Part 22 (1/2)
Colonel Dubois had not men enough to act efficiently at a distance; he did his utmost to economise his strength, and contented himself with impeding the works at the commencement with his artillery. This consisted, as we have seen, of--
Guns of various calibre 20 Twenty-four pounders 6 Howitzers 2 Mortars 4 Field-pieces 4 -- Total of ordnance 36 ==
A dozen stone mortars and rampart rifles formed the rest of the artillery. The a.r.s.enal contained also a certain supply of hand-grenades and fireworks.
At length, on the 20th of February, the batteries of the first parallel, to the number of ten, opened their fire. Each of them was armed with three guns; the first on the right (of the besieger), a ricochet, raked the covered way in front of the right face of the left bastion (of the besieged). The second swept the right face of the left demi-lune; the third, the left face of the middle demi-lune; the fourth, a ricochet, raked the covered way in front of the left face of the left bastion; the fifth swept the salient of the demi-lune; the sixth swept the right face of that demi-lune; the seventh, a ricochet, raked the covered way in front of the left face of the right bastion; the eighth, a ricochet, raked the left face of the demi-lune in the centre; the ninth swept the left face of the right demi-lune; and the tenth, a ricochet, raked the covered way before the left face of the right bastion. Four mortars were mounted between the batteries 4 and 5, 6 and 7. Captain Allaud did not doubt that the princ.i.p.al attack would be directed to the left bastion; he had the gorge of this bastion therefore retrenched during the night.
The six twenty-four pounders were placed in battery on the cavaliers of the bastions of the main defence, and well sheltered by traverses and blindages. These six pieces concentrated their fire on the fourth and fifth batteries of the besieger, and succeeded in silencing their fire about noon. Then they fired on battery No. 3, and before night silenced its three guns also. The guns in battery on the cavaliers of the bastions of the work were sufficiently well sheltered not to be in danger from the enemy's projectiles, to which they responded only feebly. But on the night of the 20th February the plans of the besieger had to be modified. At midnight the colonel ordered five hundred men to arm, put horses to his four field-pieces, whose wheels had been covered with rags and wool, and going out by the left demi-lune, he had two pieces placed on the right and two on the left of the road, two hundred yards in front of the glacis, and, on the road itself, the two howitzers, a hundred yards behind. Then he advanced resolutely towards the communicating boyau, between the third and fourth of the enemy's batteries, whose fire had been silenced. The posts offered but a slight resistance; the sappers fled, abandoning the trench, and were pursued to the batteries at the point of the bayonet.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 70.
THE THEORETICAL ATTACK ON VAUBAN'S WORK.]
The reinforcements then arrived, and the colonel drew back his men quietly, by echelons, to the guns. These then opened a simultaneous fire on the enemy with grape; and the five hundred men advanced once more, and brought back some prisoners, but seeing themselves again attacked by a superior force, fell back. This time the Germans did not go beyond their trenches, but contented themselves with a few volleys of grape at random. This skirmish did not last more than half an hour. At one o'clock A.M. Captain Allaud placed two hundred workmen at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards in front of the face of the left demi-lune No. 1, crossed by the road, to commence a trench at this point (Fig.
72). These workmen were protected by a post of one hundred men, and the two howitzers left on the road. This work consisted of two redans, with ma.s.sive traverse-shelters (see A). It was sufficiently advanced at daybreak to be able to shelter the workmen. When the enemy, who had begun his work again at the trench boyaux, B and C, in order to commence the second parallel, perceived at early dawn the new work executed by the besieged, he hastened to bring the fire of battery No. 1 upon it, for batteries 2, 3, and 4 had not yet been remounted. But from the cavaliers of the bastions No. I. and V., six guns in two hours silenced this battery, No. 1, in spite of the besieger's batteries, 5 and 6. The day thus pa.s.sed in cannonading, and the Germans could not continue their boyau of communication, B, which was raked by one of the howitzers which the besieged had placed behind the great traverse of the salient of the redan on the left. They had to modify the direction of the trench, and follow the dotted line, _a b_.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 71.
THE THIRD PARALLEL AND CROWNING OF THE COVERED-WAY.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 72.]
During the night of the 21st of February, Captain Allaud completed his redans, enlarged the traverses, and set up blindages for seven guns; and in the morning the work presented on the inner side the appearance (Fig. 73). The gun on the left, A, directed its fire on battery No. 1; the two guns on the left return, B C, on battery No. 4; the pieces D E, of the right return, on battery No. 1; and the two pieces F G, of the right face, on battery No. 6.[61] But this did not hinder the bastions V., VI., I., II., and III. from firing on these batteries.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 73.]
That same night, however, the besieger had been able to start his second parallel; but he was evidently embarra.s.sed on his right, and was modifying his plan on this side. He seemed to be giving up an attempt on the place by the salient of bastion No. 2, and was working actively on his left.
During the 22nd of February, the besiegers could not restore battery No.
1, because the besieged kept up a constant discharge on this point. They succeeded only at nightfall in remounting their guns in batteries 2 and 3; and having determined the range before night, discharged the b.a.l.l.s of two guns on the salients of the redans. About midnight Colonel Dubois sent out five hundred men, who, traversing the western ridge of the plateau, attacked battery No. 1. A few moments afterwards, a second troop of four hundred men attacked the two batteries, 2 and 3; and the besieger having been dislodged from battery No. 1, the first troop of the besieged came and formed in line of musketry between battery No. 2 and the salient of the redan on the right; while fusiliers posted at the trench, A,[62] and one of the howitzers, swept the ground as far as battery No. 1, in order to hinder the enemy from taking the sortie in the rear.
This operation was completely successful; not only were the works of battery No. 1 damaged, and the three guns with which it was armed (the carriages belonging to these guns, as stated above, were already broken), but around batteries 2 and 3 there was a very sharp struggle which resulted in the Germans being repulsed, the guns rendered useless, the munitions scattered, and the gabions and earth-bags thrown down. A body of a hundred men had also been posted by the colonel on the slopes of the plateau to hinder the enemy from making his way along that escarpment to attack the work A.
Under favour of this sortie, two hundred workmen had been placed by Captain Allaud along the western ridge of the plateau, to raise a new work, B C D (Fig. 74), which consisted of three new redans presenting three batteries each for two guns, traced _en cremaillere_, and separated by strong traverses. By the morning of the 23rd of February the first battery, B, was sufficiently strong to resist projectiles.
Moreover, this battery could not be immediately attacked by battery No.
1, which was abandoned, and whose guns were useless. Forty-eight hours at least were required to enable the besieger to restore batteries 2 and 3. Batteries 4 and 5 must change their embrasures to direct their fire on this battery B, and only batteries 6 and 7 could sweep the redans A and B. Now these batteries, 6 and 7, received the fire of the two guns of the right face of the right-hand redan, of the two guns of the right face of the bastion II., of the two guns of the left face of the bastion III., and of a gun of the right face of the demi-lune 2. Every moment it was necessary to repair the gabionades, and replace the earth-bags; and since the beginning of the day the enemy had had ten artillerymen killed, and as many more wounded, in these two batteries.
The German engineer, who had so methodically traced the successive operations of the siege, was evidently embarra.s.sed by the strategy of the besieged. It was in his opinion barbarous, absolutely contrary to rules, and showed an ignorance of, and contempt for the art of fortification, which must end in disaster.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 74.]
During the night of the 23rd of February the Germans were finis.h.i.+ng their second parallel, except in the north-west side. They gave the eastern branch of this parallel an inclination towards the south,[63]
and commenced the batteries 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Battery 13, of two guns, was to rake the work A.
But that same night Captain Allaud terminated the second battery, C, started the third, D, had an intrenchment made on the ridge of the plateau, and raised an epaulement, E, to sweep the slopes, with a good parados.
If the besieged succeeded in finis.h.i.+ng and arming these works, the batteries 11 and 12 of the besieger would be taken obliquely, the boyaux of communication would be for the most part raked, and the siege would have to be recommenced. The German general was in a very bad humour, and blamed the commander of the engineers, who, with his plan on the table, endeavoured to show that his siege had been duly arranged, according to all the rules of the art; that the ignorant temerity of these Frenchmen could not be foreseen, and that if the Germans acted with vigour, they would be made bitterly to repent of thus advancing wedge-like on the flank of the attack; that such a thing had never been seen, and that if they concentrated three batteries on this salient in the air, they would soon crush it.
On the morning of the 24th of February two twenty-four pounders, placed in battery on the left face of bastion VIII., opened fire on batteries 13, 14, and 15 of the besieger, which they raked, and damaged greatly before they were completely finished. This time the German general proceeded from ill-humour to pa.s.sion and even menaces; so that the unfortunate officer of the engineers, repairing to these batteries after a violent scene to raise traverses and rectify the line, which he a.s.serted had not been executed conformably to his instructions, had his head broken by a splinter from a gun-carriage.
The direction of the engineering was then given to a young officer, who, after a conference with General Werther, modified the plan of the attack. During the 24th of the month there was scarcely any firing on either side, the besieger firing only at long intervals. The French garrison, which was anxious to economise its munitions, scarcely replied, but worked with ardour at perfecting its advanced works on the west.