplied freely from the British a.r.s.enals), their bravest and best fell to the iron storm, and the rest fled before it.
Very shortly after the above action, _General_ Burgevine became the victim of the scheming carried on between the mandarins and those British officials who desired to establish the Ward force as an English contingent. Having taken a large amount of specie from the house of Ta-kee (the banker to the force, and in the service of the Imperial Government), which he had been compelled to seize, _nolens volens_, in order to satisfy his men, who were in an open state of mutiny for their arrears of pay--pay, too, that seems to have been purposely kept lying idle at Ta-kee's house, probably with the cunning idea it would act (as in reality it did) upon the force, and produce some outbreak that could be taken advantage of to disgrace Burgevine and replace him by a British officer--he was dismissed from his command and a reward offered for his head by the Manchoo governor, or Fu-tai, of the province. The excuse given by the Mandarins for this transaction was that Burgevine had disobeyed orders, resisted lawful authority, and seized the money.
Some measure of this is very probably true; but whatever offence had been committed by him, the mandarins had themselves been the cause of it by their peculation, withholding the wages of the troops, and underhand intriguing. Probably the fact that Captain Holland, R.M., was installed as Burgevine's successor, may account for the events leading to the latter's dismissal.
The Imperialist Mandarins were only too eager to fall into the views of those who a.s.sisted them; the command of the once despised filibustiers'
force by Englishmen meant taking all the danger and responsibility of repelling the Ti-pings out of their own hands; consequently, availing themselves of the subserviency of British officers and authorities, they accepted Captain Holland as the commander of their disciplined troops, and the services of any others who were willing, and did not feel dishonoured by hiring themselves out to support such a cruel and corrupt cause. From this moment the active operations by British troops ceased, but Ward's old legion became a British contingent, and has continued one ever since. Backed up in all their operations against the Ti-pings by the presence of British troops to support them in case of reverse, and supplied with every munition of war, artillery, s.h.i.+ps, &c. they required, the various mercenary legions infesting the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo have managed (with the a.s.sistance of the ordinary Chinese and Manchoo soldiers, who alone outnumbered those of Ti-ping tien kwoh) to terminate the allied operations by driving the revolutionists from their once happy territory.
Soon after the command of the force had been a.s.sumed by Captain Holland, it met with the most severe defeat the Ti-pings have ever given it, and he resigned the appointment in disgust. The Order in Council permitting British officers to take military service with the Emperor of China having just reached Shanghae, Major Gordon, R.E., took command of the disciplined Chinese, and many other officers joined in the questionable service. From this time forth the British Government became committed to the success and responsibilities of the force; and for every atrocity perpetrated by the Imperialists, and for every life destroyed, are equally as much accountable as they were for the previous conduct of their own troops. Under such auspices, and with boundless supplies of all the material of war, similar necessaries being successfully prevented from reaching their antagonists, it is easy to appreciate the consequent course of events--continued triumph of the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries, and repeated defeat of the Ti-pings, already much weakened by the loss of many of their best troops, and diminished in their prestige from the result of the raids headed by Admiral Hope and General Staveley.
The worst feature attending the conversion of the mercenary legions into British auxiliaries, is the fact that Sir F. Bruce, the English Minister at Pekin, distinctly repudiated any such action; and yet his Government saw fit to sanction the arrangement when it was reported to them by Generals Staveley and Brown, who seem to have been foremost among the Shanghae local advocates of the system. _General_ Burgevine having proceeded to the Manchoo court at Pekin, stated his case, and was by them reinstated in his former command; receiving, also, the full approval of Sir F. Bruce. Upon his return to Shanghae, with an Imperial Commissioner to place him in position, the British generals and their colleagues in collusion with the Imperial authorities, disregarding the direct instructions of Sir F. Bruce, successfully opposed his reappointment, and managed to retain Major Gordon in command; by what means being best known to themselves.
We will conclude our notice of the establishment of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent with a few facts proving the singular, if not sinister, circ.u.mstance, that Sir F. Bruce, although a virulent enemy of the Ti-pings, has always carefully avoided authorizing the employment of British officers against the insurgents; and, in fact, has invariably disapproved such measures, as well as the movement of British troops to support and succour the contingents when in difficulty.
In a despatch to General Staveley, dated ”Pekin, March 12, 1863,”[36]
Sir F. Bruce, referring to the liberty granted to officers to enter the Chinese Imperial service, states:--”I should prefer that the military men employed by the Chinese Government should _not_ belong to the great treaty Powers;” and, with regard to British officers choosing to enter what the Press in China has termed ”the disgusting service,” he expresses the opinion that ”they will then bear a Chinese, and not a British character.” How _literally_ this belief has been fulfilled, the torture of Ti-ping prisoners captured by the Imperialists, the treacherous ma.s.sacre of the prisoners at Soo-chow, and the great loss of life which occurred, after cities were captured, sufficiently prove.
In a despatch dated ”April 10,”[37] Sir F. Bruce expresses his wish to the same officer that Burgevine should be reinstated to the command of the Ward force, and, speaking ”of the charges brought against him,”
states: ”I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor towards the Chinese drilled force.” If the Minister had added the names of a few foreigners as being privy to the ”intrigue,” he would have hit upon the whole truth. The Governor was jealous of the force as a Chinese one managed by foreigners, and successfully plotted, with no little ingenuity and shrewdness, to make it a foreign force officered by Englishmen, and countenanced by British authorities, who accepted all the responsibility entailed.
Upon the subject of Major Gordon's appointment to the coveted generals.h.i.+p of mercenaries, Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch to General Brown, dated ”June 11,” states:[38] ”It is not expedient that British officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the security of the ports where they are stationed.... I am further of opinion that, unless the force be properly const.i.tuted, and relieved from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Government, it will do no real and permanent good; and that the officer who commands it will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible with his professional reputation, nor what is due to the character of a British officer. Under these circ.u.mstances, I must _decline_ accepting the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers beyond Shanghae.... I have informed the Chinese Government of my objections to the employment of British officers in the field.”
Singularly enough, every word prophesied by Sir F. Bruce came to pa.s.s; the force became an instrument of evil in the hands of local Mandarins, to be used for their individual purposes, and then got rid of; the officers found their honour tarnished by complicity in deeds of blood and treachery; some were disgusted, but the Commander retained his position until he was _compelled_ to break up the force by orders from his Government. In a despatch to Earl Russell, dated ”October 13,” Sir F. Bruce declares:[39] ”It was reluctantly, and in deference to the naval and military authorities, that I consented to our a.s.suming the responsibility of defending the thirty-mile radius round Shanghae, and I spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute, so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius.” Yet members of Lord Palmerston's Government have had the hardihood to declare that the operations against the Ti-pings _were approved_ by Sir F. Bruce.
When Major Gordon's force was in danger, General Brown moved detachments of British troops to support him, and to garrison the captured towns and hold them against the Ti-pings. Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch upon the subject, dated ”October 6,”[40] clearly condemns his conduct in these words:--”If officers go into the Chinese service, we are not ent.i.tled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further than we should be if the corps a.s.sisted were commanded by a Chinese general. We are _not_ ent.i.tled to lend them artillery, or men to work their guns _on any pretext_!” In the very teeth of these distinct instructions, General Brown persisted in every measure they condemn. It was the favourite _modus operandi_ over again--the military or naval authorities acting in direct violation of orders, the disobedience being ultimately endorsed by the Government, and the apparently disobedient receiving praise and C.B.'s by way of punishment.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] With the schemes of the Bruce, Wade, Lay, &c., politicians.
[30] This is a startling contrast to what Mr. Bruce declared would be the ”worst” course to pursue.
[31] To completely prove the error of Lord Russell's a.s.sumption, and the slightness of its foundation, we will read the following extract from ”A Memorandum, dated October 15, 1862, addressed to Rear-Admiral Kuper, by Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, on resigning the Command of the Station.”
[Blue Book, June, 1862, to February, 1863, p. 111.]
”_The only question of real importance on which we are at variance with the rebels_, arose from their desire to possess themselves of Shanghae, and their capture of Ningpo, since retaken.
”On my first visit to Nanking, ... I effected an agreement with them, _but limited to the year_, that they should not approach it within 100 _li_ (thirty miles), _on the whole tolerably_ WELL KEPT _during that time_, but which they refused to renew on the occasion of my last visit.”
[32] Mr. Roberts, an American Baptist missionary already referred to in this work, joined the Ti-pings at Nankin about the end of October, 1860.
Of all missionaries in China he was the least qualified for such a position. Intolerant and bigoted to the Baptist dogmas, irritable, peevish, inconsistent, and vacillating--a man singularly illiterate, without stability of character or pleasantness of manner--his presence at Nankin did far more harm than good. His objections to every other Church, and to every other denomination of dissent except his own, went far to give the Ti-pings a dread of that diversity of doctrine among the British and Americans which they had always looked upon with surprise, thinking, as they did, that G.o.d could not be well served by those who were always quarrelling about it. The circ.u.mstances attending the advent and career of Mr. Roberts among the Ti-pings I have avoided as a worthless episode, but, as the facts of his indecorous flight from Nankin have been misrepresented, I think it necessary to notice the subject. Mr. Roberts accepted temporal rank under the Ti-pings, and by his unwise dogmatical obstinacy frequently provoked unpleasant discussion. During a dispute with the Kan-w.a.n.g, who had entertained him since his arrival, that chief had particular occasion to chastise a boy of the household. Mr. Roberts was so blinded by pa.s.sion, the idea that Europeans would never know the reverse of his statement, or some other reason, that, in a paroxysm of rage, he fled from the city, and sought refuge on board H.M. gunboat _Renard_, which happened to be lying in the port. By some obliquity of vision best known to himself, Mr. Roberts mistook the stick used by the Kan-w.a.n.g for a sword, and declared that his boy _had been_ brutally murdered. Not satisfied with this, although on the previous night he had retired to rest fully believing the surrounding people saints, the very next day, after his quarrel with the Kan-w.a.n.g, he awoke to find them howling sinners. The many years that he had praised the Ti-pings as holy men were, by a moment of pa.s.sion, forgotten, and within one day Mr. Roberts not only declared himself to have been deceived so long, but, for the act of one man, gave up the hundreds of thousands in the Ti-ping cause to fire and sword. We will just contrast the different statements of Mr. Roberts, one with the other, and then dismiss the subject.
This is an extract from the first, made on board the _Renard_:--
”Kan-w.a.n.g, moved by his coolie elder brother--literally a coolie at Hong-kong--and the devil, without fear of G.o.d before his eyes, did on Monday, the 13th instant (January, 1862), come into the house in which I was living, _and with malice aforethought murder one of my servants with a large sword in his own hand, in my presence_, without a moment's warning or any just cause. _And after having slain my poor, harmless, helpless boy, he jumped on his head most fiend-like, and stamped it with his foot._”
Now, at Canton, on the 3rd of April, 1862, when it was generally known that the above charge of murder was incorrect, Mr. Roberts retracted these words [Blue Book, 1862, p. 5], having reference to the Kan-w.a.n.g's form of baptism:--