Part 18 (1/2)
When he saw the moment arriving at which he could effectually intervene in the affairs of Germany--a part of which had its eyes directed to France, and was only waiting for a signal from the Louvre to escape from the incessant rivalries of the princes and from religious contentions--he took measures not only to facilitate a successful intervention abroad, but to strengthen his frontiers and establish depots and centres for provisioning his troops. a.s.sured of the good-will of the Swiss and tranquil as regarded Italy--thanks to the alliances he had formed in that Peninsula--and wis.h.i.+ng to act at once in the east, and on the Pyrenean side, he turned his attention to the defences of Roussillon and of the line which unites Burgundy with Champagne.
Henry IV. had been engaged in partisan warfare; but then he had only his own life at stake. As a sovereign he thought it his duty not to run risks; and before launching into the great enterprises he had in view, and which might change the face of Europe, he wished to put fortune on his side as far as possible. For more than six years, in concert with Sully, he had lost not a day or an hour in preparing for France, which had been a prey to civil war and invasion at the end of the sixteenth century, a future of the n.o.blest order, and which might have secured to it the most honourable destiny, if the hand of an a.s.sa.s.sin had not in a single day destroyed hopes founded in a wise policy and the most thoughtful foresight.
This prince knew by experience that in war a check is always possible, even when fortune is, or seems to be, entirely on our side, and that the talent of a general consists in his ability to discover new resources after a reverse. Success in arms is secure in proportion to the foresight exercised in preventing a first reverse from becoming a disaster. Henry IV. therefore set about preparing a good line of retreat and supply in the rear of the army, which he was intending to lead in person towards the east. He put in a state of defence the towns and important strategic points from Chalons-sur-Saone, pa.s.sing through Beaune, Dijon, Langres, along the course of the Haute-Marne, and from Langres to Chaumont, Saint-Dizier, Chalons, Reims, Laon, Peronne, and Amiens. Verdun and Metz had been visited by him, with a view to examining their defences. At Metz he had ordered works of considerable importance. The town of La Roche-Pont was comprised in that portion of this line of defence which lay between Dijon and Langres. The engineer Errard de Bar-le-Duc had been entrusted with these operations, beginning with Chalons-sur-Saone. He had, we may observe, merited the confidence reposed in him by the king, for he had given proofs of considerable ability and ingenuity.
Errard de Bar-le-Duc made use of the ancient walls, considering them suitable for defence at close quarters; but he constructed works outside which would command the country, and force the besieger to commence his operations at a distance of one thousand or one thousand two hundred yards. The system of boulevards was still maintained, but these, instead of presenting only an isolated obstacle, defended each other by crossing their fire, and were, in fact, true bastions.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 59.--THE BASTIONS OF ERRARD DE BAR-LE-DUC.]
The three great round towers on the north of the _cite_ of La Roche-Pont were then much dilapidated. Errard had them terraced, and then surrounded them with earthworks with walled escarpments. Towards the plateau fronting the north he had a great tenaille constructed with a double ditch and ravelin. Fig. 59 gives the plan of the _cite_ after the operations planned by Errard. Besides the works just mentioned, indicated at A, B, C and D, the king's engineer raised the bastions, E, F, G, H, and I, which crossed their fires, and whose orillons masked small pieces designed to flank the old ramparts.
Most of the old towers were lowered and terraced to receive cannon. The ancient castle, of which little more than the donjon and some outbuildings remained, was surrounded by a bastioned enclosure, with a tenaille on the town side.
The lower town, towards the west, though reduced to narrow dimensions, continued nearly in the condition already described. As to the upper town, after the conflagration of the last siege, it had been rebuilt in a very indifferent style. Under Francis I., the abbey had been secularised, and its ancient church was served by a Chapter. The old stone bridge near the outflow of the rivulet still existed, and at O was a second wooden bridge connecting the two sh.o.r.es. The bridge, P, had fallen into ruins and had not been rebuilt.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 60.]
From the bastion, B, to the river, and from the bastion, D, to the pool, Errard built two fronts, K and L, _a cremailleres_,[50] to command the slopes of the plateau on the right and left, and to hinder an a.s.sailant from occupying a position on the east and west flanks of the _cite_.
For the time, these works appeared strong, and the axiom in fortifications, ”What offers itself as a defence ought to be defended,”
was already pretty generally adhered to. Fig. 60 gives the northern work which was destined to sweep the plateau, and to render difficult the approach to the cite on this its very accessible side. This work consisted of a ravelin, A, whose height above the level of the plateau was not more than six feet; next of a first tenaille, B, with orillons, eighteen feet above the plateau, and a second tenaille, C, three feet above the level of the tenaille, B. Two bastions, D and F, enveloped the two great towers, G and H, which were terraced. The platforms of the latter rose three feet above the platforms of the bastions. The gate, I, of the fourteenth century, had been preserved and repaired, and the curtains, K, terraced to receive cannon.
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 61.]
The road pa.s.sed over the right face of the ravelin, and thence at right angles to the centre of the tenailles. A wide fosse, E, protected the exterior works, and a second fosse, L, the curtain of the second tenaille.
Fig. 61 gives a sketch in perspective of the bastion, F.[51] No use, however, was made of these defences till about thirty years after their construction.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 50: In plan not straight, but broken by a series of returns each in advance of the other.]
[Footnote 51: Of the general plan, Fig. 59.]
CHAPTER XIV.
_THE SIXTH SIEGE._
About the beginning of July, 1636, France, governed by the Cardinal de Richelieu, saw its northern frontier invaded by the too celebrated Jean de Weert, with an army of Hispano-Belgians, to which the empire had added a numerous body of cavalry, composed of Poles, Hungarians, and Croats. These allied troops advanced into Picardy, and Paris was, for the moment, antic.i.p.ating a siege; but the enemy were delayed by the siege of Corbie, and, having taken this town, in which they left a garrison, they retired for fear of being taken in rear by the Dutch.
The French army soon came in its turn to besiege and retake Corbie. At the same time, an attack on Burgundy had been concerted by the Imperial troops, while the army of Conde was besieging Dole, which was holding out for the Spaniards. But the Imperialist army having had to wait long for the necessary reinforcements, did not start at the same time as that of the Hispano-Belgians, and did not cross the frontier till the 22nd of October; which gave time for the French troops employed at the siege of Corbie to pa.s.s into Burgundy, to a.s.semble the troops of the province, and to receive the reinforcements sent to the Prince de Conde by the Duke of Weimar and the Cardinal de la Valette. Being unable to raise the siege of Dole, the Imperialists directed their course to the Saone, which they pa.s.sed, and sent a body to seize the little _cite_ of La Roche-Pont, the capture of which would give them a centre for attacking Dijon or Langres, and enable them to isolate the Prince de Conde. The town of La Roche-Pont was but scantily furnished with artillery, and had a garrison of only a thousand men, when the Imperialist forces presented themselves before it on the 2nd of November. They numbered six thousand men, and brought with them thirty pieces of ordnance, of which twelve were of large calibre. They were commanded by Galas, and were expecting to take the place in a few days, for the captains knew by their scouts that the garrison was weak, scantily provisioned and unprepared for an attack.
However, Count Rantzau had been sent by the French generals to re-victual Saint-Jean-de-Losne and La Roche-Pont, and to place an experienced captain in the latter. The count arrived before La Roche-Pont two days previous to the Germans; he left a thousand men there, with Rincourt as governor--ordnance munitions and a convoy of provisions; but having only two or three thousand men left him, he thought himself not in a condition to attack the Imperialist army, and therefore marched to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, which he entered on the 2nd of November, in the teeth of the Germans, who were already beginning to invest the town. Immediately on his arrival before La Roche-Pont, Galas summoned the place, offering the garrison the most favourable conditions, and the inhabitants respect for their persons and property.
The envoy of the Imperialist general was sent back as he had come, and attack and defence were respectively prepared for.
Rincourt's nature was one of those which are apparently nonchalant and cold, fond of repose, and never appearing discomposed; he was of middle height, with a little embonpoint. His pale face, blonde hair, and dull blue eyes, would be deemed no indication of a soul of firm temper, but rather of one quite dest.i.tute of elasticity--an _esprit blase_, or at least an impa.s.sive disposition. Rincourt had however given proof of his ability on many occasions, and Count de Rantzau, who knew him well, esteemed him highly. On leaving him in the place, he had given him these simple instructions--”Hold out here to the last man: for the rest act as you judge best.” To Galas's messenger, Rincourt had replied: ”My instructions are to defend the place, and I shall defend it.”
Rincourt, while making the arrangements necessary for the defence, and enquiring into the stores of provisions, was aware that if he allowed himself to be shut up at once in the town, the enemy would have made a breach in less than a week, and the taking of La Roche-Pont would be at most an affair of fifteen or twenty days. The stock of provisions scarcely admitted of so long a resistance; and at this time of the year it was difficult to add to them, even if the place were not closely invested. The governor resolved, therefore, to take the initiative and to hinder the enemy's approach-works to such an extent, that however favourable the weather might be, the enemy would have difficulty in maintaining his position.