Part 22 (1/2)

”There is no question about the future,” he said with decision. ”That is already settled. When the German advance was checked it was checked for good.”

”Then you do not believe that they will make a further advance toward Paris?”

”Certainly not.”

He went on to explain the details of the battle of the Marne, and how in losing that battle the invading army had lost everything.

It will do no harm to digress for a moment and explain exactly what the French did at the battle of the Marne.

All through August the Allies fell back before the onward rush of the Germans. But during all that strategic retreat plans were being made for resuming the offensive again. This necessitated an orderly retreat, not a rout, with constant counter-engagements to keep the invaders occupied. It necessitated also a fixed point of retreat, to be reached by the different Allied armies simultaneously.

When, on September fifth, the order for a.s.suming the offensive was given, the extreme limit of the retreat had not yet been reached. But the audacity of the German march had placed it in a position favourable for attack, and at the same time extremely dangerous for the Allies and Paris if they were not checked.

On the evening of September fifth General Joffre sent this message to all the commanders of armies:

”The hour has come to advance at all costs, and do or die where you stand rather than give way.”

The French did not give way. Paris was saved after a colossal battle, in which more than two million men were engaged. The army commanded by General Foch was at one time driven back by overwhelming odds, but immediately resumed the offensive, and making a flank attack forced the Germans to retreat.

Not that he mentioned his part in the battle of the Marne. Not that any member of his staff so much as intimated it. But these are things that get back.

”How is America affected by the war?”

I answered as best I could, telling him something of the paralysis it had caused in business, of the war tax, and of our anxiety as to the status of our s.h.i.+pping.

”From what I can gather from the newspapers, the sentiment in America is being greatly influenced by the endangering of American s.h.i.+pping,”

”Naturally. But your press endeavours to be neutral, does it not?”

”Not particularly,” I admitted. ”Sooner or later our papers become partisan. It is difficult not to. In this war one must take sides.”

”Certainly. One must take sides. One cannot be really neutral in this war. Every country is interested in the result, either actively now or later on, when the struggle is decided. One cannot be disinterested; one must be partisan.”

The staff echoed this.

Having been interviewed by General Foch for some time, I ventured to ask him a question. So I asked, as I asked every general I met, if the German advance had been merely ruthless or if it had been barbaric.

He made no direct reply, but he said:

”You must remember that the Germans are not only fighting against an army, they are fighting against nations; trying to destroy their past, their present, even their future.”

”How does America feel as to the result of this war?” he asked, ”I suppose it feels no doubt as to the result.”

Again I was forced to explain my own inadequacy to answer such a question and my total lack of authority to voice American sentiment.

While I was confident that many Americans believed in the cause of the Allies, and had every confidence in the outcome of the war, there remained always that large and prosperous portion of the population, either German-born or of German parentage, which had no doubt of Germany's success.

”It is natural, of course,” he commented. ”How many French have you in the United States?”

I thought there were about three hundred thousand, and said so.

”You treat your people so well in France,” I said, ”that few of them come to us.”