Part 15 (1/2)

which a Phoenician must have erected and dedicated to a Phoenician G.o.d, whom he wors.h.i.+pped on Attic soil apparently without let or hindrance.

The G.o.d's name is given as ”Ask.u.m-Adar,” a form which does not elsewhere recur, but which is thought to designate the G.o.d elsewhere called Sakon, who corresponded to the Grecian Hermes.[14319] Moreover, there is evidence of the Phoenicians having wors.h.i.+pped two other deities in their Attic abodes, one a G.o.d who corresponded to the Greek Poseidon and the Roman Neptune, the other the Babylonian and a.s.syrian Nergal. Among the lost orations of Deniarchus was one delivered by that orator on the occasion of the suit between the people of Phalerum and the Phoenician inhabitants of the place with respect to the priesthood of Poseidon;[14320] and a sepulchral monument at the Piraeus was erected to Asepta, daughter of Esmun-sillem, of Sidon, by Itten-bel, son of Esmun-sibbeh, high priest of the G.o.d Nergal.[14321] It appears further from the Greek inscription, edited by Bockh,[14322] that about this time (B.C. 390-370) a decree was promulgated by the Council {bonle} of Athens whereby the relation of Proxenia was established between Strato (Abd-astartus), king of Sidon, and the Athenian people, and all Sidonians sojourning in Attica were exempted from the tax usually charged upon foreign settlers, from the obligation of the Ch.o.r.egia, and from all other contributions to the state.

The power of Persia began about this time to decline, and the Phoenicians seem to have wavered in their allegiance. In B.C. 406 or 405 Egypt shook off the Persian yoke, and established her independence under a native sovereign.[14323] Soon afterwards, probably in B.C. 392 or 391, Evagoras, a Cypriot Greek, who claimed descent from Teucer, inaugurated a revolution at Salamis in Cyprus, where he slew the Phoenician monarch, Abdemon, who held his throne under Persia, and, himself mounting the throne, proceeded to reduce to subjection the whole island.[14324] Vast efforts were made to crush him, but for ten years he defied the power of Persia, and maintained himself as an independent monarch.[14325] Even when finally he made his submission, it was under an express stipulation that he should retain his royal dignity, and be simply bound to pay his tribute regularly, and to render such obedience as subject kings commonly paid to their suzerain.[14326]

In the course of his resistance to Persia, it is beyond question that Evagoras received a certain amount of support from Phoenicia; but the circ.u.mstances under which the support was given was doubtful. According to Isocrates,[14327] he equipped a large fleet, and attacked the Phoenicians on the mainland with so much vigour as even to take the great city of Tyre by a.s.sault; but Diodorus says nothing of the attack, and it is conjectured that the contagion of revolt, which certainly affected, more or less, Cyprus, Cilicia, Caria, and some of the Syrian Arabs,[14328] spread also thus early to Phoenicia, and that ”the surrender of Tyre was a voluntary defection.”[14329] In that case, we must view Phoenicia, or at any rate a portion of it, as having detached itself from Persia, about B.C. 390, sixty years before the final break-up of the Empire.

But the disaffection of Phoenicia does not become open and patent until about thirty years later. The decline of Persia had continued. In B.C.

375 an attempt to recover Egypt, for which a vast armament had been collected under Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, completely failed.[14330]

Nine years afterwards, in B.C. 366, the revolt of the satraps began.

First Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, renounced his allegiance, and defended himself with success against Autophradutes, satrap of Lydia, and Mausolus, native king of Caria under Persia. Then Aspis, who held a part of Cappadocia, revolted and maintained himself by the help of the Pisidians, until he was overpowered by Datames. Next Datames himself, satrap of the rest of Cappadocia, understanding that the mind of the Persian king was poisoned against him, made a treaty with Ariobarzanes, and a.s.sumed an independent att.i.tude in his own province. Finally, in B.C. 362, there seems to have been something like a general revolt of the western provinces, in which the satraps of Mysia, Phrygia, and Lydia, Mausolus prince of Caria, and the peoples of Lycia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, and Syria partic.i.p.ated.[14331] Then, if not earlier, Phoenicia openly threw in her lot with the disaffected;[14332] refused her tribute like the others, and joined her forces with theirs. Nor, when the rebellion collapsed, did she at once return to her allegiance.

When Tachos, native king of Egypt, in B.C. 361, having secured the services of Agesilaus and Chabrias, advanced boldly into Syria, with the object of enlarging his own dominions at the expense of Persia, he was received with favour by the Phoenicians, who were quite willing to form a portion of his empire. But the rebellion of Nectanebo forced Tachos to relinquish his projects,[14333] and the dominion over the Phoenician cities seems to have reverted to Persia without any effort on her part.

In this condition matters remained till about the year B.C. 351, when Sidon, feeling herself aggrieved by the conduct of the Persian authorities at Tripolis,[14334] where the general a.s.sembly of the Phoenicians held its meetings, boldly raised the standard of revolt against Persia under Tennes, or Tabnit II., and induced the Phoenicians generally to declare themselves independent. Alliance was at once formed with the Egyptian king, Nekht-nebf, or Nectanebo II., who sent a body of 4,000 Greek mercenaries, under Mentor the Rhodian, to the aid of Tennes.[14335] Hostilities commenced by the Phoenicians expelling or ma.s.sacring the Persian garrisons, devastating the royal park or paradise, and burning the stores of forage collected for the use of the Persian cavalry.[14336] An attempt made by two satraps--Belesys of Syria and Mazaeus of Cilicia--to crush the revolt was completely defeated by Tennes, with the aid of Mentor and his Greeks, who gained a decisive victory over the satraps, and drove the Persians out of Phoenicia.[14337] Cyprus then joined the rebels. The nine princ.i.p.al cities made common cause, expelled the Persians, and declared themselves free states, under their respective native kings.[14338] Ochus, the Persian king, was at last roused to exert himself. Collecting an army of 300,000 foot and 30,000 horse, supported by 300 triremes and 500 transports or provision-s.h.i.+ps,[14339] he proceeded to the west in person, determined to inflict condign punishment on the rebels, and to recover to the empire, not only Cyprus and Phoenicia, but also the long-lost Egypt.

Tennes, on his part, had done his best in the way of preparations for defence. He had collected a fleet of above a hundred s.h.i.+ps--triremes and quinqueremes,[14340] the latter now heard of for the first time in Asiatic warfare. He had strengthened the fortifications of Sidon, surrounding the town with a triple ditch of great width and depth, and considerably raising the height of the walls.[14341] He had hired Greek mercenaries to the number of six thousand, raising thus the number in his service to ten thousand in all, had armed and drilled the most active and athletic of the citizens, and had collected vast stores of provisions, armour, and weapons. But the advance of the Persian monarch at the head of so large a force filled Tennes with dismay and despair. Successful resistance was, he thought, impossible; and with a selfishness and a cowardice that must ever make him rank among the most infamous of men, he resolved, if possible, to purchase his own pardon of the King by delivering to his vengeance the entire body of his fellow-countrymen. Accordingly, after handing over to him a hundred of the princ.i.p.al citizens, who were immediately transfixed with javelins, he concerted measures with Mentor for receiving the Persians within the walls. While the arrangements were proceeding, five hundred of the remaining citizens issued forth from one of the gates of the town, with boughs of supplication, as a deputation to implore the mercy of Ochus, but only to suffer the same fate as their fellow-townsmen. The Persians were then received within the walls; but the citizens, understanding what their fate was to be, resolved to antic.i.p.ate it. They had already burnt their s.h.i.+ps, to prevent any desertion. Now they shut themselves up, with their wives and children, in their houses, and applying the torch to their dwellings lighted up a general conflagration. More than forty thousand persons perished in the flames. Ochus sold the ruins at a high price to speculators, who calculated on reimbursing themselves by the treasures which they might dig out from among the ashes. As for Tennes, it is satisfactory to find that a just vengeance overtook him.

The treachery which he had employed towards others was shown also to himself. Ochus, who had given him a solemn promise that he would spare his life, no sooner found that there was nothing more to be gained by letting him live, than he relentlessly put him to death.[14342]

No further resistance was made by the Phoenician cities. Ochus marched on against Egypt and effected its reconquest.[14343] The Cyprian revolt was put down by the Prince of Caria, Istricus.[14344] A calm, prelude to the coming storm, settled down upon Persia; and Phoenicia partic.i.p.ated in the general tranquillity. The various communities, exhausted by their recent efforts, and disappointed with the result, laid aside their political aspirations, and fell back upon their commercial instincts.

Trade once more flourished. Sidon rose again from her ashes, and recovered a certain amount of prosperity. She held the coast from Leontopolis to Ornithonpolis, and possessed also the dependency of Dor;[14345] but she had lost Sarepta to Tyre,[14346] which stepped into the foremost place among the cities on her fall, and retained it until destroyed by Alexander. The other towns which still continued to be of some importance were Aradus, and Gebal or Byblus. These cities, like Tyre and Sidon, retained their native kings,[14347] who ruled their several states with little interference from the Persians. The line of monarchs may be traced at Sidon for five generations, from the first Esmunazar, who probably reigned about B.C. 460-440, through three generations and four kings, to the second Strato, the contemporary of Alexander.[14348] The first Esmunazar was succeeded by his son, Tabnit, about B.C. 440. Tabnit married his sister, Am-Ashtoreth, priestess of Ashtoreth, and had issue, two sons, Esmunazar II., whose tomb was found near Sidon by M. de Vogue in the year 1855, and Strato I. Esmunazar II.

is thought to have died about B.C. 400, and to have been succeeded by his brother Strato, the Proxenus of Athens, who reigned till B.C. 361.

On Strato's death, his son, the second Tabnit--known to the Greeks as Tennes--mounted the throne, and reigned till B.C. 345, when he was put to death by Ochus. A second Strato, the son of Tennes, then became king, and retained his sovereignty till after the battle of Issus[14349] (B.C.

333).

6. Phoenicia in the time of Alexander the Great (B.C. 333-323)

Alexander's invasion of Asia--Preparations made to resist it, insufficient--What should have been done--Movements of Memnon in B.C. 333--His death--Paralysis of the Persian fleet--Attack on Phoenicia after Issus--Submission of all the cities but Tyre--Siege of Tyre--Fall of the city--Cruel treatment of the inhabitants.

The invasion of Asia by Alexander the Great, though it found the Persians unready, was by no means of the nature of a surprise. The design had been openly proclaimed by Philip in the year B.C. 338, when he forced the Grecian States to appoint him generalissimo of their armies, which he promised to lead to the conquest of the East.[14350]

Darius Codomannus had thus ample warning of what he had to expect, and abundant opportunity to make the fullest preparations for defence.

During the years B.C. 338 and 337, while Philip was still alive, he did do something towards organising defensive measures, collected troops and s.h.i.+ps, and tried to foment discontent and encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[14351] But the death of Philip by the dagger of Pausanias caused him most imprudently to relax his efforts, to consider the danger past, and to suspend the operations, which he had commenced, until he should see whether Alexander had either the will or the power to carry into effect his father's projects. The events of the years B.C. 336 and 335, the successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Boeotia,[14352] woke him from his fool's paradise to some sense of the realities of the situation. In B.C. 335 the preparations for defence were resumed. Orders were issued to the satraps of Phrygia and Lydia to draw together their troops towards the north-western corner of Asia Minor, and to take the offensive against the Macedonian force which had crossed the straits before Philip's death. The Persian garrisons in this quarter were strongly reinforced with troops of a good quality, drawn from the remoter provinces of the empire, as from Persia Proper, Media, Hyrcania, and Bactria. Notice was given to the Phoenicians to prepare a considerable fleet, and hold it in readiness for active service. Above all, Memnon the Rhodian was given a command on the Asiatic seaboard, and entrusted with a body of five thousand Greek mercenaries, which he was empowered to use at his discretion.[14353]

But these steps, though in the right direction, were quite inadequate under the circ.u.mstances. Everything that was possible should have been done to prevent Alexander from crossing to Asia in force. The fleet should not only have been commanded to hold itself in readiness, but should have been brought up. Four hundred or five hundred vessels,[14354] from Phoenicia, Cyprus, Egypt, Lycia, and Cilicia, should have been moved into the northern Egean and the Propontis, and have kept watch on every Grecian port. Alexander was unable to muster for the transport of his army across the Straits a larger number than 160 triremes.[14355] Persia should have met them with a fleet three times as large. Had Memnon been given from the first a free hand at sea, instead of satrapial power on land, it is quite conceivable that the invasion of Asia by Alexander might have proved as abortive an enterprise as the contemplated invasion of England by Napoleon.

As it was, the fleet of Persia, composed mainly of Phoenician vessels, did not appear in the northern Egean waters until some weeks after Alexander had transported his grand army into Asia, and fought at the Granicus, so that when it arrived it was of comparatively little service. Too late even to save Miletus, it had to be a tame spectator of the siege and capture of that important town.[14356] It was then withdrawn to Halicarna.s.sus, where its presence greatly helped the defence, but not to the extent of wholly baffling the besiegers.

Halicarna.s.sus fell, like Miletus, after a while, being entered from the land side; but the fleet saved the troops, the stores, and the inhabitants.[14357]

During the early part of the ensuing year, B.C. 333, while Alexander was engaged in conquering the interior of Asia Minor, the Persian fleet under Memnon at last took the aggressive, and, advancing northwards, employed itself in establis.h.i.+ng Persian influence over the whole of the Egean, and especially in reducing the important islands of Chios and Lesbos.[14358] Memnon was now in full command. Fortune smiled on him; and it seemed more than probable that the war would be, at least partially, transferred into Greece, where the Spartans only waited for Memnon's appearance to commence an anti-Macedonian movement. The presence of a powerful fleet in Greek waters, and Memnon's almost unlimited command of Persian gold, might in a short time have raised such a flame in Greece as to necessitate Alexander's return in order to extinguish it.[14359] The invasion of Asia might have been arrested in mid course; Alexander might have proved as powerless as Agesilaus to effect any great change in the relations of the two continents; but, at the critical moment, the sudden and unexpected death of the Rhodian chief cast all these hopes to the ground,[14360] and deprived Persia of her last chance of baffling the invader.

Thus, first by mismanagement and then by an unhappy accident, the Phoenicians were precluded from rendering Persia any effective service in the time of her great necessity. Wiser than Napoleon, Alexander would not contest the sovereignty of the seas with the great naval power of the day, and he even, when he once felt himself strongly lodged in Asia, disbanded his naval force,[14361] that so it might be impossible for disaster at sea to tarnish his prestige. He was convinced that Asia could be won by the land force which he had been permitted to disembark on its sh.o.r.es, and probably antic.i.p.ated the transfer of naval supremacy which almost immediately followed on the victory of Issus. The complete defeat of the great army of Codomannus, and its retirement on the Euphrates,[14362] left the entire seaboard of Syria and Phoenicia open to him. He resolved at once to take advantage of the opportunity, and to detach from Persia the three countries of Phoenicia, Egypt, and Cyprus.

If he could transfer to himself the navies of these powers, his maritime supremacy would be incontestable. He would render his communications with Macedonia absolutely secure. He would have nothing to fear from revolt or disturbance at home, however deeply he might plunge into the Asiatic continent. If the worst happened to him in Asia, he would have a.s.sured himself a safe return.

Accordingly, no sooner was the retreat of Darius upon the line of the Euphrates, and his abandonment of Syria, ascertained, than Alexander, after despatching a detachment of his army to Damascus, marched in person into Phoenicia.[14363] The Phoenicians were placed between two dangers. On the one hand, Alexander might ravage their territory, capture and pillage their cities, ma.s.sacre or sell for slaves the greater portion of their citizens, and destroy their very existence as a people; on the other hand, Darius held as hostages for their fidelity the crews and captains of their triremes, which formed a portion of his fleet, and had on board a large number of their chief men, and even some of their kings.[14364] It was impossible, however, to temporise; a choice had necessarily to be made; and when Alexander entered Phoenicia, the cities, in almost every case, decided on submitting to him. First Strato, the son of Ger-astartus, king of Aradus, who was serving on board the Phoenician contingent to the Persian fleet, went out to meet Alexander, and surrendered into his hands the four cities of Aradus, Marathus, Sigon, and Mariamme.[14365] Then Byblus, whose king was also absent with the fleet, opened its gates to the Macedonians.[14366] Next Sidon, mindful of her recent wrongs, sent envoys to invite Alexander's approach, and joyfully embraced his cause.[14367] Even Tyre nominally made submission, and declared itself ready to obey Alexander's commands;[14368] and the transfer of Phoenicia to the side of Alexander might have been made without bloodshed, had the Macedonian monarch been content to leave their island city, which was their true capital, and their pride and glory, unmolested. But Alexander could not brook anything that in any degree savoured of opposition to his will. When therefore, on his expressing a wish to sacrifice to Melkarth in their island town, the Tyrians declined to receive him within the walls, and suggested that his pious design might be sufficiently accomplished by his making his intended offering in Palae-Tyrus, where there was a temple of the same G.o.d, which was older (they said) and more venerable than their own, Alexander's pride was touched, and he became violently enraged.[14369] Dismissing the envoys with angry threats, he at once began preparations for an attack upon the town.

The Tyrians have been accused of extreme rashness and folly in not making an unqualified submission to the demands preferred by Alexander,[14370] but the reproach scarcely appears to be deserved.

They had on previous occasions resisted for years the entire power of a.s.syria, and of Babylon; they naturally deemed themselves only a.s.sailable by sea; their fortifications were of immense strength; and they possessed a navy much superior to any of which Alexander could boast at the time when he threatened them. Their own vessels were eighty in number; those of their kinsmen upon the continent were likewise eighty; Cyprus, which for centuries had been closely allied with them, and which was more than half Phoenician in blood, could furnish a hundred and twenty; Carthage, if she chose, could send to their aid, without any difficulty, as many as two hundred.[14371] Alexander had never been able to collect from the Greek states which owned his sway a fleet of more than one hundred and sixty sail; and, having disbanded this fleet, he could not readily have mustered from the cities and countries accessible to him, exclusive of Cyprus and Phoenicia, so many as a hundred.[14372] The Tyrians, when they took their resolution to oppose Alexander, had a right to expect that their kindred would either a.s.sist them, or at any rate not serve against them, and that thus they would be sure to maintain their supremacy at sea. As for Alexander's design to join the island Tyre to the continent by means of a mole, they cannot have had the slightest suspicion of it, since no work of the kind had ever previously been accomplished, or even attempted; for the demonstration of Xerxes against Salamis was not seriously intended.[14373] They naturally counted on the struggle being entirely by sea, and may well have thought that on their own element they would not be worsted. Even if the continental towns forsook them and went over to the enemy, why might they not do as they had done in Shalmaneser's time, defeat their unnatural countrymen, and retain their naval supremacy? Moreover, if they made a gallant fight, might not Persia be expected to second their efforts? Would she not attack Alexander from the flanks of Lebanon, intercept his supplies, cut off his foragers, and make his position untenable; the Tyrians could scarcely antic.i.p.ate that Persia would sit with folded hands, a calm spectator of a seven months'

siege, and do absolutely nothing.